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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates indirect reference in German mathematical
discourse and the principles of its interpretation. It is specifically
concerned with the author's indirect reference to himself and to the
immediate and general audience.
The need to include pragmatics in the analysis of scientific discourse
is expressed in the thesis and the rhetoric of science is discussed from
the pragmatic perspective. The restricted context of scientific
communication and the pragmatic characteristics of the latter are
described.
The predicate frame model, based on the principle of verb centrality and
employing the notion of prototypical participants, is introduced. The
indirectly referring expressions are interpreted in terms of the model.
A restricted set of prototypical participants is analysed and further
related to the concept of the context-specific discourse roles. It is
argued that in the restricted context of mathematical discourse,
indirectly referring expressions, traditionally labelled as impersonal
or indefinite-personal, are assigned definite-personal interpretations.
Further, the reference-supporting and reference-switching function of
deictic elements is discussed in terms of the predicate frame model and
discourse roles. Particular emphasis is put on reference switching in
the case of indefinite and generalised pronouns. The hierarchical
structure of the system of indirect reference is described and commented
on.
Finally, the possible applications of the model are presented and some
lines of further research are suggested.
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SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF IMPERSONAL
CONSTRUCTIONS
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Research
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to analyse the
linguistic means available in German for expressing self-reference in an
indirect way, i.e. not with the 1st Person Singular sentences. The
main interest is focused on the mutual dependency between the syntax of
a clause and its semantic interpretation when some participants in the
event described by the predicate are not expressed.
For a variety of reasons the speaker may leave the acting participant in
an event (including himself) not specified overtly. The acting person
may be unknown to the speaker, known but irrelevant for the purpose of
communication, not important for some other reason, or known but the
speaker prefers not to reveal his or her identity. The latter may
result from e.g. tact or politeness; it may also result from a desire
to deceive the hearer or to avoid committing oneself or others to
something.
Focusing on the motivation for omitting explicit reference to oneself
(i.e. self-reference) allows us to limit the possible reasons. The
research presented here has been carried out on texts from the domain of
scientific (mathematical) communication, where the phenomenon of
apparently impersonal narration is particularly common. Moreover, the
justification for this type of self-presentation in science seems to be
more uniform than in everyday communication. By analysing data from
written and spoken German mathematical texts we examine ways of
impersonal, i.e. indirect, self-reference in science and describe them
using a model of relations between syntactic, semantic and pragmatic
components of discourse (described in detail in Chapter 3). In this
thesis we argue that for predicates related to prototypically human
activities, referents can be correctly inferred even if only indirect
means of referring are used.
In this chapter we look at some syntactic means available in language
that permit the acting participant to be demoted or removed from the
clause structure. The most common means of demoting the agent-like
argument, available in Indo-European languages, are:
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1. impersonal constructions, including:
a. personal and impersonal passives;
b. pseudo-reflexive expressions with originally non-reflexive
verbs and objects promoted to the subject position;
c. subjectless (e.g. infinitival) constructions;
2. nominalisation, i.e. replacing constructions with action verbs
and prototypically human subjects by expressions with a copula
verb and an adjective or noun as a predicative.
The impersonal self-presentation may also be achieved by means other
than those of syntax, for example by pronoun shift. We describe this
phenomenon in Chapter 4. There, we examine also the changed linguistic
representation of the communicative situation, i.e. representation from
which the direct reference to the speaker has been removed. In this
context we analyse shift in form and function of other deictic
elements.
In Chapter 2 we review the literature on linguistic research related to
languages for specific purposes and indicate current tendencies in that
field. We further discuss the necessity of including a pragmatic
component in analysis of language phenomena in scientific
communication.
In Chapter 3 we present the predicate frame model. This model is used
in the thesis to describe the mechanism of semantic interpretation when
the syntactic structure does not fully specify the arguments of the
predicate.
In Chapter 4 we discuss the methods employed to analyse the linguistic
data. The analysis of the data from the written and spoken German
mathematical texts is presented and commented on.
Chapter 5 summarises the research carried out on the impersonal
presentation of self and indicates the most striking examples of the
functional dependency between different levels of language analysis.
In this last chapter we also point out some other areas of linguistics
where application of the predicate frame model might be fruitful.
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1.1.2 Terminology
In this subsection we introduce the terminology that will be used
throughout this and the following chapters.
Lack of explicit reference to the participants involved in an event
results in syntactic constructions which, in the Indo-European
linguistic tradition, were labelled as impersonal. Cross-linguistic
studies show that most languages tend to represent events and actions in
an 'egocentric', 'speaker oriented' way, i.e. to give human agents a
special syntactic status (cf. e.g. Benveniste [1948], [1966], Slobin
[1982]).
In Indo-European languages, expressions used to refer to human agents
typically coincide with the grammatical subjects of action verbs. And
since Subject-Verb-Object is the neutral word order in most of these
languages, the grammatical subject further coincides with the topic {we
adopt here the definition of topic as the first constituent in the
clause, often corresponding to the 'given' information, i.e. to 'Datum'
- c.f. Halliday [1967], Benes [1967]). We may therefore assume that an
unmarked, neutral syntactic construction, used to describe an action
performed by the speaker, would have a self-referring expression as a
subject {in topical position) of an action verb (we leave the discussion
of semantic verb types till Chaper 4 where this question is analysed for
real data). In German, the unmarked choice would be a fully specified
active clause. We shall investigate how the argument of the verb,
co-referential with the subject of an active clause, may be demoted to
another position in the clause or simply omitted, and how this demotion
affects the semantic interpretation of that clause.
In the research on impersonal constructions, confusion is caused by an
inconsistent use of terminology. Since any description or analysis of
this phenomenon naturally involves taking account of the syntactic as
well as semantic level of representation, notions such as subject/agent
and object/patient are used indiscriminately. To keep these two
different levels of linguistic analysis clearly separated, we first
define the notions used for their description.
For the semantic analysis we adopt the predicate-argument approach and
use the notion of arguments or participants. For monovalent verbs, i.e.
those associated with one participant only, no further distinctions are
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needed. The (semantic) selectional restrictions on the entity that
can associate with the predicate depend on the semantics of the verb. We
discuss this problem in more detail in Chapter 3; here we merely
introduce the notion. For polyvalent verbs, a further distinction
between 1st, 2nd and 3rd participant is necessary, the indices
corresponding to the intrinsic, language specific ordering of the
arguments associated with the verb. In Indo-European languages, the
1st argument is commonly the one denoting the instigator of an action
for action verbs, or the recipient of the action (in most cases an
action of transmitting something) for verbs of 'getting1, 'receiving'
etc., cf. Kirsner [1976]. It seems quite natural that for actions
involving humans in two different roles, languages have verbs that can
present both as 1st participants. This is the case for the reversible
actions of buying and selling, teaching and learning, giving and
receiving etc. For our purposes, it is the lst-argument-position that
will be of most interest. The intrinsic ordering of the remaining
participants is language specific and can be established through
syntactic tests (e.g. passivisation of the second object). We return to
this question in Subsection 3.2.3.
In this thesis we shall concentrate on syntactic changes caused by
removing the 1st participant of the verb from the clause perspective,
which may correspond to the promotion of other participants to the
syntactic subject position. This observation, however, cannot be
generalised since there is no obligatory equivalence between the 1st
participant and the grammatical subject of an unmarked sentence.
Before we move on to this question we shall define the notion of subject
as it will be used throughout this thesis.
The term subject, as it is employed here, belongs to the level of
syntactic description and as such must be defined in purely syntactic or
syntactic and morphological terms. Traditionally, however, subject was
given a broader definition. It was defined as the nominal constituent
of a sentence (in the Nominative case), where the sentence was seen as
built up of two major constituents - the subject and the predicate. The
subject denoted a concrete or abstract thing about which the predication
was made, and it also determined the morphological shape of the
predicate. The concepts of subject and predicate originally come from
Aristotelean logic, where they have been defined in a multidimensional
way, i.e. comprising aspects of thought, speech situation and existence
of objects in the real world. The confusion caused by combining
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formal, ontological and referential aspects into one notion may be
illustrated by specifying various types of subjects in theories of
grammar. We find the following terminology: overt and implicit
subjects, formal or empty subjects of impersonal verbs, logical subjects
that do not necessarily correspond to grammatical subjects etc. Subject
understood as 'what the sentence is about' (German Satzgegenstand) may
also be identified with the notion of theme, thus bringing the
communicative aspect into consideration.
The complex nature of the linguistic concept of subject may be seen as
resulting from the way the syntactic relations within the sentence
developed, since that process must have involved both semantic and
pragmatic factors. Analysing syntactic functions and changes in word
order in some languages, von Seefranz-Montag [1983 ] points out the
importance of the relative frequency with which verb arguments were
topicalised and its function in the transition from the purely semantic
to semantic-syntactic role of cases in Proto-Indo-European (cf. also Li
(ed.) [1976]).
The necessity of separating the formal characteristics of grammatical
subjects from other aspects of their description has been advocated by
many authors and was carried out e.g. by Fries [1952]. Fries defined
sentence constituents in grammatical terms without relating them "to the
actual facts of a situation in the real world" (p. 175). Subject was
for him merely the technical name for the Class 1 word (i.e. roughly
speaking a nominal phrase) that is structurally bound with a Class 2
word (i.e. verb). The clear separation of structural characteristics
was, however, for Fries a goal in itself and he did not relate the
formal syntactic representation to other levels of language
description.
A consistent attempt to describe the relations between notions from
three levels of representation has been carried out by Hagege [1984] who
distinguishes between three points of view with respect to 'subject' -
the morpho-syntactic, the semantic-referential and the
communicative-hierarchical (French "enonciative-hierarchique").
Stressing what has already been pointed out in generative grammar (cf.
Chomsky [1965 ] p. 96) - that subject and predicate are relative notions
(i.e. that we may merely talk about subjects of in relation to a certain
predication) - he further notes that the analysis of the complex notion
of subject must comprise all three aspects but not confuse them. Thus,
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the morpho-syntactic definition as an ultimate goal of the subject
description is rejected. Hagege points out that:
"le point de vue morphosyntaxique n'est pas le seul a
retenir, qu'il est relie aux deux autres, et que, comme
l'indiquent les fleches, le terme autre que le predicat
correspond le plus souvent a un patient ou a un agent du
point de vue 2 (i.e. semantic-referential - M.S.), et a un
theme du point de vue 3 (communicative-hierarchical - M.S.).
Ces deux notions sont associees (quand el les ne sont pas
confondues avec elle) a la notion de sujet." (pp.352-353)
Following Hag^ge (1984], we limit subject to the morpho-syntactic level
of description, defining it as that nominal phrase which is bound to the
predicate by a language specific structural and mutual relationship. We
discuss some details of this relationship in Section 1.2 in this chapter
and in Chapters 3 and 4. The current literature on the questions
related to subjects, topics and participant roles is very rich. A summary of
the problems in that field is presented by e.g. Li (ed.) [1976 ],
especially in papers by Keenan, Li & Thompson and Givon included in the
selection. An interesting presentation of typological research on the
subject is given by Handwerker [1984].
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1.2 Basic Properties and Functions of Impersonal
Constructions
1.2.1 Introduction
In the rest of this chapter, we comment on the properties of syntactic
constructions considered as impersonal, pointing out their common
features and indicating how they have been analysed in past linguistic
research. We begin by examining the notion impersonal and its relevance
to impersonal self-reference in scientific texts. In this section we
review the two syntactic approaches to impersonal constructions - one
that sees their functions as object promotion, the other as subject
demotion. The following section describes the traditionally recognized
types of impersonal constructions, with examples from different
languages.
1.2.2 Object Promotion
Constructions such as passives or pseudo-reflexives may be considered as
means of promoting the object arguments of polyvalent verbs to the
syntactically and communicatively more prominent subject/topic position.
The view that the change in subject position is the major characteristic
of impersonal constructions owes much to the emphasis put on the logical
distinction between subject and predicate in traditional syntactic
analysis. Consequently, the possibility of promoting direct objects to
the subject position, was treated as 'the major function of passive or
reflexive constructions. This corresponds to the tradition widespread
in linguistics, according to which active is the norm while passive and
passive-like expressions are seen as paraphrases or transformations of
the active that do not contribute anything new to the propositional
meaning. Wackernagel ([1920] p. 135), referring to previous studies on
the Indo-European passive-forms (in particular to the research by von
der Gabelenz [1861]), is a typical representative of this approach in
German linguistics:
"Mit Recht hat man das Passiv als einen Luxus der Sprache
bezeichnet, weil der passivische Satz nichts anderes
darstellt als die Umkehr des normalen aktivischen Satzes".
Von der Gabelenz (ibid.) considered the passive merely an additional
linguistic form expressing the same content as the active. However, he
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believed that this was worthwhile investigating, "wie der menschliche
Geist ... darauf gefuhrt sein mag, diese Form der Darstellung zu wahlen
und ihr in der Sprachbildung einen EinfluB einzuraumen" (p. 455). (We
must note that he did not consider sentences with transitive verbs, but
without agent expressions, as passives.) Brugmann & Delbriick [1926]
pointed out that the major motive of the development of the passive in
the Indo-European languages was "das Bedurfnis dem Objekt eines Vorgangs
eine zentrale Stelle im Satz anzuweisen und es dam it psychologisch liber
die Agensstellung zu erheben" (p. 701). In German, the passive,
without any doubt, developed later than the active (cf. Tschirch [1969]
pp.30n). This secondary character of the passive in German is
demonstrated by morphological studies that clearly show its irregular
and defective character. The big variety of 'passive-like'
constructions gave rise to linguistic studies on the common 'meaning' of
different variants of German passive and its equivalents (cf. Glinz
[1962], Erben [1980], Pape-MUller [1980] - on the passive in general cf.
Stein [1979] and Siewierska [1984]). However, the assumption that
passive and the impersonal passive-paraphrases are just means for
promoting the object constituent to the topical, i.e. syntactically and
communicatively prominent position, fails to provide a common coherent
explanation for this linguistic phenomenon. One reason for this
failure is obviously the fact that some of those constructions do not
allow for object promotion, but preserve the same functional sentence
perspective, i.e. the same topic-comment structure or thematic
organisation. (We shall use the notion of the functional sentence
perspective, introduced in the Prague School by Mathesius and further
developed in the Neo-Prague-School by Benes [1967] and Firbas [1964].
This concept is more suitable for the description of German than the
purely positional notion of topic.) The subjectless impersonal
constructions, on the other hand, simply lack grammatical subjects.
The first case may be illustrated with the German constructions with the
indefinite-personal pronoun man, commonly considered as a passive
paraphrase, where there is neither reverse ordering nor reduction of
verb arguments. The two examples in (1):
(1) a. Die Leute schreiben die meisten Briefe zu Weihnachten
'people write most letters at Christmas'
b. Man schreibt die meisten Briefe zu Weihnachten
'one writes most letters at Christmas'
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have the same number of expressed verb arguments and these arguments
have the same linear order. The 'corresponding' passive in (2):
(2) a. Die meisten Briefe werden zu Weihnachten geschrieben
'most letters are written at Christmas'
b. Die meisten Briefe werden (*von man/lvon den Leuten)
zu Weihnachten geschrieben
'most letters are written (*by one/?by people) at
Christmas'
has the number of overtly expressed arguments reduced by one. The
argument corresponding to the subject of (la and b), i.e. the 1st
participant of the verb schreiben has been omitted, being replaced by the
former Accusative object.
A clear example of the second type of construction that fails to promote
objects to the subject position, are impersonal passives of
intransitive verbs in German. Since there are no other participants
involved, the subject position remains empty. Alternatively, if no
particular circumstances of the event are specified and topicalised, it
is filled in by a dummy es. The 'object promotion' approach cannot
explain the fact that not all intransitive verbs allow the impersonal
passive, which is possible only for events where human activities are
described (cf. Brinkmann [1971] pp. 204n). Thus, to determine whether
passive is allowed for a particular verb, it is necessary to refer to
the semantics of the subiect of the active clause.
1.2.3 Subject Demotion
It is appealing to consider object promotion in the passive as a process
necessarily involving simultaneous subject demotion. In fact in some
languages (viz. English) passive involves the simultaneous promotion of
an object up the hierarchy of syntactic relations and demotion of the
subject down the hierarchy (including the possible subject deletion).
Since the English passive involves both processes, it is legitimate to
ask (cf. Comrie [1977]) whether in other languages these two phenomena
exist independently, i.e. whether there are languages with passives
involving only object promotion or only subject demotion.
There is no linguistic evidence for the existence of passives with
object promotion only. A possible exception may be noted in North
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Russian. A detailed analysis of North Russian passives is given by
Timberlake [1976]. However, the examples quoted by Timberlake involve
the Russian locative equivalent of the predicate to have and therefore
the 'promotion only' interpretation would not be appealing. The author
gives the two locative phrases a distinct interpretation, considering
the one as a possessor and the other as agent.
Comrie [1977] refers to the constraint proposed in Relational Grammar
(the so called Relation Annihilation Principle - for discussion cf.
Johnson [1977]) and based on English, that there can be no rules of
spontaneous demotion of the subject, since, in English, any subject
demotion is a direct result of the promotion of the object. The sentence
cannot have two subjects and therefore the old subject must be removed,
i.e. deleted or demoted. Comrie concludes that, consequently, such
demotion is not spontaneous, but he also points out that the evidence
from English does not allow us to infer that there are no languages with
a spontaneous demotion of the subject. In fact, there are several
languages with impersonal passives having subject demotion or deletion
but lacking object promotion. The examples given in Comrie [1977]
include Spanish, Latin, German, Dutch, Polish, Welsh and Finnish
impersonal passives. The impersonal passive of German monovalent verbs
has been recently analysed from the functional point of view in Latzel
[1984 ]. He considers the German werden + Partizip II constructions as
means of nominalisation of the action expressed by the verb, i.e.
presentation of the action as agent-independent (German "losgelost vom
Tater" - p. 49). The agent, even if not expressed, is still
"mitgesetzt", i.e. understood as being involved. Kirsner [1976] presents
an analysis of Dutch 'impersonal passives', considering them as means of
an 'absolute backgrounding' of agent-like participant. Kirsner points
out that, although the 'high participant' (the one "which ranks
comparatively high on a scale of relative contribution to the bringing
about of the event named by the verb" p. 389) is not focussed, i.e. not
foregrounded as grammatical subject, he is still involved in the event
and seen as a contributor to the occurrence named by the verb. For
English, the syntactic, semantic and pragmatically-referential
constraints on the 'agentless passive' have been analysed by Weiner &
Labov [1983], who investigate the conditions that determine speaker's
choice of the agentless passive or generalised active (i.e. use of the
generalised pronouns they, you, we). The distinction between different
types of impersonal constructions is based on speaker's/hearer's
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knowledge of the referent (± definite, ± specific) and on the
distribution of the given/new information, i.e. on the pragmatic
function assignment. Also for Chafe [1970], passive has simultaneously
two functions: one is to allow the verb to occur without the 1st
participant (agent or experiencer), the other is to change the order of
the given/new information. This approach derives from the research
carried out in the works of linguists from the Prague School, e.g.
Firbas [1964] and from Halliday [1967].
The backgrounding of the 1st participant for some pragmatic reason and
the syntactic reflexion of this backgrounding, i.e. the subject demotion
or deletion seem to be a common characteristic of Indo-European passive
and impersonal constructions. Thus, to provide an adequate
interpretation of a given impersonal construction it is necessary to
account for the pragmatic aspects of the discourse to which it belongs,
and to consider the pragmatic choice as having a primary influence on
the choice of syntactic structure.
This insight is now generally recognized and has become a basic
assumption of some linguistic studies, especially in discourse analysis.
It is, however, relatively new in the form-oriented linguistic research
prevalent in British and American linguistics, although it has an
unbroken tradition in basic language description. It has a longer
tradition in Germanic linguistics and we close this section with some
remarks on Indo-European passives by Weisgerber.
In his [1963] study, Weisgerber clearly indicates that the only
consistent approach to this question would be to look for a key to the
problem of passive "in der geistigen Rolle des Subjekts" (p. 247). He
continues:
"Wenn man nach etwas sucht, was alien aufgezeigten
passivischen und passivahnlichen Verfahrensweisen in echter
Opposition gemeinsam ist, so findet sich das in der
Auschaltung des agierenden
Tater-subj ekts . Das gilt ebenso fur die
passivischen Formensysteme wie fur die unperson 1ichen
Passivbildungen, wie fur die reflexiven Verfahrensweisen, wie
fur das Einsetzen des Dativobjekts an die Subj ektstel le Liber
bekommen, wie fur ein gelangt zur Auffiihrung, wie schlieSlich
sinngema'6 auch fur ein unperson 1 iches man. Was alien
gleicherweise zukommt, ist offenbar die sprachliche Fassung
von Geschehnissen ohne herausgehobenen Urheber." (p.247).
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And further:
"Die nicht aktivischen Sprachmoglichkeiten, die sich in
verschiedener Weise und in verschiedenem Umfang ausbiiden,
setzen nicht an der Lage des 'Behandelten' an, sondern an der
Stellung des 'Handelnden. . Aktiv-Passiv, das ist also
hier verbale Forderung nach einem aufweisbaren 'Tater', dort
Belassen (oder ZurUckversetzen) des Agens, des
'tatsachlichen' Tragers, unter den anders geordneten
Komponenten eines Geschehens, das man nicht auf einen daftir
Verantwortl ichen zuruckfiihren will." (p. 248)
Instead of the term 'passive', Weisgerber uses the notion
"taterabgewandte Diathese", since this corresponds better to the
abstract meaning of passive and passive-like constructions. He also
notes that, because of the basic properties of Indo-European personal
verbs, a fully agentless presentation is impossible.
We come back to this question in Chapter 3, where we analyse the
representation of semantic roles associated with personal predicates.
The fundamental concept of agents being potentially inferrable from the
inherent properties of these predicates is discussed there in more
detai1.
Most studies of impersonal constructions start with an analysis of their
form (syntax) and, by means of syntactic analysis, arrive at a semantic
interpretation. This research does not attempt to give a full
description of impersonal constructions available in German. We begin
by defining a specific pragmatic condition to be satisfied (i.e.
non-direct self-reference of the speaker in scientific communication)
and we analyse data looking for syntactic options that meet the
requirements imposed by pragmatics (Chapter 2). In the following
section we present some general types of impersonal expressions and
analyse their syntax and semantics.
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1.3 Illustration of the Influence of Language Type on the Syntax
of Impersonal Constructions
1.3.1 Impersonal Verbs
In this subsection we discuss the common syntactic means of demoting the
1st participant of a verb from the clause perspective. We start by
examining the notion impersonal and its applicability to constructions
with demoted 1st participant.
The term impersonal, as not referring to any particular person, not
influenced by personal feeling or having no existence as a person, was
originally used in traditional grammar to refer to verbs which, due to
their semantics, could not occur with personal subjects. Those verbs,
the impersonalia, usually describe events or processes where natural
forces are causally involved. Some examples are given in (3):




According to the syntactic requirements of a particular language,
determined among other factors by the degree of inflectionality, these
verbs may either occur with a 3rd Person Singular pronoun (English,
German, French) or without any overt subject at all, but with the
inflection of the 3rd Person Singular, as in Latin and in Slavic
languages.
However, RAIN verbs, commonly treated as a standard example of
impersonal verbs, exhibit different syntactic properties in Slavic
languages cf. (4).
(4) a. Deszcz pada literally 'rain falls'
b. Dozd' idet literally 'rain goes'
In the Polish construction in (4a) and in the Russian (4b) we have a
grammatical subject noun deszcz/dozd' ('rain') and the construction must
be treated as syntactically 'personal'. In Polish, however, there
exist two parallel constructions - one which is truly 'impersonal' (i.e.
no subject is possible) and one which is 'personal', as illustrated
in (4). They are put together in (5).
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(5) a. Deszcz padaZ 'rain fell' personal
b. PadaZo 'it fell' impersonal
c. Pada 'it falls' personal/impersonal
The example in (5c), where the Present Tense is used, allows for both
personal and impersonal interpretation since no Gender distinction is
made. An identical construction for this verb is also used in
Ukrainian. However, it is not possible for the Russian example
in (4b):
(6) a. Dozd' sel 'rain went' personal
b.*Slo *'it went' impersonal
c. Dozd' idet/*idet 'rain goes' personal/*'it goes' impersonal
where the subject noun cannot be omitted. On the other hand, an overt
subject in (4a) or in the German example in (7b):
(7) a. Es regnet
'it rains'
b. Regen regnet auf das Dach
'the rain rains on the roof'
may be considered as pleonastic or redundant, since the verb may also
occur without it (i.e. with the impersonal pronoun es in German or with
impersonal verb inflection in Polish) and the meaning of the proposition
remains unchanged. The communicative value of (5b,c) must still be
inferred either from the non-linguistic context (that is from the
knowledge about the weather outdoors) or from general knowledge of the
world (i.e. typically rain, possibly snow in the winter, assuming
European weather conditions). Both the impersonal (subjectless) and
the personal (having an overt lexically specified subject) constructions
of that type may co-occur with a wide range of adverbs of manner, time
and place.
If verbs which, because of their semantics, naturally belong to the
class of impfjesonalia (e.g. verbs describing weather phenomena), occur
with lexically specified subjects, as in (7b) or in (8):
(8) a. Dann schneiten ihm immer neue Gaste ins Haus
'then new guests kept pouring into his house'
b. Vater hat machtig wegen unseres Zuspatkommens gedonnert
'father flew into great rage because we came too late'
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c. Schwefel regnete auf Sodom und Gommorha
'sulphur rained down on Sodom and Gommorha'
»
we recognize the metaphorical shift in meaning. A similar metaphorical
shift takes place if nouns like rain, snow, snow flakes etc. occur not with
their prototypical verbs (or semantically neutral verbs, e.g. verbs of
location to lie, to cover etc.) but rather with verbs without any
impersonal subject restrictions or with verbs typically associated with
human or animate 1st participants. This is illustrated in (9):
(9) a. The snow blocked the road
b. Deszcz uszkodzi/ nawierzchniq drogi
'rain damaged the surface of the road'
c. Die Schneeflocken tanzten in der Luft
'the snowflakes danced in the air' .
The Duden Grammatik der deutschen Sprache [1984 ] adds to that confusion
with a comment:
"Neuerdings scheint es bei den 'Gerauschmachern' in Theater,
Fernsehen und Film auch nicht ungewohnlich zu sein, da0 man
Redewendungen wie Ich donnere/regne usw. gebraucht." (p. 556)
In this case, however, it would be more appealing to say that ich donnere
and es donnert are not different uses of the same lexical item but rather
that we have two different lexical entries in the lexicon for the form
donnern .
Since for the analysis of scientific discourse we are interested in
impersonal constructions rather than in semantically impersonal verbs of
the type to rain or to snow, we concentrate here on the discussion of the
semantic and syntactic status of the German impersonal pronoun es and
its equivalents in other languages.
1.3.2 Impersonal Constructions with es and its Equivalents in
Other Languages
The discussion of the syntactic status of es in impersonal constructions
necessarily leads to an area of language description which the
Duden-Grammatik [1984 ] refers to as "ein der umstrittensten Kapitel der
Sprachwissenschaft" (p. 555).
There has been a controversy as to whether it is possible to assign es
any semantic content. Es may be seen as an empty, dummy subject,
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purely formal Platzhalter (to secure the 'verb-second' word order) etc.
However, it has also been argued that es in German is an expression of
an unknown force, "Ausdruck fur das Wirken unperson 1icher, irrationeler
oder mythischer Krafte". The Duden Grammatik continues:
"Aber auch wer mythologischen Deutungen gegenuber skeptisch
ist, durfte doch fur nachstehende Wendungen (as e.g. es regnet,
es nieselt etc. - M.S.) die Ansicht zulassen, da0 mit dem 'es'
eine nicht naher zu bestimmende Ursache des Geschehens
angezeigt wird". (p. 555)
If we compare the communicatively equivalent constructions in different
languages, even within the Indo-European family (cf. examples in (3) and
(4)), it is apparent that languages may present those mysterious
impersonal forces with different degrees of explicitness. While
English, German or French use lexically meaningful, autosemantic verbs,
combined with pronouns it/es/il respectively, to mark the impersonal
character of the verb, Slavic languages often condense the lexical
content in the noun which is then accompanied by a semantically neutral
verb, expressing merely the kind of movement involved.
In the Polish (4a) we have a fixed construction with a restricted set of
possible subject nouns: {deszcz ('rain'), inieg ('snow'), grad
('hail')}. The situational context makes the choice of one of them
highly predictable. As a consequence, the construction may be used
without any subject noun and may become 'secondarily' impersonal. Note
that in the Present Tense the morphological distinction between
'personal' and 'impersonal' use (reflected by the Masculine or Neuter
Gender marking respectively) cannot be made - no subject NP is required
because of the deictic character of the Present Tense impersonalia. This
means that Slavic languages do not necessarily present the weather
phenomena as results of 'unknown forces'; they may present the rain
(snow etc.) as proper syntactic subjects, assigning them weak actor
character.
Yet another way of viewing the weather phenomena may be found in e.g.
Southeastern Pomo, an Indian language in North America. The equivalent
of English it's raining is given in (10):
(10) seen scekit
where the meaning of the verbal stem /see-/ may be represented as
'objects are distributed on a surface' (the features 'source' and
'motion' are not present) and /sce+n/ has the nominal interpretation
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'rain' (-n is an absolutive suffix forming adjectives from certain
verbs, such as those indicating quality, as well as states of action
nouns) (cf. Moshinsky [1974] pp. 78 and 87).
A proper impersonal character is found in the Latin (3d), where the verb
does not allow any noun to be a subject. Similar constructions are
found in Slavic languages such as Polish, Ukrainian or Russian, cf.










'it is getting cloudy' .
In the examples above, no subject nouns are acceptable, possibly with
the exception of (11c,e). One could think about the noun niebo ('sky')
being the possible subject (omitted for the same reason as deszcz in
(5c)), since the constructions in (12) may also occur:
(12) a. Niebo Sciemnia sip
'the sky is getting dark'
b. Niebo chmurzy sip
'the sky is getting cloudy' .
This interpretation, however, fails, because in some contexts niebo
cannot be assumed to be a proper, elliptically omitted subject. For
instance (13), where two clauses are coordinated, would be marked as
ungrammatical under the coreferential reading. Since it is a correct
coordination, the coreferentiality of the implicit subject of the first
clause and the explicit subject of the second clause (i.e. niebo) is not
acceptable.
(13) Sciemni/o sip i niebo pokry/o sip gwiazdami
'it got dark' impersonal 'and the sky covered itself with
stars' personal with a Neuter subject .
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The analogous examples from Ukrainian are given in (14), quoted from the




'it is getting dark'
c. Nini xmarit'sja
'it is getting cloudy today' .
They are accompanied by a following comment: "In all the above
examples, the English sentences have 'it' for their subjects. In no
case does 'it' refer to any real subject, therefore it is known as a
grammatical subject only. In Ukrainian the grammatical subject is not
expressed" (p.241). In section 1.1.2, we commented on the
inconsistent use of the notion of subject illustrated in the above
passage.
What is surprising about Polish and equivalent Ukrainian constructions
of the type illustrated in (11 c,d,e) and (14c) is the fact that they
are reflexive. They have a reflexive pronoun si<> or a reflexive suffix
- sja, but there is no constituent that could serve as its antecedent.
Since the analysis of reflexivisation traditionally assumes the mutual
dependency of two co-referential nouns within a syntactic construction
this would suggest the existence of a subject in an impersonal
construction.
The existence of any (whether grammatical or logical) subject in
sentences labelled by traditional grammar as subjectless, is, however,
counter-intuitive for a native speaker. Even if, historically, those
constructions could have been associated with some kind of argument,
this association path is now blocked and if we were to describe the
predicate argument structure of the sentences in (11) or in (14), we
would have a null argument predicate P (0) (on the subjectless
construction in Polish compare GoZqb [1975] and Brajerski [1978]).
The apparently subjectless constructions in Slav languages pose yet
another difficulty for the formal description and this is because of the
possible WH-complement question as in (15):
(15) a. Dzi& rano bardzo pada/o
'it was falling badly this morning' impersonal
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b. Co pada/o?
'what was falling?' impersonal;
Deszcz czy bnieg?
'rain or snow?'
c. Deszcz/PadaZ deszcz/*PadaZo deszcz
'rain/rain was falling/*it was falling rain' impersonal .
That fact may be explained by the existence of two parallel
constructions, as in (5a,b), one of which is 'personal' with a subject
noun, the other one 'impersonal'. The verb padad ('to fall') in this
construction is not contextually autonomous and that is why we should
probably consider (5a) as a primary construction. Consequently, (4b)
is only 'secondarily impersonal', i.e. built up in an analogous way to
the other impersonal constructions. This impersonalisation is possible
because of the fact that the verb padad allows only for a small set of
nouns to appear in the subject position (we could call them perhaps
'cognate subjects'). The limited number of possible subjects makes the
choice of subject highly predictable in most contexts. This, in turn,
makes it possible to leave the subject unspecified, which could lead to
the secondary impersonalisation of the already 'subjectless'
construction. On the other hand, the parallel fully specified
construction, and the choice of the 1st argument from the set of (rain,
snow, hail) enables the speaker to ask the question What is falling?. The
question whether the WH-construction is impersonal or personal remains
open. Apparently the verb shows impersonal inflection, as in (15a). It
could, however, be argued, that it is simply the neuter WH-word co
('what') that requires the personal neuter inflection on the verb, and
this argument is appealing.
Looking at the Polish examples, the question arises, at what level of
representation does the subject exist, if at all? We must assume that
it is not (or does not have to be) the level of syntactic description,
to account for yet another type of subjectless reflexive construction as
in the Polish example in (16):
(16) Litowano sip nad nim
'there was a feeling of mercy for him'
impersonal-reflexive .
Here, the morphological form of the predicate (historically Nominative
Singular of the passive past participle in the Neuter gender, cf.
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Klemensiewicz et al. [1955] p.432) rules out any possible ellipsis of
the subject (no agreement in Person and Number is possible). This
construction, derived historically from the subjectless passive and
present also in some other Slav languages (e.g. in Russian and
Ukrainian) is now interpreted as active, referring to an "indefinite,
but close to 3rd Person referent", Klemensiewicz et al. [1955] p. 435.
However, postulating the existence of an underlying subject in a deep
syntactic representation, which is deleted after the agreement feature
assignment takes place, glosses over the interesting but awkward facts
of surface syntax in many languages (cf. Miller [1985] p.28).
Coming back to the controversial status of the German es, we have to
note that it does not occur only in that one type of syntactic
construction. The origins of the dummy subject es in Germanic
languages have been studied by Brugmann [1917] and the manifold
functions of es have been analysed in most studies of the German syntax.
At least three different functions, and, in fact three different types
of es, characterized by different semantics and/or different syntactic






a. es wird gearbeitet
'there is work going on'
b. es steht ein Baum im Odenwald
'there stands a tree in Odenwald'
c. es donnert
'it's thundering'
d. es geht ihm gut; er bringt es we it
'he is fine'; he'll do well'
e. es freute ihn, da/3 du kommst
'he was very glad that you are coming'
f. er bedauerte es, nicht kommen zu konnen
'he regreted not being able to come'
g. das Buch ist dick und es liest sich schwer
'the book is long and it reads with difficulty'
Schatte [1982] p.42
Both es0 and es1 in (17) are, according to Schatte, semantical ly empty
and do not refer to anything in the extra linguistic reality. They are
only "innersprachlich logisch notwendig" as Schatte put it. However,
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even these semantically homogeneous (i.e. semantically empty) types of
es do not behave in a syntactically uniform way. While es0 in (17a,b) may
appear only in a sentence initial position (Vorfeld), with a finite verb
taking the second place {Mittelfeld), this does not apply to es1 and es2.
If anything else takes the sentence initial position in (17a,b), as in
(18a,b), the es disappears:
(18) a. dort wird gearbeitet
'work is going on there'
b. dort steht ein Baum im Odenwald
'a tree stands in Odenwald' .
It must, however, be present in (19a,b,c) no matter what word order is
chosen:
(19) a. jetzt donnert es schon wieder
'now it is thundering again'
b. ihm geht es gut
'he is fine'
c. we it bringt er es
'he'11 do well' .
We may note here, that in (19a and b) es is a grammatical subject, while
in (19c) it is a direct object. It does not have any real referent but
it has a constituent status. Thus, has a syntactic function, es0,
on the other hand, has according to Schatte "satzordnende Funktion" in
(17a) and "pragmatisch-kommunikative Funktion auf illokutiver Ebene" in
(17b) (cf. also Engelen [1975]). We discuss this distinction in more
detail in Chapter 3 (Subsection 3.2.2).
In (17e,f and g) es refers to another constituent of a clause or to a
clause as a whole. It takes over its semantics, i.e. is not
semantically empty, but does not have any constant semantics either.
Thus it is used as a pro-form for another constituent and as such has
constituent status itself.
1.3.3 Syntax and Semantics of Impersonal Construction
Any description of impersonal constructions poses so many difficulties
because it involves both semantic and syntactic phenomena, and the
mapping from one to the other level of representation is not always
one-to-one. The authors of Grundziige einer deutschen Grammatik [1981],
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a recent grammar of German, make the following comment on the
relationship between semantics and syntax:
"Die Strukturen der semantischen Ebene bilden, obwohl eine
isomorphe Abbildung nicht besteht, die Grundlage der
Strukturen der syntaktischen Ebene." (p.500)
In this thesis we adopt the approach represented by the authors of
Grundzuge... , typical of descriptions of German syntax since the time of
Humboldt and developed also in the current theory of German grammar.
According to this approach the verb takes the central position in a
clause. The complex lexical meaning of the predicate determines the
semantic structure of the sentence, since it is the "Basis der ...
Bedeutungsbeziehungen zwischen dem Verb and seinen Gefugepartnern im
Satz, wie sie durch die Valenzstrukturen verkorpert und in den
syntaktischen Strukturtypen des Satzes realisiert werden" (ibid.).
Hohle [1978] presents a similar point of view. He discusses the notion
of lexical dependency and states:
"Der Begriff der lexikalischen Abhangigkeit, der mit dem der
lexikalischen Selektion zusammenfalIt, ist offenbar genau der
Abhangigkeitsbegriff, der fur die sog. Valenzlehre relevant
ist, dort aber iiberaschenderweise weitgehend als unklar
empfunden wird und zu ausgedehnten - und weitgehend
ergebnislosen - termino logischen Erorterungen An la/3 gegeben
hat." (p.19)
Hohle continues:
"Es liegt auf der Hand, da/3 aus der (jedenfalls
termino logischen) Gleichsetzung der lexikalischen
Abhagigkeit mit einer 'Abhangigkeit' hinsichtlich
allgemeiner syntaktischer Regularitaten, wie sie sich in
alien mir bekannten Abhandlungen zu sog. Dependenzgrammatik
dokumentiert, Konfusion entstehen mu/3." (ibid.)
He further associates lexical dependency with the unpredictability of the
distribution features of the lexical elements, i.e. with the
idiosyncracy of the case marking on the verb dependent NPs. Thus,
again, he brings together notions from different levels of
representation, considering them as causally dependent.
The lexical meaning of a predicate determines the structure of the
entire sentence. We leave out the discussion of the arbitrary or
semantically motivated character of the case selection, as this is a
complex problem itself. An interesting discussion, based on data from
Slavic languages and advocating the semantic motivation of case
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selection, is presented in Wierzbicka [1980]
The general idea of a lexical predicate that must be associated with a
specific number of semantic arguments, recalls the traditional
definition of verb valency, as the ability of verbs (and in fact some
other parts of speech) to open a number of Leerstellen, i.e. 'empty
places' that must or may be filled in by certain linguistic entities.
Sometimes, as e.g. in Charitonova [1976], Ruzicka [1978] or in the
Grundzuge einer deutschen Grammatik [1981], the selection restrictions on
the semantics of the verb actants are stated at one of the levels of the
valency analysis. In the German linguistic tradition the notion of
valency usually encompasses a set of interrelated problems comprising
the predicate-argument structure (quantitative valency analysis),
phrase-structure (qualitative valency) and the semantics of the
arguments (Selektionsrestriktionen in Charitonova [1976 ]). This approach
obscures the originally purely syntactic notion of valency. In Chapter
3 (Section 3.1.2), we further comment on the applicability of the theory
of valency for our purposes. Here we merely indicate the importance of
the fact that certain semantic arguments of the predicate are
predictable or inferrable from its lexical meaning. Therefore, if
certain pragmatic conditions are met (cf. Chapter 4, Section 4.2) and if
language specific rules of syntax allow for this, the predictable
arguments may be omitted without affecting the semantic interpretation.
Not all verbs behave in the same manner in this respect. It seems that
the verbs with more precisely determined prototypical arguments/
participants correspond to the predicates of what Hopper and Thompson
[1982] consider as 'highly transitive sentences'. They treat
transitivity as a feature of the entire clause, not of the verb, and
postulate a scale of transitivity according to 10 criteria such as e.g.
number of participants, kinesis (action/non-action), volitionality,
agency (prototypical/non-prototypical agents), affectedness and
individuation of an object etc. High on this scale of transitivity are
sentences where a prototypical, i.e. human, agent volitionally does
something to a/i highly individuated object.
Slobin [1982] gives the following comment:
"The important point is that Hopper and' Thompson have, on
linguistic grounds, identified a 'highly transitive clause
type' characterized by a human-like agent, 'behaving
actively, volitionally and totally to a definite or
referential object'. The languages of the world have chosen
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- in one way or another - to give special status to such
clauses in their grammars." (p.411)
We might formulate the above statement in a more general way. It seems
that the 'highly transitive clause type' is a subtype of a class of
sentences that are used to refer to humans performing real or mental
actions. It is for this class of sentences (or more precisely for this
class of predicates) that the existence of external agency is either
obvious or not necessarily required and the speaker may leave the
interpretation open (i.e. omit the reference to the agent) since the
hearer should be able to infer the missing information from elsewhere.
The available ways of demoting the agent-like argument from its neutral
(in Indo-European) position of subject of an active clause are language
specific and depend on the morphological and syntactic options possible
in the language considered. Important factors are, among others, the
function of the word order (i.e. its pragmatic or syntactic relevance)
and inflectionality (i.e. repertoire of nominal cases, verb inflection
and, consequently, the possibility of subject incorporation or
omission).
From the above considerations it is easy to notice that for the
interpretation of the notion 'impersonal' one more important distinction
is necessary, namely, between syntactically and semantically impersonal
expressions, which do not necessarily coincide with each other.
We have discussed so far syntactically impersonal constructions, i.e.
constructions with the 1st participant of the verb demoted from the
subject position (passive, reflexive and subjectless clauses) or
constructions with verbs that do not have any arguments (weather
phenomena). On the other hand, whether a given construction is to be
treated as personal or non-personal from the semantic point of view
"hangt nicht von dem Subjekt, sondern von dem Pradikat des Satzes ab und
zwar von der lexikalischen Bedeutung des Verbs, das im Satz als Pradikat
fungiert, oder des Adjektivs, das Pradikativ darstellt", Charitonova
[1976] p. 59.
As long as the linguistic and non-linguistic context allows the human
agent to be inferred from the lexical meaning of the verb, and as long
as this interpretation is not ruled out by the surface syntax or by the
aoentive character of another participant, the expression referring to
the agent may be demoted from the subject position, or omitted, and
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the entire clause will still be given a personal interpretation.
In the rest of this thesis we discuss syntactically impersonal
constructions which are assigned a semantically personal interpretation.
Particular emphasis is put on the syntactically impersonal
self-presentation of the speaker. The vast literature on this subject
shows that the investigation of impersonal structures and referring
expressions involves constant interactions between different levels of
language description. In these introductory remarks we have not even
touched on the problem of a pragmatic function assignment, although it
is of major importance for sentence structure. Halliday commented on
this problem in the late 1960's:
"The clause is the domain of transitivity, of mood and of
theme, all of whose options have to be accommodated in its
structure; ... we cannot say that the structure of the clause
is determined by its transitivity pattern, with other
components providing only optional extras. The choice of
subject, for example, depends largely on thematic options,
since it is the participant functioning as theme rather than
that functioning as actor that is normally chosen as the
subject." (p.169)
Halliday [1976]
Since the research presented in this thesis is based on texts from the
domain of scientific communication, we are interested in a very specific
pragmatics. We discuss the pragmatics of scientific communication in
Chapter 2, and return to the question of pragmatic options important for
the analysis of impersonal constructions in Chapter 3, where they are
considered along with the syntactic and semantic characteristics of
sentences.
From the above considerations it is apparent that the semantic
impersonalia, i.e. verbs that describe events as caused or brought about
by unknown or mysterious forces, will have no application to modern
scientific, and specifically mathematical texts. Thus, in this
thesis, we describe syntactically impersonal constructions and the way they
are used as a means of indirect reference to human activities.
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CHAPTER 2
PRAGMATICS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE
2.1 Review of Past Research on the Language of Science
2.1.1 Introduction
The research presented in this thesis has been carried out on scientific
texts. This chapter is devoted to those problems of scientific
communication that are relevant to linguistic research in general, and
in particular to the problem of narration in science. The chapter
consists of three parts. The first part comprises section 2.1 and
presents the development and the current state of linguistic research on
languages for special purposes (LSP). We outline major tendencies in
the literature on LSP, indicating their deficiencies. We further
discuss arguments for including a pragmatic component in the analysis of
scientific communication in order to provide a functional explanation
for the linguistic phenomena commonly associated with the language of
science (Section 2.2). Finally, in Section 2.3, we focus on the notion
of 'subjectivity1. We show how the complex approach to LSP, proposed
in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, allows us to analyse 'impersonal constructions'
in scientific texts.
2.1.2 Development of Scientific Language
The history of European science has its origins in ancient Greece. Greek
was therefore the first language in the Western world to become a medium
of scientific communication. To be a useful tool for scientist or
philosopher (as far as this distinction applies to ancient Greece),
Greek had to develop ways of describing and expressing more than the
simple experience one could arrive at via the five senses. The major
step in that direction was the development of abstract concepts and,
consequently, the formation of abstract nouns by nominalisation of
adjectives and verbs (cf. Snell [I960]). The Abstracta enriched the
vocabulary with a new category of objects that could be given names -
the objects of thought.
Since abstract concepts could not be affected by the imperfect senses, a
higher degree of 'objectivity' was attributed by philosophers to them
than to concepts denoting things in the real world.
Analysing the development of the scientific language in Greece, Snell
[1960] makes the following comment:
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"Nur in Griechenland ist wissenschaftliches Reden
autochthon; wo es spater auftaucht, lebt es davon, daS es
Griechisches ubernimmt, ubersetzt, weiterbi ldet". (p.73)
Greek, and then also Latin, served for centuries as international
languages in European science. The Renaissance brought the breakdown
of Latin as the language of international scientific communication. Some
scientific studies continued to be written and published in Latin (in
fact up to the 20th century) but the rising interest in national
languages, and consequently their rising status, as well as the spread
of secular education contributed to the growing use of languages other
than Latin in the scientific domain. Many works were translated from
Latin (some directly imitating Latin syntactic constructions), new books
had already been written in national languages and, thanks to the
invention of printing, scientific knowledge became more easily
accessible. The easier exchange of scientific knowledge in the
Renaissance period led naturally to the idea that human language should
be improved to suit the needs of the time, and even to the idea that a
new universal language might be created. Leibniz [1666] hoped that the
newly devised universal symbolization of human thought, free from the
deficiencies of natural language, would make it possible to solve
controversies by means of a calculus of thoughts.
Similar ideas of universal or philosophical languages occupied other
great thinkers of that time, such as Descartes and Bacon. Bishop John
Wilkins, with the support of the Royal Society, published a
comprehensive study on a universal language that was in fact a complex
system of human knowledge representation (Wilkins [1668], for a short
discussion cf. Robins [1979]; for a detailed presentation of the idea of
universal grammar in the European linguistics, 1500-1700 cf. Padley
[1976] and [1985]). Although in the 17th century none of the proposed
projects became widely recognized or used in practice, the idea of a
universal language of science must have influenced the form of
scientific communication at least as much as it had influenced the
community of scientists. This was reflected by the tendency to a
greater unification of scientific terminology. The language of science
attracts the attention of researchers for a variety of reasons. It
naturally attracts the attention of scientists themselves who, through
the analysis of language, investigate the methodology of their science.
This is particularly true for those disciplines of science where
language is more than just a transparent medium of communication, i.e.
especially for philosophy and mathematics. On the other hand, the
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interest of philosophers and mathematicians such as Frege, Russell,
Tarski or Wittgenstein (to mention only some of those who have
Con&ideasA \ ,
contributed to this field over the last century) natural language as a
key to the nature of human knowledge, resulted in analyses that laid the
foundations of new theories in linguistics.
Since mathematics may be viewed as a highly specialised language
constructed to be as exact and precise as possible, it seems to be an
interesting task to investigate how natural language is used in this
science. In the following subsection we review the linguistic research
on scientific communication and outline the approach to the problem of
LSP adopted in this thesis.
2.1.3 Review of the Literature on Languages for Specific Purposes
The language of science attracted the attention of linguists relatively
late. The Prague School linguists were the first to introduce the
distinction between what they called different functional styles (cf. Benes
[1969], [1981]). They believed that the heterogeneous multilevel
system of natural language has to be divided into subsystems according
to the specific functions of language (on different classifications of
language functions cf. e.g. Buhler [1934], Jakobson [1960], Halliday
[1973]). Scientific style may be differentiated from that of the press,
literature or everyday communication because it serves different
purposes and therefore selects different means to achieve its goal.
The functional stylistic approach has given rise to a wide variety of
linguistic analyses on LSP in the Soviet Union (cf. e.g. Kozina [1966],
Solganik [1967], Budagov [1971], Mitrofanova [1976], Trojanskaja,
[1979]). In that framework, scientific style is attributed such
properties as precision, simplicity, logical structure of argumentation,
emotional austerity, economy of expression, abstraction and generality
of presentation. These general stylistic characteristics are then
associated with the specific linguistic means employed in scientific
communication. Here are some most often quoted features of the
language used in science: high frequency of Genitive chains as
attributes (to achieve terminological precision), neologisms with Greek
and Latin morphemes, lack of certain word formation morphemes (e.g.
suffixes used to express personal attitudes), use of suffixes
unproductive elsewhere, limited use of standard figurative expressions
(this cannot be generalised for all sciences), a complex system of
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relations between the elements of a clause and between clauses, high
frequency of participle-, infinitive- and gerundive- constructions,
deverbal substantives, general tendency towards nominalisation ('nominal
style'), semantic emptiness of verbs (preference for the 'copula +
nominal predicative' constructions) etc. An exhaustive review of the
research on LSP up to mid 1970's is given in Hoffmann [1976].
The functional-stylistic point of view brought new insight into
linguistic research distinguishing between various functional styles or
registers within the national language. This distinction was also a
starting point for the sociolinguistic research on the varieties of
language, i.e. on the group-, age- or profession-dependent sublanguages.
From the purely linguistic perspective, however, the stylistic approach
as represented by the Prague School, is too general to capture the true
relationships between the form and the function of language. Scientific
style is a label covering a great diversity of language forms as used in
different scientific disciplines. The linguistic characteristics of
the abstract scientific style had therefore to be quite general to apply
to the wide range of styles of different sciences. This approach has
been criticised from the communicative point of view. It has been
pointed out (cf. Hoffmann [1976]) that the rough classification into a
limited number of styles does not take into consideration the situation
specific and context dependent factors that often influence the choice
of linguistic forms far more than abstract stylistic norms 'prescribed'
for a particular functional style. This discussion had been summarized
by Hoffmann's comment: "Die Fachsprachen haben Stil aber durchaus keinen
einheitlichen" (p.73). (On recent developments in stylistics cf.
Spillner (ed.) [1984].)
In British linguistics (the so called Neo-Firthian School) a concept of
register has been developed to account for situational varieties of
English (cf. e.g. Crystal and Davy [1969]).
Since the registers are not described in contrast to the language of
literature, as was the case for most of the Czech and Soviet analyses,
they are more suitable for the analysis of scientific texts. A brief
comparison of the three approaches and a stylistic analysis of English
for specific purposes (ESP) based on text typology (cf. Sandig [1972],
Werlich [1975]) is given by Glaser [1982]. Her typology of styles in
ESP, aimed at the communicative-pragmatic functions of texts, comprises
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five styles:
- the academic scientific and technological style, represented by
highly specialized literature or lectures, "addressed to
'insiders' of a particular field of knowledge";
- the popular-scientific style of semi-technical texts addressed to
"the intelligent layman";
- the didactic style of textbooks that make scientific or
technological subjects "understandable to the learner of a
certain age group";
- the directive style "typical of texts which serve the directive
function of language and the administrative force of the state";
- the practical style of everyday communication which, because of
the subject matter, "touches upon LSP vocabulary".
Glaser [1982] pp.76-78
The style or register based approach is a perfect point of departure for
a more complex analysis of scientific language because it allows for a
functionally motivated division of language into communicative domains.
Very often, however, this is also the end point of analysis and the
researcher does not go into any detailed description of the
correspondence between form and function of language in a specific
domain. The 1981 AILA Symposium on Pragmatics in LSP made clear the
need for of a wider approach to the linguistic analysis of technical and
scientific communication (cf. Todd-Trimble & Trimble [1982], Weber
[1982], Kalverkamper [1982], Ard [1982], Heslot [1982]). A good
selection of papers on the relationships between the language as used in
general communication (Germ. "Gemeinsprache") and the languages for
specific purposes (Germ. "Fachsprachen") is given by Bungarten (ed. )
[1981]. Unfortunately, although promising proposals have been made,
a comprehensive study of scientific communication is still not
envisaged.
From the layman's point of view, the most striking feature of
scientific, technical or any highly specialised communication, is very
often the specific vocabulary. Let us illustrate this approach with the
quotation from Porzig [1957]:
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"Wenn wir etwa in eine Gessel lschaft von Arzten Oder von
Juristen oder von FuBballspielern geraten und die Leute
beginnen von ihrem Beruf oder ihrem Interessengebiet
untereinander zu sprechen, so hort unser Verstandnis bald
auf. Wir verstehen einfach die entscheidenden Worter nicht
mehr. Jeder Beruf, jeder Interessenkreis hat seine
Fachausdriicke und seine besonderen Wendungen, die man gelernt
haben mu(3 und die der Au/3enstehende, der Laie, darum nicht
kennt." (p.219)
If the special nature of the language of science resides merely in
special terminology then the task of a linguistic analysis is to collect
the special vocabulary. This was indeed the result of the lexical
approach and language minima of particular sciences have been worked out
via statistical analysis of word frequency in scientific texts. The
major field of application of those minima or basic languages was LSP
teaching, i.e. teaching material limited to a specific science or
technology and intended for the students of that particular subject. The
main centre of the linguistic research on frequency of lexical data in
LSP in the 1970' s was the group "Statistika reci" at the Institute of
Linguistics, Academy of Sciences in Leningrad. This approach had also
some followers in East Germany (cf. review of the LSP research in
Hoffmann [1976] pp. 57n).
We may note here that the LSP research was often directly motivated by
the didactic needs of a specialized, i.e. subject-oriented foreign
language teaching (e.g. English for the students of medicine etc.) or
professional interpreter training. Since English is the most widely
used language in international scientific communication, there is not
much interest among British and American linguists in LSP (and
consequently in LSP research), although exceptions may be found (cf.
e.g. early works by Savory [1953] and more recent research by e.g.
Todd-Trimble & Trimble [1982].) Research in that field is concentrated
in Germany (both East and West) and in the Soviet Union. It may also be
worth noting that the rich (often theoretical) literature on LSP
research and teaching, published mainly in German, is generally unknown
to linguists working in other languages.
Frequency analysis, first applied to scientific vocabulary, was extended
to research on morphology and syntax. However, the belief that there
is no specific syntax of the language of science was dominant. Beier
[1979] makes the following comment about the grammar of language for
specific purposes:
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"Im Unterschied zur lexikalischen Ebene... hat die
fachsprachliche Syntax keine speziellen Strukturen
entwickelt, die es ermoglichten, sie in qualitativer Hinsicht
von den anderen, nicht fachgebundenen Realisationen des
Sprachsystems abzugrenzen. ...Ihr Wesen besteht... in einer
spezifischen Haufigkeit und Verwendungsweise sprachlicher
Strukturen, deren Auswahl weitgehend von den
charakteristischen Inhalten und Funktionen fachsprachlicher
Kommunikation beeinfluBt wird." (p. 276)
A similar opinion has been expressed by Schmidt [1968]:
"Es gibt keine eigene fachsprachliche Grammatik, es gibt
lediglich eine bevorzugte Verwendung bestimmter grammatischer
Mittel." (p.66)
In spite of these comments, syntax oriented research on LSP led to
frequency analyses of various grammatical phenomena. The differences in
language use between different disciplines of science within the same
national language were studied and texts from the same discipline
written in different national languages were compared (for a more
detailed presentation of this problem cf. Stroirtska & Zamojska [1985],
for a review of results see Hoffmann [1976], Hoffmann & Piotrowski
[1979], Kalverkamper [1982]). The major danger of this approach has been
pointed out in Kalvenkamper [1982]:
"Die Gefahr besteht..., da0 sich die fachsprachliche
Forschung bei ihrem Bemtihen um Fachtextsorten in immer
subtilere und pragmatisch differenziertere Einteilungen
verliert. Sie sind letztlich Wiederspiegelung eben einer
hochdifferenzierten Sachwelt, auf die die
Fachsprachen-Forschung taxonomisch, also sorten-einteilend,
reagiert, bzw. die sie nachvol lzieht, ohne auch nur auf
breiter Basis begonnen zur haben, sich Gedanken zur machen um
die sogen. Fachlichkeit ihrer Sachwelt, und damit verbunden
um die sogen. FdiChsprachl ichkeit von deren sprachlicher
Erfassung, also von deren Vertextung." (p.112)
We shall argue (Chapters 4 and 5) that the common belief that
scientific texts have the same syntax as non-scientific communication,
(with differences due to the changed frequency only) is mistaken. The
results of statistical research are often interpreted without bringing
them into a wider perspective, i.e. ignoring the language-, science- and
group-specific factors. Thus, texts (i.e. discourse) are interpreted
in terms of a sentence grammar and this naturally leads to very
superficial conclusions about some linguistic phenomena. This point is
further discussed in Section 2.2.
Since the 19601 s, when LSP research could be seen as "a peripheral
curiosity within language pedagogy" (Hbedt & Turner [1981] p.Ill), a
-34-
lot has changed in this field of linguistics. The last decade has seen
an "explosion of interest" (ibid.) in language use in science and
technology and this for a variety of reasons. Some linguists have
chosen this field of language use as an interesting domain for purely
linguistic research (cf. e.g. Gopnik [1972].
With the development of the sciences and the growing level of
specialisation of scientists, new sociological problems have emerged.
They partly result from the fact that scientific communication became
incomprehensible to the layman, which, in turn, isolated the community
of scientists from society. Some recent linguistic studies focus on
reasons for the present situation and on possible solutions (cf.
Bungarten (ed.) [1985]).
The most promising direction is, as was rightly noted by Hoffmann
[1983], the "kommunikativ-textuelle, pragmatische Fachsprachen-
Linguistik", as advocated by Kalverkamper [1982] p.109. The major
objective of this approach is to concentrate on the questions of the
inner structure of scientific and technical texts (spoken and written),
that are seen as communicative acts. This line was originally
proposed by Hoffmann [1976 ] who talked of LSP as a means of
communication in specific communicative domains. Hoffmann's research
concentrated, however, on the statistic analysis of language in
different disciplines of science and technology, and on a comparison
between it and the standard language.
In this thesis we adopt the communicative approach to the study of
language in science. In the following sections we discuss the
pragmatic approach to the analysis of scientific communication and show
how it influences the investigation of the linguistic phenomenon of
'impersonality' commonly associated with the language of science.
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2.2 Pragmatics of Scientific Discourse
2.2.1 Introduction
Scientific exchange of thoughts, like all instances of human
communication, takes place in a specific situational context and obeys
certain rules and conventions, different from those applying to everyday
conversation. The context of the communication (i.e. communication
situation, participants, their beliefs, presuppositions and attitudes)
as well as group- and situation-specific rules always influence the
linguistic form of the communication itself. This correspondence
between the form of discourse and the communicative situation in general
constitutes that aspect of linguistic analysis which belongs to the
domain of pragmatics.
Pragmatics has been incorporated into the general framework of
linguistic analysis only relatively recently. Most of the research on
LSP was done before the rise of pragmatic theory in the 1970's, i.e.
without reference to the context or any other pragmatic notions. This
was also the case for functional stylistic analysis, which was carried
out at the sentence level and did not take into consideration the
situational context. Although the need for a pragmatic component in
LSP research has been now recognized (cf. Proceedings of the 1981 AILA
conference on pragmatics in LSP), a comprehensive study of the
pragmatics of scientific communication is still to be done.
We believe that the analysis of reference and the apparent impersonality
of presentation in scientific texts requires the analyst to go beyond
the scope of a sentence grammar to discourse. This brings pragmatics
into consideration and it is the aim of this section to present an
outline of the pragmatics of scientific communication in general and of
mathematical discourse in particular. (Some aspects of this problem
have been presented in Stroihska [1986].)
2.2.2 Gricean Maxims and Scientific Communication
Since the pragmatics of scientific language has not yet been
investigated in any great detail, we begin by comparing the pragmatic
features of scientific communication with those of everyday
communication. As a testing device, we may use the Gricean maxims of
conversation (cf. Grice [1975]) which were originally proposed for
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colloquial language. We do not attempt to give an exhaustive
comparison of pragmatic features characteristic for scientific and
non-scientific communication but rather to point out the differences
that seem to be relevant for linguistic analysis.
Let us briefly recall for convenience what we refer to as Gricean maxims
of conversation. These are:
1. Cooperative Principle : Make your conversational contribution as
requested;
2. Maxims of Quality : Try to make your contribution one that is true.
Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say what you lack
adequate evidence for;
3. Maxim of Quantity : Make your contribution as informative as
required;
4. Maxim of Relation : Be relevant;
5. Maxim of Manner : Avoid ambiguity and obscurity of expression.
The Gricean maxims have often been criticised as being ideal and
unrealistic. Indeed, natural everyday conversation does not always
conform to their patterns and requirements. Speakers may agree with
Gricean principles in theory, but they violate them in everyday
practice. This raises doubts as to whether they apply to natural
language communication. Some critics even suggest that the maxims may
"at best be valid if applied to an exchange between computers"...
(Riniker [1979] p.60).
A more constructive way of using the Gricean maxims is to consider them
as a set of principles for the evaluation of hypothetical
interpretations of an utterance. In order to interpret an utterance,
we assume that the speaker wants to say something true and relevant and
that he does it in the best and most economical way. We shall give up
these assumptions only if there is a reason - e.g. previous experience -
not to trust the speaker. Should this be the case, we modify or adjust
our principles of evaluation to avoid being misled by the speaker.
It is clear that the Gricean maxims apply to scientific communication
more readily than to colloquial conversation. The reason for this may
be the fact that both the Gricean maxims and the principles of
scientific exchange of thoughts define an 'ideal communication'.
If we try to summarize the maxims, we could say that they simply
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characterize good speech or a we11-trained speaker. As such, they
could be derived from the principles of classical rhetoric, which
translates as 'the art of using words in the most efficient way1.
Going back to Greek rhetoric we find that there were two traditions: one
deriving from the sophists, the other from Aristotle. The sophists
developed rhetoric as an art of "giving effectiveness to the speaker",
while Aristotle's rhetoric was conceived as the art of "giving
effectiveness to truth" (Baldwin [1928] p.3). However, despite
Aristotle's efforts to fight the sophistic style of rhetoric, it is the
latter that survived as a part of general education. This is also why
the attribute 'rhetoric' often implies insincerity and exaggeration (a
brilliant discussion of differences associated with the notions
'rhetorician' and 'orator' in various European languages is presented in
Klemperer [1957]). The Aristotelean tradition, on the other hand,
could survive only where the search for truth was declared a major goal,
and this characteristic often applies to sciences, though with different
degrees of relevance for different disciplines.
Scientific communication in the European tradition, especially in the
exact sciences, follows Aristotle's rhetoric. It is, therefore, an
example of human communication naturally fitting Gricean principles of
conversation.
One may ask: why talk about scientific texts in terms of conversation?
Reading a scientific article is indeed a peculiar form of conversation
but some interaction between the author and the reader can still be
traced (for a comparison of texts on the basis of the participant
relationships between the writers and reader of the text cf. Huddleston,
et al. [1968 ] or Smith [1985 ]). Writers usually have in mind an
imaginary reader for whom the paper is written. Coler [1963],
discussing the structure of scientific papers, comments: "if W (i.e.
writer - M.S.) is a competent and aware worker in the field, the
resemblance between R (i.e. imaginary reader - M.S.) and actual readers
will obviously be more than fortuitous" (p.231). Coler introduces
also the concept of 'encyclopedic reader' i.e. "reader who has all prior
existing knowledge regarding S (subject) at his command" (p. 232 ).
The interaction between the author and the reader is 'delayed' as i's the
case for most forms of written discourse. The delay in interaction
causes a possible difference between the situation of text production
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(context of writing) and the situation of text interpretation (context
of reading). This fact may lead to the assumption that the scientific
text is 'situation-independent', but this is not quite right. Rather,
a scientific text is 'self-contained1, i.e. it explicitly or implicitly
includes all the information required for a correct interpretation, so
that the ghanging situation does not affect it, and does not cause
ambiguity. It is, however, not 'situation-independent' since it takes
into account both the context of writing and the context of reading. For
example, the arguments of the author are meant to influence a specific,
contemporary reader or a group of such readers, but at the same time
they are presented in such a way that they can be followed by any future
reader who has the required and explicitly indicated knowledge.
Scientific texts fall therefore into the category of what Nystrand
[1982] calls "endophoric", i.e. explicit and "self-contextualizing"
texts, as opposed to "exophoric texts", that are cryptic due to their
context dependency.
Thus, scientific texts may be seen as part of a larger communicative
interaction within the community of scientists. Francis [1961],
discussing the rhetoric of science, makes the following statement:
"Science, though it can be abstracted from any particular
human being, is a part of human culture. It is a kind of
human behaviour. As such, it occurs in a social situation."
(p.7)
He further suggests that 'scientific acts' shall be looked at "as human
behaviour which necessitates communication among scientists" (p.9). We
may thus assume that as long as we have a speaker addressing a specific
(even if imaginary) audience with a specific purpose (and with a
possibility of direct or indirect response) we may talk about a
conversational or discourse interaction, extending simply the notion of
conversation beyond an everyday verbal exchange. (For further
discussion of the notion of 'audience' both in rhetoric and in
linguistics cf. Nystrand (ed.) [1982].) The fact that the Gricean
maxims of conversation, unrealistic elsewhere, are obeyed by scientific
discourse, may be seen as an indirect argument for the view that
scientific text is more than a collection of sentences, i.e. that it
must be analysed in terms of discourse.
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2.2.3 Pragmatic Characteristics of Scientific Communication
We have mentioned the feature of being 'self-contained' as a
characteristic of scientific discourse. Let us now examine other
pragmatic properties of scientific communication in general.
Scientific discourse may be characterized as follows. It has:
1. a well-defined subject matter or topic, usually indicated in the
title;
2. a well-defined 'audience'. We use the notion of 'audience', taken
from classical rhetoric, to describe intended readers of a book
(paper, etc.) or people gathered in a lecture hall. They are not
a random sample of society and represent the same or related
discipline of science as the author (we ignore here the case of
popular-scientific papers or lectures and other instances of
non-academic communication);
3. easy-to-define assumptions about the knowledge of the audience. We
call this knowledge 'level of specialization'. The author is
usually well aware of the level of specialization of his audience
and may adjust the way he expresses his thoughts according to that
level. In this thesis, we concentrate on mathematical discourse
with a high level of specialization;
4. a well-defined purpose. This may be a didactic purpose in the
case of an academic handbook or a student lecture. The scientific
communication may have an evaluation purpose in the case of a
discussion of the arguments for and against a particular theory.
Its purpose may also be the presentation of the author's own work
and results. In some scientific disciplines, especially in the
social sciences, the communication may be of a persuasive
character. Discourse purpose may be associated with the
traditional rhetorical distinction between text genres
expository, procedural, narrative, hortatory, etc. However,
although we may talk about the general purpose of a specific
instance of scientific communication, each text needs further
subdivision into smaller units with their particular purposes (e.g.
Heslot [1980] distinguishes between Introduction, Materials &
Methods, Results and Discussion as constitutive parts of scientific
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papers in experimental sciences, each associated with a specific
selection of linguistic phenomena);
5. extended time for sentence production and interpretation,
especially in the case of writing and reading scientific texts;
6. the property of being 'self-contained', as mentioned before.
The features listed above describe the situation(s) in which scientific
communication takes place, the overall purpose of the communication and
the participants in the discourse. They refer to very general
properties of this communication and we call these features 'external
requirements' of a successful scientific communication.
2.2.4 Mathematics and Mathematical Discourse
Apart from these external requirements, each discipline of science sets
up its own internal conditions. We shall concentrate on the internal
properties of mathematical discourse.
In section 2.1 we argued against the vague notion of 'scientific style',
on the ground that, due to the steadily growing specialization of the
sciences, it does not correspond to any linguistic reality. Mow, when
we talk about 'mathematical discourse', we might be accused of making
the same mistake. The development of mathematical theories and their
applications is so enormous that people often talk about 'mathematical
sciences' instead of just one mathematics. It is not surprising,
because, while most sciences are at most a few hundred years old, the
history of mathematics is measured in millenia, and some fundamental
advances go back as far as ancient Greece. Over the 25 centuries of
its history, and despite all the radical changes in the field,
mathematics has remained a unique human activity, one that escapes the
simple classification into arts and sciences. Mathematics is unique
among sciences (e.g. it is not an empirical science) and it is a
peculiar form of art. Nevertheless, mathematicians, e.g. Henri
Poincare [1948], Paul Halmos [1968], write about the feeling of
mathematical beauty, harmony and elegance and often judge mathematical
results according to aesthetic criteria. Halmos [1968] argues that
mathematics is "a creative art because mathematicians create beautiful
new concepts", because they "live, act and think like artists" and
because they regard mathematics as art. The controversy on the dual
character of mathematics is not the only one. There is no consensus on
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yet another fundamental question of methodology, namely whether
mathematical truths are discovered (the idea of revealing mathematical
reality advocated by Plato) or invented by the human mind (cf.
discussion of the above controversies in Alexandrov [1963], von Neumann
[1947], Whitehead [1956]).
Despite the fact that some basic questions about the methodology of
mathematics remain open, the mathematical sciences have developed an
enormous potential of knowledge. However, the situation is
complicated by the growing isolation of modern mathematics from society.
To visualize the gap between the current level of development in
mathematics and the mathematical education of the general European
public, it is enough to say that the secondary school programme does not
usually go beyond the XVIII century (one of the few exceptions being the
set theory), thus leaving out the great and revolutionary achievements
of the last two hundred years. There are also hardly any
popular-scientific publications that would make this specific domain of
human knowledge more accessible for educated non-specialists. One of
the very few exceptions in this field is the collection of essays on
modern mathematics edited by Steen [1978], where deep concern is
expressed about the difficulties facing mathematicians communicating
with the society. The isolation of the mathematical community has also
a linguistic dimension. In everyday conversation it is impossible to
guarantee that two people have exactly the same interpretation of any
word uttered. They would have to agree about the definitions of the
key words first, but even in this case they could attach different
emotional value to them, and this would remain beyond the scope of
definition (this may be explained in terms of the distinction between
intensional versus extensional identity). On the other hand, for
everyday communication it is enough if people share just the core
meaning of the words they use. However, the higher the level of
abstraction of the subject matter and the less "derived from the senses"
the notion is (to adopt a phrase of Russell's), the greater is the
likelihood that two people will interpret it in a similar way.
Here, the other-worldly vocabulary of mathematics, which makes any
communicating with society almost impossible, proves very useful.
Mathematical concepts are closest to the ideal of abstraction. Very
often not even analogy could make mathematical concepts closer to any
real human experience. They are, nevertheless, well-defined and the
speaker has a "discriminating knowledge" (cf. Evans [1982] p.89) of the
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objects he refers to using mathematical vocabulary, i.e. he has the
capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other
objects. The meaning of a mathematical term may be identified with its
definition (i.e. with a set of properties or requirements that must be
met by the referent) and is therefore likely to be the same for the
speaker and the hearer. In addition, preliminary assumptions
concerning the discourse topic must be made explicit (the assumed level
of knowledge required from the audience is indicated), and therp are
certain conventions for each science as to how this is to be done. (Ard
[1982] refers to that indication ascribing to it the 'context building'
function.) The well-defined meaning of the notions used and the lack of
figurative expressions other than the standard jargon, does not leave
much space for ambiguity.
Further, as mathematics is a deductive science, it has developed a
highly sophisticated system for drawing inferences. These rules of
inference (logic) and the highly formalized process of mathematical
proof do not fully prevent false statements and do not give a ready
decision on truth values (cf. Godel's concept of "undecidabi1ity") but
they naturally make the Gricean maxim of quality "Do not say what you
lack evidence of" easier to obey.
We might refer here to the concept of truth developed by Alfred Tarski
both for everyday language and for formalized languages. Tarski states
that there are difficulties with defining truth in colloquial language.
"With respect to this language not only does the definition of truth
seem to be impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in
conformity with the laws of logic" (Tarski [1956] p.153). For
formalized language, on the other hand, it is possible to introduce a
consistent and logically correct use of this notion, even if it is not
always possible to decide whether a particular statement is true or
false.
The internal features of mathematical
far may be summarized as simply the
We have:
discourse that we have outlined so
features of a deductive science.
1. well-defined terminology,
2. high level of abstraction,
3. explicitly given assumptions and axioms,
4. formalized rules of inference,
-43-
5. consequences (derived from assumptions via the rules of
inference).
The question of redundancy in mathematical discourse, i.e. the
applicability of the Gricean maxim of quantity, was addressed by Ard
[1982]. Ard points out that the strictly mathematical (i.e.
symbolic) and the verbal part of mathematical text often paraphrase the
same 'theme'. He quotes the advice of the mathematician Menahem
Schiffer as to how to write mathematics (cf. Schiffer [1973] p. 58):
..."Give the important theorems in two stages, the heuristic
argument and the rigorous logical change."
This indicates that the paraphrase serves largely to facilitate
understanding of the complex concepts, i.e. is by no means redundant
from the communicative point of view. Ard makes also an interesting
observation about the general interpretation of the informative value of
a text. He says that it would be 'absurd' to interpret a mathematical
text including all inferences and deductions that could be based on it,
since all theorems, lemmas and corollaries could be deduced on purely
logical grounds from the set of definitions and axioms. Therefore,
anything in a given mathematical text, beyond these axioms and
definitions, would be obvious, i.e. redundant. This observation again
confirms the necessity of placing mathematical discourse in a correct
situational and temporal context.
In a deductive system of mathematics, there should be no space for
lexical ambiguity or indeterminacy and we could say that the Gricean
maxims, as 'intellectual requirements' (cf. the concept of 'intellectual
requirements' in Chisholm [1981] pp.l76n), are implied by the specific
rhetoric of mathematics. They follow naturally from the inherent
conditions of discourse in the deductive sciences. In this sense we
might call mathematical discourse 'ideal' from the pragmatic point of
view, because it meets the appropriateness conditions on discourse in
general. The external requirements spelled out before may then be
regarded as specifying a restricted context which guarantees that
scientific communication will be successful. (On the concept of
language use in a 'restricted semantic domain' cf. the selection of
papers in Kittredge & Lehrberger (eds.) [1982]. On a possible
formalization of language use in the restricted context of science cf.
Bellert & Weingartner [1982] in the above mentioned publication.)
-44-
There are, however, some 'ambiguity-1ike1 phenomena in mathematical
discourse. They may be caused by e.g. deriving intuitions about
concepts from their names or from mathematical jargon. For example
many terms are apparently 'dynamic' and may present as dynamic certain
mathematical relations which in fact are not so. This concerns
especially verbs used in mathematical expressions such as:
a. "a series of points converges..."
b. "data is projected (or mapped) onto the surface"
c. "embedding a covariate (in a family)..."
We may illustrate this type of interpretational ambiguity with a more
familiar example from linguistics. In GPSG features associated with
syntactic categories may be 'passed down' the tree or may 'go up' the
tree according to certain principles. It usually takes a while to
realize that no real 'movement' of passing down or going up is involved
- the features are simply distributed according to these principles. (On
'dynamic' terms cf. also Hockett [1954].)
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2.3 Impersonal Rhetoric of Science
2.3.1 Subjectivity versus Impersonality in Science
In Section 2.2 we have talked about general features of scientific
communication and about internal properties of mathematical discourse
which follow from the inherent requirements of a deductive science.
There is yet another phenomenon distinguishing scientific and
non-scientific communication that we have not mentioned as a pragmatic
feature because its nature is philosophical rather than strictly
pragmatic. It is the phenomenon of subjectivity and we consider it in
more detail because of its deep linguistic implications.
Subjectivity is a natural feature of any speaker - or
situation-dependent discourse, and since practically all instances of
natural language communication are egocentric, we may merely talk about
different degrees of subjectivity. In fact, some philosophers argue
that the human mind naturally "applies a constant subjective perspective
to the world" (McGinn [1983] p.69) - the property of being 'constant'
refers basically to the constant linguistic meaning of indexical
expressions that build up the 'logic of context'. In everyday
communication subjectivity is quite common and may even be an inherent
element of the structure of some literary works (on subjectivity in the
literary texts cf. Jay [1984], on apparently impersonal narration cf.
Banfield [1983]). In science, however, subjectivity is regarded as a
vice. Bertrand Russell [1946], who adopted a rational approach to
science, expressed this as follows:
"Scientific knowledge aims at being wholly impersonal, and
tries to state what has been discovered by the collective
intellect of mankind."
The same point has been made more recently by McGinn [1983]:
"Science aims for 'neutrality' in its depiction of the world :
it should not be possible to read off from a scientific theory
any peculiarities of its propounder",
and further:
"It is a closely connected point that perception cannot
represent the world as it is (entirely) 'independent' of the
perceiver - but just this is what a scientific description
aspires to achieve." (p.Ill)
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It seems that McGinn translates the idea expressed by Russell into terms
closer to those of linguistic description. He concludes that the
representation of the world by humans can be "innocent of subjective
elements" if it is presented in a non-indexical mode. The
non-indexical mode of presentation is connected with the condition of
dealing only with the 'primary qualities' of objects, i.e. with those
properties that do not consist in the objects' disposition to produce
sensory experiences in perceivers (the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities was introduced by Locke and further analysed by e.g.
Jackson [1929], Bennett [1971] and McGinn [1983]).
The "desire to escape from subjectivity", as Russell [1946] p.17 put it,
may lead some scientists, especially those adopting the positivistic
approach, to make the language they use as 'impersonal' as possible - we
use here the notion 'impersonal' as opposite to 'subjective'. Thus, they
eliminate, or at least try to eliminate, everything that may be
considered as subjective and therefore non-scientific, i.e. first of all
any direct reference to themselves and to when and where the text is
produced. As a result, there are hardly any instances of direct, i.e.
1st Person Singular, self-reference. Dates and geographical locations
are substituted for the subjective, deictic here and now, and other
'egocentric particulars'. Since Tense is also deictic, the general
Present Tense is a preferred convention.
The requirement to be 'impersonal' or 'neutral', i.e. not to be
subjective, is a natural rhetorical imperative for most sciences. To a
certain extent it may again be derived from Aristotle's principle of
giving effectiveness to truth. Although some scientists write in a
more individual manner, each science still has its standard rhetoric,
and the standard rhetoric of mathematics has been impersonal for
centuries.
We may illustrate the 'impersonal' tendency with the example of Carl
Friedrich Gauss, the great 18/19th century mathematician, who for many
years kept a private mathematical diary, published only recently, where
he recorded his own discoveries. Even these private notes, written in
Latin, often have the impersonal form. Here are two examples of his
style:
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1. with an impersonal construction
Numerorum primorum non omnes numeros infra ipsos residua
quadratica esse posse demonstratione munitum
' it can be shown that not all quadratic remainders
of prime numbers are themselves prime'
2. with 1st Person Plural, we
Consoicuum exemplum novimus et quod congruum
videtur. Confidamus
1
we know about an extraordinary example which
seems to agree with this. let us hope1 .
Gauss, [1981] p.41, 43
2.3.2 Self-Reference in Impersonal Narration
We shall now consider the problem of subjectivity and self-reference in
the language of science in more detail. This topic has a rich
philosophical literature. Philosophical theories of 'first-person-
sentences' concentrate on the intentional character of reference and the
subjective character of human knowledge (cf. e.g. Evans [1982]). The
apparent idiosyncracy of certain 1st Person related statements is the
central point in much of the Philosophy of Mind, Solipsism, Scepticism,
Private Language theories and other doctrines. The philosophical
approach to self-reference, however, takes not much interest in real
language data, basing itself mostly on the properties of isolated
sentences. Thus, they are of limited relevance for the analysis of
discourse phenomena, and we mention only the major theoretical points of
the philosophical analysis of self-reference.
First-person-sentences may be considered as 'direct-attribution' of a
certain property to the speaker by the speaker (cf. Chisholm [1981]
pp.27n). The properties that are most commonly attributed by the
speaker to himself are those properties that are 'empirically certain'
for him, i.e. "immune to error through misidentification" (cf. Evans
[1982] pp.215n); these are first of all his 'states of mind' and other
mental self-ascriptions, such as thinking, feeling or believing as
experienced by him.
Talking about scientific communication, we shall be mainly interested in
those states of mind which are related to beliefs and knowledge. We
may distinguish several different epistemic levels for accepting or
-48-
rejecting a proposition, i.e. deciding about its truth value. 'Being
evident' is the level which distinguishes knowledge from true belief
that is not knowledge (cf. Chisholm [1981] pp.76n; on the semantic
status of know and believe cf. Wierzbicka [1972], on the 'cognitive
vocabulary' of scientific texts and on its semantic interpretation cf.
BogusZawski [1981]). Restricting our analysis to the highly formalized
language of mathematics, we may assume that what the author says is
"beyond reasonable doubt" for him {Chisholm [1981] p.78), and he may
prove, according to the codified rules of mathematical reasoning, that
he is right. The restricted context of a deductive science brings
therefore a new quality into the discussion of subjectivity.
The linguistic question which has to be answered is: Is it possible
to achieve successful self-reference using devices other than
first-person-sentences? Strawson [1959] p.158, for instance, doubts
that an object could be identified if it is referred to by some sort of
'indefinite description'. This is because indefinite descriptions
either do not distinguish one term from another or do not definitely
identify a given term. It seems that this general assumption does not
hold in the specific context of scientific communication. We come back
to Strawson's considerations on self-reference towards the end of this
section.
It has been said that scientific rhetoric avoids the use of the 1st
Person Singular. The pronoun 'I', however, is the most economical, but
not the only possible way of expressing self-reference (cf. Coval
[1966]). Therefore, authors who avoid 1st Person Singular have to
exploit other possibilities offered by the syntax of the language they
use. Of particular importance in this regard is the fact that the
language is used in a pragmatically and semantically restricted domain
which may influence the referential properties of some expressions.
In German mathematical discourse, we may find many forms of
non-lst-Person-Singular self-reference. These are e.g. the 1st Person
Plural pronoun wir, the indefinite personal pronoun man, impersonal
passives, reflexive and infinitive constructions and other syntactic
structures with the acting participant demoted from the grammatical
subject position, as well as some other means of non-direct
self-reference such as speaker restricted names, e.g. der Autor.
The use of 1st Person Plural forms when referring to one's own
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acitivities or experiences as a member of a group has been addressed by
philosophers who discuss the question of whether there could be a 'group
mind' as opposed to individual minds. Strawson [1959] refers to this
problem asking whether it would be possible to "construct the idea of a
special kind of social world in which the concept of an individual
person is replaced by that of a group". In this context he further
discusses the use of plural pronouns we and they as referring to those
groups. He concludes:
"...these are not genuine plurals, they are plurals without a
singular... . They may also refer to elements in the group,
to members of the group, but exclusively in terms which get
their sense from the parts played by these elements in the
corporate activity." {p.113)
What is interesting for present purposes is that Strawson's observation
applies to the language of science. The plural wir used in scientific
discourse may have, as one of its functions, reference to a 'group mind'
of the community of mathematicians, when the speaker talks of the common
body of mathematical knowledge.
We provide the full description of the use of pseudo-plurals and other
linguistic means of 'indirect self-reference' employed in German
mathematical discourse in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3 we introduce the
theoretical model for interpretation of indirectly referring expressions
that allows us to analyse them in a complex way, i.e. taking acount of





3.1 Knowledge Representation and the Concept of Frame
3.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the predicate frame model which we use to
analyse the referring expressions in scientific texts. The chapter
consists of three parts. First, in Section 3.1, we review the
literature on frames and related concepts. In the second part,
Section 3.2, we present and define the concept of a predicate frame
(further abbreviated as PF). In the third part, Section 3.3, we use
the model to determine the elements necessary for a successful
interpretation of referring expressions and demonstrate how the
predicate frame model handles non-isomorphic correspondences between
the syntax and semantics of a sentence.
3.1.2 Review of the Literature on Frames
The notion of frame appeared simultaneously in sociology and in the
field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Frames were first introduced
in sociology by Goffman [1974 ], but the term frame had already been
used, in much the same sense, in Bateson [1955]. The aim of Goffman's
work was to "isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding
available in our society for making sense out of events" (p.10). He
distinguished between two basic ("primary" as Goffman put it) frameworks
for interpreting events: natural and social. Natural frameworks
identify events that are perceived as undirected, not involving "any
willful agency" (p.22). Social frameworks provide ways for
understanding events where some sort of "will, aim, and controlling
effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human
being" (ibid.) is involved. Goffman assumed that situations are defined
according to principles of organization which govern events.
He then defined frames as basic identifiable elements of a situation, as
sets of elements we necessarily identify in a stereotypical situation of
a certain kind. Individuals may be unable to define or describe their
situational frameworks but they easily apply them in practice to
interpret events they are involved in.
The concept of frame as a formula to organize knowledge representation,
was introduced in computer science by Minsky [1975] in his influential
paper A Framework for Representing Knowledge, where frames were applied
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to computer vision. Frames were soon applied to all sorts of computer
processing of information. There is a vast literature on frames and
frame-based text processing, written mostly in the late 1970's. An
exhaustive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter
and we indicate only those developments in the field of AI which seem to
be useful for our research. A comprehensive summary on frame
conceptions applied to text processing and a good selection of papers on
the most important topics is presented in Metzing (ed.) [1980] and Barr
& Feigenbaum (eds.) [1981].
The main point in Minsky [1975] was that the processes of recognition
and comprehension are 'expectation-driven' and that the modelling of
these processes on the computer requires special devices for the
organization of the knowledge base and special devices for selecting
relevant fragments of that knowledge (i.e. 'frames' relevant for the
situation to be analysed). In these situational frames the elements
necessary for 'understanding' a particular situation are specified.
When processing information, the model fills the frame with data
available, according to the frame specifications. Thus, when correctly
selected, frames provide guidelines for information processing.
Minsky's frame concept has stimulated research on writing and
implementation of knowledge representation languages (cf. Goldstein &
Roberts [1977], Bobrow & Winograd [1977]) and on formal analyses of some
selected linguistic problems, as for instance 'discourse links' (cf.
Rosenberg [1980]) or extended use of words (cf. Wilks [1980]). Frames
and related concepts (as e.g. scripts and plans in Shank and Abelson
[1975 ], [1977] and in Lehnert [1980 ], action-frames in Charniak [1976 ],
[1980] etc.) were employed in the analysis of 'situations', 'events' or
'stories', and the psychological validity of the frame theory was
experimentally tested.
Our concept of predicate frame has some similarities with those proposed
in Minsky [1975], Bobrow and Winograd [1977], Hayes [1980], Rosenberg
[1980] etc. It is, however, applied to the analysis of
predicate-argument structures and, therefore, differs considerably with
respect to detail. Describing the predicate frame in Section 3.2 we
refer to the use of the term frame in frame theory as developed in
Artificial Intelligence and point out general similarities in form and
differences in function.
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Long before the idea of frame-like structures for knowledge
representation became popular in AI research, formally similar concepts
had been developed in linguistics. The most influential theories in
this field of linguistics were Dependency Grammar as proposed in
Tesniere [1959] and Case Grammar as developed by Fillmore [1968a],
[1968b], [1971], [1975]. However, studies on the relationships holding
between a given verb and the noun phrases that accompany it to build up
a (grammatically correct) clause, have been in the focus of attention of
language philosophers and linguistics for a relatively long time.
Linguistic research of the verbal system in, e.g., German followed many
different lines, the most interesting from the point of view of this
study being the analysis of the verb's syntactic value according to the
number of objects it needs to constitute a clause. Already at the end
of the 18th century, Meiner [1781] divided verbs into three groups :
"einseitig-unselbststandige", "zweiseitig-unselbststandige" and
"dreiseitig-unselbststandige", i.e. those that need one, two or three
complements respectively. The most interesting point in this approach
was the equal treatment of the subject and other arguments. Meiner's
approach differed from that represented in later research on German,
e.g. in Heyse [1914] and Behagel [1924], where verbs were divided into
"absolute" (i.e. those taking subject only) and "relative" (i.e. those
taking other arguments also ). Thus a different status was assigned
to subjects than to other complements of the predicate. Probably the
best known formula proposed in German linguistics for describing the
syntactic incompleteness of some parts of speech in terms anticipating
valency theory, was the one in Bu'hler [1934 ] who recognized "daB die
Worter einer bestimmten Wortlasse eine Oder mehrere Leerstellen urn sich
eroffnen, die durch Worter bestimmter anderer Wortklassen ausgefullt
werden mtissen" (p.173).
A new insight into the nature of predicate-argument structure was given
by Tesniere [1959] whose Dependency Grammar was designed to reveal
hierarchical dependencies hidden behind the linear order of natural
language structures. In Tesniere's model, the verb is the point of
departure for the analysis of sentences. The nominal elements
accompanying the verb can be divided into the subordines immediats of the
predicate, further subdivided into the actants and circonstants (i.e. the
participants in an action described by the verb and the circumstances of
that action). According to Tesniere, only the actants are properly
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required and determined in number by the verb. The ability of verbs to
require complements (i.e. actants) Tesni&re calls valency. In his model,
subject is just one of the actants, i.e. it has lost its special status
(traditionally based on semantics). This purely syntactic treatment is
supposed to facilitate description of the dependencies within the
sentence, as well as the description of the active-passive opposition.
The model also allows for some valency positions to be not filled, i.e.
to remain inemployees in the actual clause, giving a new insight into the
phenomenon of syntactic ellipsis. The same point is made by Hockett
[1959] p.252.
Valency theory has been applied to the description of German by Grebe
[1959 ], Schmidt [1963 ], [1965], Brinkmann [1957/58 ],[1971 ], Erben
[1972 ], Admoni [1982 ]," Grundzuge... [1981], Duden Grammatik [1984 ] and
many other authors. A compendious critical review of the subject is
presented in Helbig & Schenkel [1973] and more recently in Abraham
[1978] and Helbig [1982]. Although the above mentioned authors adopt
various approaches to the nature of hierarchical dependencies in the
predicate-argument structure (e.g. as to the place of semantics in the
model), the common point is the central position of the verb and taking
syntax as the starting point of the description. Helbig & Schenkel
[1973] point out that taking semantics as primary in the determination
of verb valency presupposes one-to-one mapping between structure and
content, which is obviously not the case in language (p.18).
Recognizing the verb as a central component of a sentence, Fillmore
[1968] proposed another approach to the primary system of dependencies
within a sentence. Fillmore's early model was conceived merely as a
small revision to the theoretical framework of transformational grammar
and an alternative to the generative semantics (as developed by e.g.
Lakoff [1965]). Instead of a decomposition of semantically complex
predicates into a string of primitive predicates, as was proposed in
generative semantics, Fillmore developed a framework based on the
concept of deep cases, i.e. semantically relevant syntactic relationships
that hold between the verb and each noun phrase associated with it. For
any verb, the cases co-occurring with it form an ordered set, called a
case frame. The inventory of cases proposed by Fillmore [1968]
consisted of:
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- Agentive : the instigator of an action, typically animate;
- Instrumental : the immediate physical cause of an event,
inanimate force or object;
- Dative ; something animate being affected;
- Objective : semantically most neutral case, objects affected by
an action;
- Factitive : something resulting from an action;
- Locative : location of.an action.
A revision of the inventory in [1971] introduced the Experiencer case
instead of Dative, and divided the Locative into Source and Goal. Case
frames not only indicated what cases may co-occur with a particular verb
but also indicated whether they can be omitted (facultative valency).
Fillmore also proposed a Case Hierarchy to account for the regular
syntactic changes in a sentence when some cases were missing, e.g.
conditions for an Instrument to become a subject. The case frames gave
an elegant account for e.g. paraphrase relations (the same case frame
corresponding to different syntactic representations) or word pairs as:
buy and sell or teach and learn (the same basic meaning but different case
frames). Although it was Fillmore's ambition to keep the case number as
low as possible, his model used up to 9 cases and still could not
provide an exhaustive description for all predicate-argument structures.
(We refer to this point in more detail in Section 3.2.)
In his linguistic analysis, Fillmore took into consideration the
psychological research on human memory and cognition processes. He
notes, (Fillmore [1975] p.124), that the frame idea goes back as far as
the concept of schema in Bartlett's research on remembering in the
thirties (cf. Bartlett [1967]), and refers to Berlin and Kay's [1969]
study of the colour terms and to the analysis of natural categories by
Rosch [1973]. Fillmore's Case Grammar, operating with semantic
primitives, could readily be translated into the semantic networks in the
AI research on natural language processing. (On the implementation of
Case Grammar in AI cf. Barr and Feigenbaum [1981], IV C4.) The main idea
of Case Grammar, the one that we shall adopt in our research on
reference, is that verbs provide templates within which even incomplete
sentences can be understood. This approach relates to much of the
current developments in the field of Artificial Intelligence, where the
notions of prototypes and analogy proved to be very useful in modelling
problem solution and language understanding processes (cf. Proceedings
of the 7th European Conference on AI [1986 ]; on analogy matching cf.
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Owen [1986] in the above source).
The predicate frame model resembles linguistic concepts from various
theoretical frameworks. The aim of our research is to describe a model
for interpreting reference patterns in scientific discourse. To
achieve this specific goal, we do not follow any particular linguistic
theory. Interpreting reference involves taking account of linguistic
phenomena from various levels of language description, such as semantic
verb classes, types of participants, syntactic options valid for a
particular language, pragmatic factors etc. We believe that eclectic
methods are appropriate in the investigation of a heterogeneous field.
3.1.3 Verb Classes and Types of Participants
When choosing criteria appropriate for description of the predicate
characteristics relevant in the reference interpretation, we follow some
lines proposed by Fillmore, Halliday and Foley & Van Valin. The common
point in their research is that they consider predicate as a nucleus of
a clause, that is as an element which determines the internal structure
of the clause syntactically (the number of necessary complements) and
semantically (participant roles). Although these two aspects seem
inseparable, in traditional systems of verb classification a distinction
was often drawn between the two criteria of description:
1. semantic characteristics of a predicate, i.e. type of
action/state/process described by the verb;
2. number and type of arguments/participants involved in an
action or state described by the verb.
The separate consideration of these two aspects of the verb semantics
may have been motivated by discrepancies between semantics of the
predicate and the syntactic structure of a clause. It resulted in
systems of verb classification based on either purely syntactic or
purely semantic grounds.
A purely syntactic account of the German verb is presented by e.g.
Helbig & Buscha [1974] who classify verbs according to the following
criteria:
1. relations within the predicate (Verhaltnis im Pradikat)-.
main and auxiliary verbs;
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2. relation to the subject (Verhaltnis zum Subjekt): personal
and impersonal verbs;
3. relation to the object (s) (Verhaltnis zum Objekt):
intransitive, transitive, ditransitive verbs;
4. relation to the subject and object (Verhaltnis zum
Subjekt und Objekt)'. reflexive and reciprocal verbs.
The semantic characteristics of the verbs and their arguments are given
in the section on the semantically motivated syntactic constraints (e.g.
formation of the Vorgangs- and Zustandspassiv). As a general type of
verb classification, Helbig & Buscha give only an analysis of different
Aktionsarten, i.e. types of action/process in respect to the time
factor.
The new edition of the Duden Grammatik [1984 ] notes in the section on
the subdivision of the verb class, that with respect to their meaning
verbs can be classified as describing actions, processes or states
(p.92). These semantic classes are vaguely linked with the number of
participants. Verbs denoting an action usually involve two
participants, while those denoting a process may involve one or two
participating entities. Verbs of the third type, i.e. those denoting a
state, may again involve one or two participants. Both the process and
the state denoting verbs often require prepositional complements with
local meaning. This approach ties up the semantic interpretation of
the verb with the syntactic shape of a clause and, more specifically,
with the grammatical function of subject. The type of subject's
involvement determines the semantic class of a verb. This does not
give much insight into the nature of the relationship between syntax and
semantics, since the basic meaning associated with the verb (i.e. verb
type) does not change drastically even if the grammatical function
assignment changes. We believe that it is more appropriate to
subdivide German verbs into semantic classes either without any
reference to the grammatical functions of their inherent arguments or
with a secondary indication of possible grammatical function
assignments. Consequently, we are interested in systems of
classifying the inherent participants parallel to the semantic verb
classification.
In the preceding subsection we introduced some basic concepts of
Fillmore's Case Grammar. Taking a set of semantic cases as linguistic
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primitives allows us to classify verbs in a new way. Verbs may have
the same set of cases associated with them (that is the same case frame)
independently of their syntactic properties. This is because the
structure of a basic proposition (defined as "a tenseless set of
relationships involving verbs and nouns", Fillmore [1968a], p.23) does
not have any subject or object labels on the nominal arguments.
Consequently, subject loses its special position, its function comes
from the surface syntax and is irrelevant for the basic semantic
description of a predicate.
The classification of verbs according to their case frames is
methodologically similar to the classification with respect to the
subcategorization frames in phrase structure grammars. (We ignore here
the different status of the subject NP in both models.
Subcategorization works locally and applies only to the domain of the
VP. Since subject is not dominated by the VP node, it does not belong
to the subcategorization frame. A justification for excluding the
subject NP from the subcategorization analysis was that the existence of
a subject may be assumed and is always predictable, i.e. all verbs have
subjects. This approach clearly ignores the distinction between personal
and impersonal verbs, which apparently lack subjects. It also ignores
the fact that some languages may have the subject incorporated in the
finite verb form.) Despite this methodological similarity, the resulting
classification of verbs is different. Subcategorization merely lists
the syntactic environment of a verb and assigns the same syntactic
description to structures with different meanings. It captures
regularities in syntax. Case frames list semantic relations associated
with a verb, its semantic environment, and the same set of semantic
relations may be associated with syntactically different structures.
The concept of semantic cases was further developed by other authors.
Foley & Van Valin [1984], representing the functional orientation in
linguistics, propose a classification of verbs based on logical
structures and corresponding semantic relations. Semantic roles used
in their classification are: agent, effector, patient, theme and
locative. Foley & Van Valin adopt a system of lexical decomposition of
predicates and distinguish between a class of state verbs and a class of
activity verbs, further subdivided according to some additional
criteria. Activity verbs, e.g. are divided into those expressing
potentially controllable actions and those expressing a motion. The
potentially controllable actions are then subdivided into:
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a. controlled actions - the logical form of the verb is
DO (x('predicate1(y)) with x being an agent, acting in a
volitional way, and y a patient;
b. uncontrolled actions, having the logical form
x('predicate'(y)), with x being an effector and y being a
patient, (p.53)
Verbs of motion involve one entity which is the theme and possibly a
locative.
Having presented this detailed set of semantic relations associated with
particular verbs, the authors introduce two more general and abstract
notions - the ACTOR and the UNDERGOER. These two terms are defined as
follows: the actor is "the argument of a predicate which expresses the
participant which performs, effects, instigates or controls the
situation denoted by the verb", while the undergoer is "the argument
which expresses the participant which does not perform, initiate, or
control any situation but rather is affected by it in some way" (p.29).
The notions of actor and undergoer cannot be identified either with
grammatical functions (subject may be either actor or undergoer) or with
semantic case roles. However, they have "both semantic and syntactic
significance" since they "constitute an interface between syntactic
relations ... and semantic relations" (p.32). Foley & Van Valin
further propose a hierarchy of actors-undergoers, associating these
notions with the previously introduced semantic relations. The primary
choice for an actor is agent, the primary choice for an undergoer is
patient. Thus, an active clause with a transitive verb is a
prototypical realization of these categories. The semantic relations
of effector, locative and theme fall between them.
The concept of a hierarchy of actors-undergoers is modified and further
developed in the following section. Here, we comment on yet another
complex approach to the verb classification introduced in the late
sixties by Halliday.
Halliday (first published in Kress (ed. ) [1976 ]) uses the term process in
a very broad sense to cover "all phenomena to which a specification of
time may be attached - in English, anything that can be expressed by a
verb : event, whether physical or not, state or relation" (p.158). He
further distinguishes between different types of process and brings into
consideration the number of participants that are "inherently
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associated" with them (ibid.).
For modern English Halliday distinguishes three main types of processes:
ACTION, MENTAL PROCESS and RELATION. For the verbs expressing the
action type of process, ACTOR is the inherent participant in the
predicate-argument structure. Action verbs may be involved in
different syntactic constructions, which Halliday refers to as:
operative ACTOR = subject
+ another participant;
middle ACTOR = subject
no other participants;
receptive no ACTOR
or ACTOR in adjunct position.
Operative and middle clauses correspond to the active voice, receptive
clauses correspond to either passive or active voice. For action
verbs, the actor is clearly the first choice for a subject position..
The other participant of an operative clause, referred to as a GOAL,
may, but does not always have to, be expressed. Whether its existence
is presupposed by the speaker and whether it is to be inferred by the
hearer depends on the idiosyncratic properties of the use of a
particular verb, as well as on the situational context. Last but not
least, it depends on the syntactic construction within which it occurs.
Mental process clauses involve at least two participating entities:
"a human, or at any rate animate, being whose consciousness - feeling,
perception etc. - is involved, and a phenomenon - object quality, event
etc. - which impinges on it" (pp.165-166). The first of these is
called PROCESSOR, the second the PHENOMENON.
Relational clauses are clauses "in which the 'process' takes the form of
a relation between two participating entities, or between one
participating entity and an attribute" (p.167). Halliday distinguishes
between the attributive clauses (with an ATTRIBUTE and ATTRIBUEND) and
equative clauses (with an IDENTIFIED and IDENTIFIER).
Halliday's classification systematically brings together the semantics
of a predicate and types of inherent participants. In this thesis, we
take a similar approach and analyse the discourse data following some
lines proposed by Halliday. A system of verb classification adopted
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for the purpose of this research is presented in Section 4.2. In the
following section of this chapter we define the concept of predicate
frame, further used for modelling the interpretation of reference.
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3.2 Concept and Structure of Predicate Frame
3.2.1 Definition of Predicate Frame
In this thesis the concept of frame is applied as an explanatory device
for the interpretation of referring expressions when there is no simple
correspondence between the syntax and semantics of a sentence. We
regard the predicate frame as equivalent to a general form of lexical
entry for verbs. This is similar to the classic definition of frame
(given in Minsky [1975] p.212) as "a data-structure for representing a
stereotypical situation". If the notion of 'situation' is interpreted
in a narrow sense, as 'what a verb is used for', then our use of the
concept of frame conforms to this elementary definition.
A predicate frame (PF) as a structure for representing data necessary
to describe a 'situation' is a notion potentially compatible with a
variety of linguistic models. It is most readily applicable to the
predicate calculus approach as a convenient way of describing
predicate-argument structure. The basic predicate-argument network of
relations may be 'spanned over the frame' and given an internal
structure and operational form.
In a PF, the arguments of the predicate are represented as "'slots' that
must be filled by specific instances of data" (Minsky [1975] p.212) and
may have specified conditions which their assignments must meet. The
number of slots in a particular PF is determined by the valency of a
predicate. The argument slots have their assignments specified by
features of the prototypical participants associated with those slots
in natural usage. These features comprise the semantic requirements on
arguments as they are specified e.g. by selectional restrictions in a
standard phrase structure grammar, including the argument taking subject
position (for examples see Subsection 3.2.3). The specification
contains some extra information concerning the syntactic functions the
argument can have and the principles of semantic and pragmatic
interpretation of these functions. Rosenberg [1980] p.97, writing
about frame-based text processing by computer, uses some extra features
on frame slots - facets, and distinguishes between the following five
facet types:
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the SValue facet - contains the slot value;
the $Default facet - specifies a default value for that slot;
the $Require facet - specifies requirements which any value for
that slot must meet;
the $To-Add facet - specifies procedures which must be run to
compute a value for that slot;
the $If-Removed facet - specifies procedures which must be run
if the slot value is to be removed.
Rosenberg's parsing model is an implementation of Goldstein and Roberts'
[1977] frame representation language (FRL-0) which was based on 'deep
case frames'. Deep case frames were defined in terms of the
selectional restrictions and contained information on further frames
that could be associated with the frame considered. The 'facets'
associated with particular 'slots' in a 'deep case frame' contained the
'procedural knowledge' about those slots (on distinction between
declarative and procedural knowledge cf. e.g. Bobrow and Winograd
[1977]). Rosenberg's model described text processing at discourse
level and the 'facets' on the frame slots referred to the principles of
linking together text units. Our PF model employs the conceptual
solution of facets with procedural knowledge for a slightly different
purpose. The conditional form of facets (i.e. their "If-Then"
structure) gives options for procedures that are to be executed if
certain conditions are met. We may use facets with 'procedural
knowledge' to operate on syntactic categories. We come back to this
question and discuss it in more detail in Section 3.2.2.
One of the essential elements of the frame in Artificial Intelligence is
the concept of default value, "a value which is taken to be the slot
filler in the absence of explicit information to the contrary" (Hayes
[1980] p.54). One remark is necessary at this point. When writing on
default values and the model's expectations arising from the knowledge
of frame defaults, many authors seem to imply (or indeed do imply) the
psychological relevance of frame models. We must, therefore, note here
that no claims about the psychological validity or adequacy of our PF
model frame are intended.
Referring to the question of frame storage in long-term memory, Minsky
[1975] p.228 writes:
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"Frames are probably never stored in long-term memory with
unassigned terminal values. Instead, what really happens is
that frames are stored with weakly-bound default assignments
at every terminal!"
The default values associated with slots may be represented as a number
of semantic (declarative in form and function) and syntactic
(procedural) features referring to a prototypical argument or prototypical
filler, which is instantiated if there is no specified slot value to
take its place. In defining the prototype for an argument slot we take
the point made, e.g., in Bobrow and Winograd [1977], who emphasized the
importance of describing an object by comparing it to another object
described in the memory. The object which is used as a basis for
comparison, called the prototype, is not necessarily a specific
individual but "a stereotypical individual which represents the
'typical' member of a class" and whose description "combines the
'default' knowledge applied to members of the class in the absence of
specific information" (Bobrow and Winograd [1977] p.6). The default
assignments, i.e. the prototypical slot values, therefore determine in a
natural way the model's 'expectations' and are the basis for the
mechanism of drawing inferences in order to fill in the missing
information. The importance of people's ability to recognize "implicit
causalities" and to infer missing bits of information have been pointed
out by Lehnert [1980], who investigated the role of 'scripts'
(situational frames) in human understanding and noted:
"People are so adept at filling in missing information, that
they often cannot remember what they were explicitly told and
what they inferred." (pp. 81-82)
A predicate frame is a structure consisting of nodes (i.e. argument slots
with their specifications) and relations. The lexical predicate is its
label, and each time the 'label' is used, this instantiates a new
predicate frame. When a new frame is instantiated it is a copy of a
basic PF associated with a particular 'label'. If an argument value
matching the slot entrance conditions is explicitly given and specified,
it fills in the slot. If there is no specified value for a particular
frame slot that must be filled (i.e. is required by the obligatory
valency of the predicate) then the slot in the copy inherits the set of
default values from the basic PF. Each time new data is added to the
slot values, a new copy of the frame is made, where some slots have
their values changed while some simply inherit values from the previous
version of the PF. (On the mechanism of inheritance cf. e.g. Bobrow
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and Winograd [1977], Goldstein and Roberts [1977] or Rosenberg [1980].)
Because of the procedure of inheritance, each frame has a slot which
specifies what basic PF the current PF is copied from. In the
literature this slot is called AKO (A Kind Of) slot.
Information specified on argument slots of a PF is contained in:
a. semantic features with the value of a prototypical assignment
(default value of the slot);
b. facets with procedural knowledge associated with argument slots
(options for grammatical function assignments);
c. AKO-slot pointing to the basic PF.
£ .
The semantic information in the PF is discussed in Subsection 3.2./I. The
facets operating on syntactic and pragmatic information are further
discussed in 3.2./ and 3.2.4. In Subsection 3.2.5 the relationship
between the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of the
interpretation of referring expressions is discussed and examples are
given.
3.2.2 Semantic Component of PF
In the following two subsections we discuss the semantic, syntactic and
pragmatic information contained in the 'features' and 'facets' of the
predicate frame. We begin this discussion with the semantic component
of the PF because of its primary importance for the entire structure of
PFs.
According to the 'frame' definition (cf. Subsection 3.2.1), the number
of frame slots (i.e. the number of argument positions in the verb
valency) corresponds to the number of necessary elements in a
stereotypical situation described by a given predicate. Thus, the
arguments evoked by any use of the predicate correspond to the entities
naturally participating in an event. We refer to them using the terms
inherent arguments of a PF and inherent participants in an event respectively.
Apart from the inherent arguments, predicates are normally open to all
sorts of modification and, consequently, may be accompanied by various
modifying elements such as expressions of time, location or manner. In
our discussion we concentrate on the analysis of inherent arguments and
their syntactic representation, and consider only those modal
expressions that either have obligatory complement status (i.e. that are
required by the valency of the predicate) or have a reference-supporting
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function (discussed in Section 4.4).
First we introduce the terminology and notation used throughout this
chapter.
Let V denote the set of all verbs in the language X. Then, we define
valency as a function that takes as its arguments the elements from V




V 3 v > Val (v) e N s (0,1,2 n).
Remark. Let us note here that taking this approach we consider verbs
that have two (or more) different valencies as two (or more) separate
verbs. The status of facultative verb complements is further
discussed in Section 3.3.
We distinguish two prototypical participant roles, Agent and Target,
represented as <AGENT>, <TARGET>. The arguments of a verb may take
either of them as their prototypical value, or may be specified as
neither of them, i.e. take the value <0THER>. We denote the set of the
feature values by C,
C = { <AGENT>, <TARGET>, <0THER>).
We define the predicate frame PFk of the k-valent verb v as a (vector)
function
PF
V 3 v M> PFk(v) g Ck, where k = Val(v)
and where Ck denotes a Cartesian product of the set of features C. For
instance
C2 = { «AGENT>, <AGENT> ), «AGENT>, <TARGET> ), «AGENT>, <0THER> ),
«TARGET>, <AGENT>), «TARGET>, <TARGET> ), «TARGET>, <0THER>),
«0THER>, <AGENT>), «0THER>, <TARGET>), «0THER>, <0THER> )}.
By C° we denote the empty set 0.
The features <AGENT> and <TARGET> represent the two extreme opposite
types of argument involvement in an action. They are semantically
complex, i.e. they in turn have some prototypical properties associated
with them. <AGENT> prototypically implies a volitional and
goal-oriented instigator of the action described by the verb, and these
features are commonly treated as characteristics of human activities.
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Thus, the feature <AGENT> associated with an inherent argument suggests
humans as prototypical instigators of an action. Being a <TARGET> of
an action, on the other hand, suggests a rather passive involvement of
an argument, i.e. does not imply volitionality and, consequently, is not
prototypically associated with humans. The relative position of <AGENT>
and <TARGET> in the animacy hierarchy is shown below:
<TARGET> -3 Inanimate -3 Animate -3 Human -3 <AGENT>
where -3 denotes the animacy hierarchy partial ordering. The scale of
the prototypical involvement in an action naturally corresponds to a
scale of prototypical participant roles. We have distinguished only
the extreme points of that scale, i.e. a prototypical AGENT and a
prototypical TARGET of an action, and we deliberately do not state the
prototypical conditions on other participant roles, such as INSTRUMENTAL
or EXPERIENCER. Arguments of a predicate, when defined in terms of
prototypical participants, are functions of the lexical meaning
associated with that predicate by the language users; they "derive from
the semantic structure of predicates themselves" (Foley & Van Valin
[1984], p.27).
The prototypical argument assignments are conceptually related to the
deep cases as employed in Fillmorean case grammar (and to primitive
notions of participants in Burke [1969]). Fillmore [1968] defined his
cases as sets of "universal, presumably innate, concepts which identify
certain types of judgements human beings are capable of making about
events that are going on around them, judgements about such matters as
who did it, who it happened to, and what got changed" (p.24).
Despite the formal similarities between the deep case frame in the early
version of Fillmore's case grammar and the predicate frame in our model,
the two concepts are basically different.
Fillmore's grammar assigned semantic cases to the lexically specified
objects. Thus, the deep case assignment depended on, or was even
determined by, the lexical characteristics of the argument. For
example, whether an NP was assigned 'Agentive' or 'Instrumental' case
was mainly determined by whether it denoted an animate or inanimate
object. Consequently, verbs could have different case frames associated
with them, according to the variety of possible lexical fillers of the
argument slots. At the same time, the great diversity of the possible
lexical fillers for the same argument slot, combined with a wide range
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of the possible semantic verb types, naturally resulted in a relatively
big inventory of cases. Even this big inventory, however, was not
sufficient to provide a full description for all sentences of a natural
language, and this despite the fact that some of the Fillmorean cases
(e.g. the 'objective') had very broad and vague definitions. What
Fillmore's case grammar lacked was the notion of a stereotype
role-player, i.e. the notion of a prototype.
In our model, the prototypical roles are permanently associated with
slots, and the lexical assignments may only modify the prototypical slot
value. Thus, the semantic interpretation of an argument position
filled by a lexical element is a function of:
1. the prototypical value assigned to the PF slot, and
2. the semantic features associated with the lexical filler for
that slot,
and may differ from the prototypical value assigned at the PF-level. At
that level we operate with a simple distinction: <AGENT>, <TARGET>,
<OTHER>. Agents and Targets are the only participants whose roles
derive from the semantic structure of predicates themselves, as Foley &
Van Valin [1984] put it. (This is true for the prototypically action
verbs. We discuss other semantic verb types and the feature <0THER>
towards the end of this subsection.) The part of the scale between the
two extremes may be seen as a passage from prototypical to 'peripheral'
Agents (non-volitional humans, animate objects, force, inanimate,
objects, etc.), and 'very bad' Agents may naturally be seen as
'reasonably good Targets'. (The concept of a continuum of participant
roles has been proposed by Schlesinger [1979 ] who argued for this
approach to the Instrumental-Comitative distinction.) Although Agent and
Target are two extremes, it is these two participant roles that appear
to be most frequent in the language use. It is also striking that they
may be associated with the same referent, even within one discourse
unit, e.g. within one clause. The most common instance of the double
role of one participant are some reflexive constructions where the same
participant is both the source (Agent) and the goal (Target) of an
action. We discuss reflexive constructions in more detail in Section
3.3 and in Chapter 5, where the use of the impersonal pseudo-reflexive
constructions is illustrated with examples from scientific discourse.
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The prototypical Agents and Targets account for the representation of
prototypical actions. These, however, constitute only one fragment of
the system of verbal predication in general. In Fillmore's model,
'deep cases' were designed to cover the entire network of semantic
relations holding between predicates and their arguments. As pointed
out above, Fillmore's case system was built up on elements derived from
two different sources. These were: the verb semantics, represented as
abstract human knowledge of the situational patterns (type and number of
participants) and semantics of the actual lexical items that co-occur
with particular predicates in language use. These two sources
correspond to two separate levels of language description - the level of
actual, lexically filled clauses, and the level of a more abstract
semantic representation of the content of those clauses. We shall try
to avoid defining concepts from one level of description in terms
specific for the other. Therefore, our level of semantic
representation corresponding to the basic PF-structure contains
exclusively information about the prototypical argument assignments,
i.e. we distinguish only between prototypical Agents and Targets at that
stage. If the notion of a prototype is to be of any importance, we
should avoid multiple 'prototypes'.
Instead of multiplying primitive notions in the semantic representation
and introducing additional roles into the basic PF we leave this further
differentiation of participant roles to the level where the slots in a
copy of the basic PF are filled with the lexical material. It is here
that the prototypical features are confronted with those of the lexical
items. The slot inherits its basic role assignment (i.e. it remains
either more Agent- or more Target-1 ike), but the features of the lexical
item may override features specified as a slot default value. We may now
define other common participant roles as resulting from certain
combinations of the prototypical feature assignments and actual features
of lexical items that do not match the slot defaults. Thus, slots with
the feature <AGENT> as an inherent value, filled in by lexical items
denoting inanimate, concrete objects, may be interpreted (if the lexical
meaning of the verb allows for that interpretation) as Instruments. If
the lexical item filling in the <AGENT> position has the feature
indicating the location, it may receive an interpretation as Source.
The animate, especially human, Targets, on the other hand, may receive
interpretation as Experiencers, and if they indicate location, they may
be interpreted as Goals, according to the position in the PF, i.e.
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according to the verb semantics.
The feature <OTHER> is assigned to the argument slots that permit
neither Agentive nor Target interpretation. This is the case for PFs
with monovalent verbs; i.e. verbs involving only one participant. This
is also the case for relational predicates, especially those involving
the verb BE. (For a semantic description of elementary sentences with
the verb BE cf. Matheson Styan [1987].) A more detailed analysis of
verbs taking arguments with the feature <0THER> as used in mathematical
discourse is presented in Chapter 5.1.3.
3.2.3 Syntactic Component of PF
The PF of the verb v is an ordered set of prototypical features for
argument slots whose number equals the verb valency k. (Actually the
number of PF slots is K+l, since we have an additional slot, the
AKO-slot, containing the reference to the basic PF.) The ordering of the
PF argument slots is implied by the language system itself and can be
arrived at by morphological and syntactic tests. In some languages, e.g.
those from the Indo-European family, syntax reflects the intrinsic
ordering of arguments by assigning the same grammatical functions to the
same participant roles (although this cannot be considered as a rule).
In German, for instance, semantic 1st participants are commonly assigned
the subject position in the morphologically simpler (synthetic verb form
in the Present Tense) type of construction (i.e. in the active). The
subject position is therefore syntactically neutral and pragmatically
unmarked for the 1st argument. Each PF has its intrinsic argument
ordering and the neutral syntactic function assignment. If an argument
is to be moved out of its neutral position, e.g. in a passive
construction, the conditions of such movement are specified in the
'If-Removed' facets.
The fact that an argument may be moved out of its neutral syntactic
position is marked by the presence of the 'If-Removed' facet associated
with its slot. The information contained in that facet specifies other
syntactic positions that can be taken by the argument and states the
principles of the semantic interpretation of that movement (no
transformational sense is implied). These rules of interpretation
comprise the pragmatic relevance of the sentence topology. 'If-Removed'
facets account specifically for those cases when an argument slot does
not have its value lexically specified, i.e. its filler is missing in
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the actual clause. The patterns of interpretation of the missing
arguments, encoded in the PF, allow therefore for interpretation of the
impersonal constructions. We describe these patterns for German
impersonal constructions in Chapter 4.
For languages such as German or English, which require the syntactic
subject position to be filled, it is necessary to describe the
conditions and constraints on subject demotion or other arguments
promotion. An argument may be promoted to a 'higher' position in the
syntactic hierarchy (which usually corresponds to the ordering of the
arguments in the PF) if it has the 'If-Promoted' facet associated with
its slot. This is for instance the case for the 2nd argument of
predicates describing prototypical actions, and generally for
'transitive' verbs. The 'If-Promoted' facet specifies other syntactic
positions that the argument may be moved to and the conditions of such
promotion (e.g. the verb-marking which indicates a 'non-neutral' form -
in German it is the passive- or reflexive-inflection). Since the
primary reason for the argument demotion/promotion is pragmatic, the
pragmatic conditions must also be specified to allow for the
interpretation of the topological and syntactic changes. The pragmatic
information, however, cannot be contained in the PF since it is provided
only by the context of the speech act. The principles of pragmatic
interpretation may be represented as a set of language specific rules
for expressing the pragmatic relations (focussing, theme-rheme
distinction etc.) by means of syntax, morphology, word order,
intonation, etc. In Chapter 4 we describe how in German scientific
discourse pragmatic information may be linked with the PF information.
Below, we give the structure of a basic PF for the verb zeigen ('to





PREDICATE LABEL : zeigen
(AKO slot)
1st ARG : <AGENT>
2nd ARG : <OTHER>
3rd ARG : <TARGET>
Figure 1. Basic PF for the verb zeigen with prototypical semantic
feature specification
If no pragmatic information is supplied by the context, a neutral
grammatical function assignment takes place, i.e. 1st argument is taken
as subject. A different choice is made if, for pragmatic reasons, the
'If-Removed' facet is activated, i.e. when the reference to the 1st
participant is to be avoided. This question is discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4.
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3.3 Relations between Semantics and Syntax in the PF-Model
3.3.1 Predictability of Inherent Arguments
In the previous sections we have defined the concept of predicate frame
and described PF-structure, indicating the three aspects or types of
information to be represented in or linked with a PF - the semantic,
syntactic and pragmatic information. Let us now discuss, in terms of
the PF-model, the relations between syntax, semantics and pragmatics of
some German constructions.
Being implied by the verb semantics, the inherent arguments of a
predicate are predictable. If they are not explicitly specified in a
particular sentence, they may be 'reconstructed' either by reference to
hearer's knowledge (general knowledge or knowledge of a particular
situational context) or by reference to the frame of the lexical
predicate (i.e. by the reference to the knowledge of the language
system). Let us illustrate this point with an example. The German
verb lesen ('to read') requires ah entity who does the reading and
something that can be read. We may infer the existence of the latter
in (lb and c):
(1) a. Hans liest eine Zeitung 'Hans is reading a paper'
b. Hans liest 'Hans is reading'
c. Hans liest viel 'Hans reads a lot' .
In addition, the existence of a reader can be inferred in (Id):
(1) d. Zu dieser Zeit wurde viel gelesen
'at that time people read a lot' .
The PF for lesen needs to have two argument slots filled in. When
interpreting (lb and d), our model makes a frame copy with default values
for the 2nd or for the 1st argument slot respectively.
One might suggest that (lb) does not describe the reading of a
particular book or paper but rather reading as an activity at a
particular time, and (lc) reading in general, as a hobby or Hans'
favourite pastime. In fact (lc) may be interpreted as a statement of
Hans' good knowledge of literature in general or on a particular
subject. On the other hand, the existence of the inherent 2nd argument
may be confirmed by the possibility of asking a WH-question about that
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argument, as in (2):
(2) a : Hans liest; Du darfst ihn nicht storen!
'Hans is reading; you must not disturb him!'
b : Was liest er denn?
'what is he reading then?' .
B's question in (2) shows that the existence of the 2nd argument may be
inferred, even if one interprets (lb) or (2a) as used to refer to
reading as a pastime. Although that argument may be left lexically
unspecified it is inferrable as a sort of cognate object of the
predicate.
Inherent arguments with the same syntactic status (e.g.
Accusative-objects) do not necessarily behave in a syntactically uniform
way. Their semantic value may influence their syntactic properties.
The 2nd argument of the verb lesen is highly predictable since it has a
considerably narrow meaning. 'Something to read' consists of a set of
books, papers, leaflets etc., and each specific context narrows the
acceptable interpretation. Metaphorically, lesen may also be used with
abstract objects as in (3):
(3) Er konnte in ihren Augen die ganze Wahrheit lesen
'he could read the whole truth in her eyes'
or, apparently, without any object, as in (4):
(4) Er konnte in ihren Augen wie in einem Buch lesen
'he could read in her eyes as in a book' .
Then, however, it is either impossible to omit the object (since it is
no longer predictable due to the fact that its semantics violates
feature specifications on the frame slot) or the metaphorical character
of the utterance is made explicit, e.g. by means of comparison, as
in (4).
The syntactically similar (i.e. followed by an Accusative NP) verb
machen ('to do'/'to make') does not behave in the same manner as lesen.
Its 2nd argument, 'something to be done', has a very broad meaning,
which can hardly be predicted. Although its existence is predicted by
the PF, it can hardly be omitted since it is in most cases the rhematic,
new and relevant part of a sentence, as in (5):
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(5) Frau Claire Zachanassian bietet eine Milliarde, wenn ihr
das Unrecht wieder gut macht, das Frau Zachanassian in
GUI 1en angetan wurde
'Mrs Claire Zachanassian is offering a milliard if you
put right the wrong that was done her in Gtillen'
Durrenmatt, Der Besuch der alten Dame
or it is in fact part of the predicate, as in the so called Streckform
of the verb in (6):
(6) Ihr scheint eure Erfahrung mit der Polizei gemacht zu haben
'you seem to have had some experience of the police'.
Durrenmatt, Der Besuch der alten Dame
The 2nd argument of machen may, however, still be promoted to the
thematic subject position and then left out as in (7a) or (7b):
(7) a. - Erinnert sich jemand an ein Gebaude, das ihr Vater
errichtete? Wurde sich gut in der Rede machen
'does anybody remember a building that her father
erected? it would fit well in the speech'
b. - Sofort! Sofort! Der Arzt besitzt ein Automobil...
- Wird gemacht, Herr Burgermeister. Den Wagen schaffe
ich behordlich zur Stelle
'immediately! doctor has a car...'
'it will, be done, your Honour. I'll have the car
brought here officially'.
Durrenmatt, Der Besuch der alten Dame
The promotion to the subject position is accompanied by the
rearrangement of the syntactic structure, i.e. it requires either
passivisation or reflexivisation of the sentence. The subject NP, even
if its semantics has already been established, i.e. if the thing to be
done has been mentioned in the previous discourse, may be left out
syntactically only in colloquial (spoken or written down) German, not in
standard written German.
The intransitive (as illustrated in (8)) or reflexive (as illustrated in




'get a move on!'
(9) Wann machst du dich endlich an die Arbeit?
'when will you get started to your work?1.
Structures with machen used intransitively cannot be interpreted as
direct object ellipsis, and examples with the reflexive machen cannot
have the reflexive pronoun sich translated as a proper 2nd argument
(e.g. since sich does not allow for passivisation). These three uses
of machen represent different degrees of transitivity. The
intransitive and reflexive machen would, therefore, require separate
lexical entries. The question, whether the PF's for machen-mtT and
™achenie{lex are derived from the basic PF for ""zc/zerctran8 cannot be
answered without diachronic evidence. This question, however, refers
to the organization of the lexicon and is not of major importance for
the purpose of the present discussion.
The relationship between the semantic and syntactic representation of a
predicate-argument structure may be seen as a one-to-one isomorphic
mapping between these two levels when all inherent arguments from the
semantic representation have their syntactic counterparts, and all
constituents of a sentence represent inherent arguments (facultative or
obligatory), i.e. when there are no syntactically unemployed or
semantically empty constituents.
This ideal mapping is not the only one possible. Modern German shows
another type of relation. Following the distinction suggested in the
literature (cf. Hohle [1978]), we may talk about constituents without
arguments and arguments without constituents. We shall discuss these
two cases in more detail below.
3.3.2 Constituents without Arguments
The standard example of 'constituents without arguments' are some
reflexive constructions. Reflexivity is a characteristic of a class of
verbs, such that the subject and the object of a verb are referentially
identical (i.e. co-referential) and the action described by a verb is
carried from the subject <AGENT> to the object <TARGET>. The reflexive
relationship may be, but does not have to be, explicit. English, for
instance, distinguishes between explicitly (i.e. mirrored by syntax) and
covertly reflexive constructions, as illustrated by (10a) and (10b)
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respectively:
(10) a. John didn't wash himself
b. John didn't shave this morning
Examples in (10) are properly reflexive, since John is physically agent
and patient of washing. This fact is confirmed by the syntax, since
himself in (10a) may be substituted by another NP as e.g. in (11a):
(11) a. John didn't wash the car
and the empty argument slot in (10b) may be filled by an NP not
co-referential with the subject, as e.g. in (lib):
(11) b. John didn't shave the client.
The verb behave is also either explicitly or implicitly reflexive.
However, if it occurs with a reflexive pronoun, that pronoun cannot be
substituted by anything else.
(12) Can't you make your little boy behave (himself)?
*herself, *yourself, *him... etc.
We shall use the term improper reflexive to denote verbs with similar
properties to behave.
The German language has many reflexive verbs (both proper and improper),
but in most cases the reflexive pronoun sich (mich, dich etc.
respectively) is obligatory and cannot be left out.
The following questions arise:
1. does the reflexive pronoun sich correspond to the syntactic
obj ect?
2. does the constituent represented by sich correspond to an
argument in the semantic structure?
We shall try to answer the above questions for both types of German
reflexive verbs.
It must be noted here that a different terminology is used by e.g.
Helbig and Buscha [1974 ] who also distinguish between echt (i.e. proper)
and unecht (i.e. improper) reflexive verbs. Echt reflexive are for them
those verbs where no substitution for the reflexive pronoun is possible.
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They add, however:
"Im semantischen Sinne liegt nur bei Gruppe 2 (unechte
reflexive Verben) eine echte reflexive Beziehung vor, da
nur bei diesen Verben von einem Subjekt und Objekt
Liberhaupt gesprochen werden kann." (p.66)
The definition of reflexivisation adopted in this thesis and given at
the beginning of subsection 3.3.2, presupposes that an agent carries out
an action of which he himself is the goal or object (target). For most
of the improperly reflexive verbs, we can hardly talk of an action. The
verbs sich schamen ('to be ashamed'), sich benehmen ('to behave'), sich
verlieben ('to fall in love'), sich befinden ('to find oneself') etc., do
not describe any action in the prototypical physical sense and it would
be rather peculiar to distinguish between the two different roles of the
subject involved; that of an Agent and that of a Target.
For those verbs, the reflexive pronoun does not behave like a proper
object. We cannot e.g. ask any WH-questions about it:
(13) *Wen schamst du?
If it is impossible to ask questions about this particular constituent,
we may assume that it does not correspond to an argument of the semantic
representation.
Some Polish reflexive verbs show similar syntactic properties. The
syntactic and semantic 'emptiness' of reflexive pronouns is confirmed by
the fact that the reflexive element si<t may be left out in constructions
involving two reflexive verbs. The reason for this omission is
primarily stylistic, but it is made possible by the lack of syntactic
and semantic functions. Examples are given in (14):
(14) a. Postaraj sip nie wstydzid
'Try-REFLEX-not-to be ashamed'
b. Postaraj siq nauczyd tego
'Try-REFLEX-to learn-this'
where all verbs (i.e. starai si% ('to try'), wstydzid si<> ('to be
ashamed') and uczyi si<> ('to learn')) are reflexive, the first two are
improperly reflexive, while the last one is properly reflexive (i.e. we
may have it used transitively, although with a shift in the meaning -
uczyd .»<?reflex corresponds to English learn, ttczyitTaaa to English teach-, thus
(14b) is ambiguous).
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Some German verbs co-occur with pronouns having both functions (i.e.
reflexive and transitive object) but it never happens in the same
sentence (cf. the principle of coordination as stated e.g. in Gazdar et
al. [1985]). The example in (15):
(15) *Ich furchte mich und ihn
is ungrammatical since ihn has object status and the reflexive mich is
syntactically unemployed (e.g. cannot be passivized).
There is yet another syntactic test of the object status of German
reflexive pronouns. We may check how the participles derived from both
types of reflexive verbs behave if they are used as attributes of their
previous subjects (i.e. 1st arguments of their PF-s)
(16) a. der Junge wascht sich
'the boy washes himself'
b. der gewaschene Junge
'the washed boy'
c. der sich waschende Junge
'the boy washing himself'
(17) a. der Junge benimmt sich gut
'the boy behaves himself well'
b.*der gut benommene Junge
'the well behaved boy'
c. der sich gut benehmende Junge
'the boy behaving himself well'.
The sentences in (16b) and (17b) suggest the reading to be ge(-x-)t/en by
someone else, which in German is acceptable only for the properly
reflexive verb in (16). (17b) is incorrect, since der Junge cannot be
seen as a target of the action referred to by the use of the verb sich
benehmen. Consequently, the subject and the reflexive pronoun sich in
(17) are not co-referential. Some improperly reflexive verbs apparently
differ from the pattern illustrated in (17), sich verlieben, e.g. allow
for a construction corresponding to (17b) and illustrated in (18):
(18) a. der Junge verliebte sich
'the boy fell in love'
b. der verliebte Junge
'the boy in love1
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c. der sich (oft) verliebende Junge
'the boy (often) falling in love'.
Helbig & Buscha [1974 ] and Duden-Grammatik [1984 ] refer to the
construction in (18) as Zustandsreflexiv, distinguishing it from the
proper Zustandspassive. This difference is due to the fact that
Zustandsreflexiv has an active interpretation. The pronoun sich in (17)
and (18) is only formally identical with the one used with reflexive
verbs and may be treated as a part of the idiosyncratic verb morphology.
As such it may be handled in the lexicon although it exhibits different
properties than the verb inflection. (It is a separate element and has
a changing position; it may be treated as a verb particle.) It cannot be
properly handled by the syntax because it is a constituent without a
corresponding argument.
We now consider another example of a non-isomorphic mapping between
syntax and semantics. The difficulties in the syntactic and semantic
description of German es have often been mentioned in discussions of
impersonal verbs and constructions (cf. Subsection 1.3.2). Now, we
analyse a different type of sentence with es. It is illustrated in
(19):
(19) Es sei ABC ein Dreick mit der Eigenschaft...
'let ABC be a triangle with the property...'
If we compare (19) and (20):
(20) a. ABC sei ein Dreick... 'let ABC be a triangle...'
b. ABC i-st ein Dreick... 'ABC is a triangle...'
we may say that they all refer to the same basic fact (or to the same
PF) and differ in modality and in rhetoric or expressive value. If
they all have the same predicate-argument structure (i.e. PF), then the
pronoun es in (19) is an extra element without argument status. As
such, it does not have constituent status in the syntactic
representation either. If we start our analysis from the syntactic
representation, we should arrive at the same conclusion because we
cannot assign to es any syntactic function. The NP ABC has a subject
function and controls the verb agreement, which may be confirmed by
(21):
(21) Es seien ABC und DEF Dreiecke...
'let ABC and DEF be triangles...'
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where the verb necessarily shows agreement with the Plural subject. Es
in (19) remains syntactically unemployed and vanishes if something else
takes the sentence initial position. Schatte [1982] refers to this
function of es as 'the sentence ordering function' and quotes such
examples as Es steht ein Baum im Odenwald (cf. Subsection 1.3.2). The
standard initial sentence of German fairy tales Es war einmal... has a
similar structure.
The word order with an initial es permits everything that follows the
thematic pronoun to be treated as new and relevant. While the examples
with the non-syntactic sich may be described by means of morphology, it
seems that the description of es in constructions such as (19) requires
pragmatic explanation. The presence or absence of es influences and
changes the functional sentence perspective, using the terminology of
the Prague School. Thus, es in (19) has a discourse function.
Syntactically, it is there only to give the finite verb the second
position. The pragmatic function is to leave the thematic position
semantica11y empty.
These two examples of a non-isomorphic mapping between the
predicate-argument structure and the syntactic constituent structure
(i.e. examples with improperly reflexive verbs and with pragmatically
justified initial es) illustrate the case when the number of
constituents is apparently bigger than the number of arguments in the
predicate-argument structure. It is only 'apparently' bigger, because
the syntactically unemployed sich and es do not have their own
grammatical functions. This type of discrepancy between the syntax
and semantics of a sentence does not pose any particular problems for
the interpretation of reference.
3.3.3 Arguments without Constituents
Now we consider the case when the syntactic representation contains
fewer constituents than the number of inherent arguments of the
predicate-argument structure in the PF. We may generally distinguish
between:
1. ellipses motivated by pragmatic and stylistic factors, and
2. omissions motivated by the rearrangement of the syntactic
structure itself .
Ellipsis has been defined by many linguists in a relatively homogeneous
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way. Let us recall some of the relevant definitions, starting with the
one by Gotfried Herrmann, (after Lewandowski [1979]): "ellipsis est
ommissio vocabuli, quod et si non dictum tamen cogitatur". Lewandowski
[1979] defines ellipsis as "Kurzform der Parole", that is as:
"Auslassung von Satzgliedern, Redeteilen, Morphemen,
die durch Nontext and Situation (im engeren und
weiteren Sinne) bedingt oder ermoglicht wird.
...Nicht-Besetzung von Leerstellen, Nicht-Realisierung
der Fugfepotenz in der Parole".
This definition introduces the notion of valency and we may interpret it
in the following way: Only those elements of a syntactic structure may
be elliptically omitted that are predictable from the specification of
the predicate frame, and that, if made explicit, would function as given
and known, i.e. non-rhematic.
An interesting type of ellipsis in German, is the omission of a finite
auxiliary verb in the Perfekt and omission of the present participles
habend and seiend, as illustrated in (22) and (23):
(22) a. Maria Magdalena, sag uns was du gesehen
'Maria Magdalena, tell us what you saw'
b. Auch wer zur Nacht geweint, der stimme froh mit ein
'also whoever has wept by night, joins happily in
the singing'
from German Church songs
(23) Er stand vor der Tu'r, Koffer in jeder Hand
'he stood at the door, a case in each hand'
(Note that (23) could also be interpreted as an apposition.)
It is interesting that the above examples are characteristic for two
different registers of German. The type illustrated in (22) is typical
for literary texts while the type illustrated in (23) occurs
predominantly in colloquial German. Duden Grcimmatik [1984 ] explains
(22) as the stylistically motivated omission of redundant auxiliary
verbs. Accepting the stylistical explanation, we might add that the
ellipsis is possible because the occurrence of the verb is predictable
(inferrable) from the syntactic structure of the sentence (for the
auxiliary verb in Perfekt) or from the semantics (for the participle in
(23)). We may note that the omission of the participles habend and
seiend in German resembles the present Tense constructions involving the
-83-
verb to be in Russian. The verb is omitted, and only the nominal
arguments are expressed, e.g. subject and the predicative adjective.
Russian equivalent of the verb to have is to be associated with two
arguments: one expressing location and corresponding to the 1st argument
of the English to have (however, expressed by a prepositional phrase i.e.
not functioning as subject); the other corresponding to the 2nd argument
of the English to have and functioning as subject. The verb form is
omitted. An excellent discussion on the structure- and/or
discourse-dependent character of elliptical expressions is presented in
Cornish (1986).
An analogous elliptical omission of the auxiliary verb in the Past Tense
(as in (22)) led to a major morphological change in the Polish system of
Tenses (cf. 24).
(24) a. Ja to bylam (1st Pers., Sing., Fein., PAST) zrobi/a
(Sing., Fem., PAST)
'I have done it'
b. Ja to zrobi/am (1st Pers., Sing., Fern., PAST)
'I did it'
c. ZrobiJam to (1st Pers., Sing., Fem., PAST)
1(I) did it' .
The Polish past participle, however, showed the Gender and Number
agreement with the subject, so that the auxiliary verb (after the
participle also took the Person marking) became redundant and
eventually vanished. Modern Polish does not use the analytical Past
Tense except in literature. The Polish constructions with deictic
pronouns of the 1st, 2nd (and sometimes 3rd) Person incorporated into
the finite verb form cannot be treated as elliptical omissions either.
This omission is motivated not only by the pragmatic redundancy
(referents are inferrable from the context) but also by the
morphological redundancy. The pronoun simply repeats the same
information that is already encoded in the finite verb form. If it is
used, then it is usually marked as emphatic or contrastive.
We restrict the use of the term ellipsis to the omissions that are
motivated by communicative (i.e. stylistic and pragmatic) redundancy
only. These cases are different from the omission of inherent arguments
of a PF motivated by syntax, i.e. required, due to the rearrangement of
the predicate-argument structure.
-84-
Syntactically motivated omission - usually of the 1st argument - takes
place if the element omitted is either redundant or demoted from its
syntactically neutral (prototypical in terms of the PF-model) position
and syntactically unemployed.
An important difference between context motivated and syntactically
motivated omission relates to the reconstruction of the missing
elements. Pragmatically and contextually motivated ellipsis is
revealed by knowledge of situation (in a broad sense, i.e. including the
co-text and including the impact of the group specific rhetoric).
Syntactically motivated omission, which may be illustrated by e.g.
passive and impersonal constructions, is reconstructed by the knowledge
of the syntactic and semantic system of a language. Thus, these two
types of reconstruction present different levels of difficulty.
Ellipsis, as context dependent (and in most cases supported by means of
morphology and syntax - e.g. agreement), is easily revealed if in an
appropriate context and, consequently, may be more readily used in
colloquial spoken discourse (for analysis of situation-dependent
ellipsis and anaphora cf. Hankamer & Sag [1976]). In a written,
context-independent discourse, e.g. in mathematical texts, only a
co-text dependent ellipsis is recoverable. On the other hand, the
syntactically motivated omission, which involves reference to the
predicate frames (i.e. to the syntactic and semantic representation) is
frequently used in written and more sophisticated discourse, in general
where extra time is allowed for text processing (cf. Chapter 2).
Scientific discourse favours syntactically motivated omission, because
it allows certain arguments to be left out without affecting the
context-independent character of the discourse. This is why passive,
subjectless or reflexive impersonal constructions are used in scientific
texts more often than anywhere else. (For a comprehensive study of the
'situation-independent' texts cf. Meyer [1983].)
While both types of omission result in semantically, and consequently
referentially, incomplete syntactic structures, elliptic sentences are
often also syntactically defective and ungrammatical if analysed in
isolation. The other type of omission yields grammatically correct and
apparently complete sentences - this is why this type of construction
(i.e. impersonalia) has often been analysed in isolation. The
referential incompleteness of impersonal constructions is less obvious
and often ignored. The PF-model offers a fairly simple descriptive
mechanism to capture the relationship between the syntactic and semantic
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representation in this case.
3.3.4 Indirect Reference
In the rest of this section we discuss how the PF-model interprets the
German impersonal constructions in terms of indirect reference, and
illustrate it with some examples.
If some of the necessary participants of an event, i.e. some arguments
of a predicate frame, instantiated by the use of its label, remain
unspecified, the model follows the instruction on the facets (cf. the
'If-Removed' facet in Section 3.2) that specify how the reference may be
established. As described in Section 3.2, the PF contains the most
expected semantic features of the prototypical participants. The
prototypical assignments for argument slots are determined by the basic
meaning the language user associates with a verb, and are completed or
modified by the individual linguistic experience and by the context.
Having assumed (cf. Chapter 2) that the Gricean principle of cooperation
is valid in the restricted context of scientific communication, we take
it for granted that the speaker can omit to specify a participant only
if he believes that the audience is able to infer or interpret the
missing element of the message on the basis of their own knowledge.
This is in general true also for non-technical communication and,
therefore, constructions as in (25):
(25) Es wurde getanzt 'there was dancing'
are used if the referent of the first argument slot can be successfully
inferred from the context (e.g. die Hochzeitsg'dste). If this is not the
case, constructions as in (26) or (27) would be used instead:
(26) Die Hochzeitsgaste tanzten 'the wedding guests were dancing'
(27) Warend der Hochzeit wurde getanzt
'during the wedding there was dancing1
On the other hand, the sentences in (28) do not bring more information
than (25):
(28) a. Die Leute tanzten 'people were dancing1
b. Man tanzte. 'they danced'
since the semantic feature +HUMAN is a default assignment for the 1st
argument slot in the PF for tanzen.
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The difference between (25) and (28) is that the sentences in (28) have
the argument values explicitly specified, i.e. the argument slot is
filled by a lexically non-empty elements which do not violate the
prototypical feature specification. Therefore, there is no need to
check the feature default specification on the frame slots in order to
interpret the sentence. In (25), however, no argument value is
provided and the model instantiates the frame with the argument default
value for the missing participant.
If it is necessary to refer to the semantic features of an argument
listed in the basic predicate frame in order to identify the referent of
an expression (as it is the case for impersonal constructions), we
consider that expression indirectly referential.
We may note here that a similar concept of reference as an
intersentential link has been described by Rosenberg [1980], pp.99.
Rosenberg distinguishes this type of reference, simple frame reference
(called "reference using slots") from paraphrase ("frame reference by
name") and from contextual reference ("frame reference by description").
He defines frame reference as "a form of reference which depends on the
empty slots of a frame for effect" (ibid.). Frame reference is
illustrated with the following example:
(29) a. John shot his wife
b. The gun was a forty-five caliber automatic ,
and Rosenberg comments that "the sentences can be linked through the
realization that the action of the first sentence ('to shoot') has an
unspecified instrument. The second sentence specifies this instrument"
(ibid.). The concept of describing recognition processes in terms of
a comparision to a stored stereotype is also present in Bobrow and
Winograd [1977] and other AI works on natural language processing (cf.
Schank & Nash-Webber (eds.) [1975], Metzing (ed.) [1980] etc., the most
recent being the Proceedings of the 7th European Conference on AI
[1986]).
The following chapter presents the data from German mathematical
discourse that have been analysed and the methods used for their
description. The mechanism of indirect reference retrieval is employed




MECHANISM OF INDIRECT REFERENCE IN GERMAN
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE
4.1 Research Materials and Methods
4.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we use the predicate frame model, presented in the
previous chapter, to describe a cross-discourse reference tracking
mechanism. We begin by presenting (in Subsection 4.1.2) the data used
for the purpose of this research. Then, (in Subsection 4.1.3) we give
the criteria which were adopted for a formal description of the clause
internal structure, i.e. for the analysis of the relations holding
between a predicate, its inherent arguments and other elements of a
clause. We further discuss (in Section 4.2) the system of verb
classification based on discourse roles adopted in this thesis.
In the following sections we describe the mechanism of indirect
reference in the restricted context of scientific communication. We
discuss the use of indefinite and generalised pronouns, pronoun shift,
and reference switching in the case of indefinite referring expressions.
In Section 4.5 we comment on the use of direct reference in mathematical
discourse. Finally, in Section 4.6, we indicate the results of a pilot
count carried out on a small data sample.
4.1.2 Research Materials
The research on indirect self-reference of the author in scientific
discourse presented in this thesis is based on two data sets from German
mathematical discourse. The first corpus, which we shall further refer
to as corpus A, consists of twelve papers on various mathematical
topics. Six of the papers are recent. We have chosen most of the
texts from mathematical journals, as opposed to e.g. monographs (or
parts of monographs), because they represent a variety of different
idiolects. This, consequently, diminishes the danger of domination of
a style of one particular author over the whole corpus. This
selection of texts was preferred to the investigation of chosen
fragments from longer works. Analysis of short papers gives a
cross-cut of all components of a mathematical text.
The second data set, which we shall refer to as corpus B, consists of a
transcription of 8 mathematical lectures (approximately 10 hours). The
lectures were given during the summer term of 1985 in the Department of
Mathematics at Christian Albrecht University in Kiel and at Hamburg
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University (West Germany). The recorded lectures cover a variety of
subjects and were given by mathematicians of different ages and
experience. The list of texts is given in Appendix 1.
Apart from the investigation of the corpuses A and B we looked at some
original German texts on mathematics written in the 19th century. Also
we looked at German translations of Greek (Euclid) and Latin
mathematical texts (Euler, Jacobi, Frobenius and Gauss).
The comparison between the data from written and spoken discourse
(corpuses A and B) shows to what extent the immediate presence of the
speaker and the audience influences the choice of referring expressions.
By considering some examples of the older mathematical discourse we
wanted to highlight the development of mathematical rhetoric and the
influence of the individual style of particular authors. This is done
in Chapter 5.
Investigating data from the spoken discourse, i.e. analysing the
transcription of the recorded lectures, we often came across incomplete
utterances, repetitions and even illegible fragments of discourse. The
delimitation of clauses was carried out according to the content and
form (syntax), and in the case of very long complex sentences also
according to some intonational clues. Since for the purpose of this
research we were mainly interested in the predicate-argument structures,
we considered the question of sentence delimitation as a minor issue and
concentrated on the clause analysis. Utterances lacking a predicate or
with an incomplete predicate (e.g. with the auxiliary verb only) were
ignored. The proportion of the discourse fragments left out was
different for different speakers.
In written discourse, the syntax of mathematical formulae was left out
of consideration since they do not contain any expressions that could be
used to refer to the participants in the communicative situation. All
omissions are indicated by /.../ . In transcription of recorded
lectures no punctuation is used. Punctuation is used only in
translation of German examples in Appendix 2 to facilitate their
interpretation.
4.1.3 Research Methods
The data are investigated in order to find out what linguistic means are
used in German for self-reference of the speaker in a restricted context
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of scientific communication. We describe the data using the following
criteria:
1. types of lexical predicates occurring in the text. We established a
classification of predicate types according to the participant roles
they prototypically involve and then linked up the predicate classes
with discourse roles characteristic for a given restricted context.
Since, as has been argued in the preceding chapters, the type of lexical
predicate determines the prototypical participants, certain predicates
could, in a restricted context, have their argument slots associated
with particular discourse roles. This would further diminish the
informative value of the lexical fillers in those slots and could be
considered as one of the possible motivations for leaving some argument
slots unfilled. The concept of a link between predicate types and
discourse roles is further developed in Section 4.2.
2. other non-lexical characteristics of the predicate, such as Tense,
Aspect, Mood, Voice and Modality. We consider Modality as
'non-lexical', concentrating on its reference-switching function. (The
grammatical categories of verbal predicates involved in the subject-verb
agreement, i.e. categories of Person and Number are considered in
connection with the 1st participant of a predicate. ) The non-lexical
characteristics of the predicate are seen as deictic and bringing the
subjective point of view of the narrator into the text.
3. definite, generalised and indefinite pronouns. We looked at the
system of pronouns used in mathematical discourse to refer to the
participants in the communication, i.e. to the speaker and to the
audience (a distinction has to be made between the immediate audience
and the general audience, i.e. the mathematical community of the time.)
We are interested in finding out the rules that govern the referential
use of generalised and indefinite pronouns. Since most of them can be
used to refer to the speaker as well as to the audience, we are
interested in conditions and constraints on their interpretation. We
also investigate how the rules of interpretation could be accommodated
within the classification of predicate types based on discourse roles.
4. other than pronominal ways of expressing deixis. The use of local
and temporal deictic expressions in mathematical discourse is
investigated. We look at expressions such as here and now and their
co-occurrence with other deictic elements and with indirectly referring
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expressions. We further analyse how the interpretation of local and
temporal deictic elements is influenced by the presence of indirectly
referential pronouns.
An exhaustive presentation of indirect reference in German is beyond the
scope of this thesis. We concentrate on the indirect presentation of
'self' in one communicative domain, i.e. in mathematical discourse.
-92-
4.2 Predicate Frames and Discourse Roles
4.2.1 Semantic Classes of Predicates
In Subsection 3.1.3, we discussed systems of verb classification and
indicated the predicate characteristics important in our research on
indirect reference. In this section we present the verb classification
system adopted in this thesis. Since the research presented here
concerns reference patterns in scientific discourse, the adopted system
was chosen to serve this particular purpose and no claims are made about
its more general applicability.
In our model of verb semantics, we distinguish two levels containing
information relevant for the interpretation of reference:
1. predicate frames and
2. discourse roles.
At the PF level, prototypical features of verb arguments are represented
(as prototypical feature specifications at PF-slots). Consequently, we
can distinguish between different verb classes according to different
combinations of the type of lexical meaning and the set of prototypical
participants (cf. Section 3.2). We draw a distinction between:
1. action verbs; their PFs contain at least two participating
entities, one of them being the AGENT (prototypically human
and volitional), the other one being the TARGET of the
action. We further distinguish:
i. prototypical action verbs, with a human agent and the target
of the action physically affected;
ii. cognitive action verbs, restricted to human agents, where
action has an abstract, mental, i.e. not strictly physical
character (the object is not physically affected) and the
1st participant is seen as a Processor;
iii. event verbs, i.e. other verbs with at least two
participants, that, however, cannot be seen as describing
either prototypical or cognitive actions (e.g. verbs such
as helfen, ('to help') geben ('to give') etc.) Sets of
participant roles associated with the PF-slots are verb
specific.
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2) middle verbs-, their PFs contain only one participating entity.
Its prototypical status is a function of the lexical meaning
of the predicate. There is no need to specify this relation
since there is no source of confusion (i.e. no other
participant that could be involved).
3) relational verbs-, their PFs contain one or more argument slots
with the feature OTHER (the fillers of those slots may be
co-referential - different degrees of co-reference are
possible) and a relation holding between them. We may
further differentiate this class and distinguish between:
i. relational-equative verbs as in:
Das Resultat ist eine Funktion f(x)
'the result is a function f(x)'
ii. relational-attributive verbs as in:
Die Menge von t ist kompakt
'the set t is compact'
iii. relational-locative verbs as in:
Der Punkt m liegt auf der Ebene L
'the point m lies on the plane L'
Only action verbs (possibly with exception of some event verbs) allow
for passive voice. Lack of passive paraphrases for middle and
relational verbs is motivated by their semantics - the inversion of an
action is not possible, since there is no action in the prototypical
sense.
The predicate classes distinguished above do not represent any complete
verb classification system. (For instance, the classification does not
have a class for proper impersonalia, i.e. verbs with no arguments, e.g.
regnen ('to rain').) They are, however, sufficient for description of
the language use in the restricted context of mathematical discourse.
4.2.2 Pragmatic Classes of Predicates
Having specified the prototypical features of the PF arguments, we
introduce an additional dimension which is meant to represent the
pragmatic information supplied by restricted context in which the
language is used. This information is added to the prototypical
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information stored in the lexicon.
We assume that a restricted context supplies a set of discourse roles.
These discourse roles are associated with immediate participants in the
communicative situation and/or with the physical or mental objects the
discourse is about.
Let us consider as an example the restricted communicative domain of
mathematical lectures. In this restricted context, verbs referring to
the action of knowledge transfer, e.g. lehren ('to teach'), zeigen ('to
show') etc., have some of their argument positions associated not only
with features of prototypical participants but also with specific
discourse roles. Therefore, participants in the communication
sustaining those roles may be directly linked, i.e. identified with
referents of the appropriate predicate argument positions.
In the restricted context of a mathematical lecture we shall distinguish
between two major discourse roles - the speaker transferring his
knowledge and the audience being the goal of the transmission. The
first role is associated with the individual giving the lecture, the
second with his immediate audience. This link remains constant in the
restricted context specified above.
Discourse roles are further associated with certain argument positions
of predicates related to the transfer of knowledge. For verbs such as
e.g. lehren ('to teach'), darstellen ('to present'), angeben ('to give'),
the 1st argument position is associated with the source of knowledge and
the 3rd argument position is associated with the goal of the transfer.
This link too, is constant in a given context. Figure 2 shows how the










Arguments of the [1st argument] [2nd argument] [3rd argument]
predicate frame
Figure 2. Link between participants in an event, discourse roles and
PF argument slots for predicates related to knowledge
transfer in a restricted context
The remaining 2nd argument position in PFs from this verb class has an
open prototypical feature specification object of transmission. Even
though this discourse role is generally linked with a specific lecture
topic, this link exists at discourse level, not at clause level. Thus,
at PF level, the 2nd argument position remains a variable whose
semantics is given by the lexical filling of the appropriate PF-slot.
For verb pairs expressing reversible actions, e.g. lehren/lernen or
geben/bekommen, there are two reverse discourse role assignments; i.e.
the PFs have constant but different links between the referent of the
1st participant slot and the set of discourse roles provided by the
restricted context. While for lehren, darstellen, geben etc., the referent
of the 1st argument is the speaker, for verbs such as lernen ('to
learn'), bekommen ('to receive') etc. it is the audience.
The diagram below shows how in the restricted context of a mathematical
lecture, argument slots of a predicate related to knowledge transfer are














PREDICATE LABEL : zeigen
(AKO slot)
1st ARG : <SPEAKER>
2nd ARG : <T0PIC>
3rd ARG : <AUDIENCE>
Figure 3. PF of the verb zeigen with argument slots associated with
discourse roles characteristic for the restricted context of a
lecture
Other groups of predicates, e.g. those describing cognitive actions
labelled by verbs such as denken {'to think'), verstehen ('to
understand'), annehmen ('to assume') etc., may have either the speaker
or the audience as referents of their 1st argument position. The choice
of an appropriate link depends not only on the lexical filling of the
1st argument slot on the PF. It may also be a function of the lexical
filling of the 2nd argument slot corresponding to the object of the
cognitive action expressed by the predicate, i.e. type of knowledge or
belief may determine the reference link. One of the surface clues as
to how to interpret some cognitive action predicates is the use of modal
verbs.
In the following sections we show how the concept of indirect reference
and discourse roles in restricted context applies to data from spoken
and written German mathematical discourse.
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4.3 Indirect Reference via Predicate Frame
4.3.1 Introduction
In this and the following section, we describe a means of indirect
reference, particularly author's self-reference, in German mathematical
discourse. In this section we concentrate on indirect reference via
predicate frame. Other means of indirect reference, e.g. pronoun
shift, reference by deictic elements and other lexical reference
indicators, as well as the reference switching function of model verbs
etc., are discussed in Section 4.4 . Syntactic and pragmatic
conditions and constraints on interpreting indirect reference are
summarised in Chapter 5.
As we pointed out in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), the prototypical features
specification of the predicate arguments is associated with PF-slots and
is inherited by the frame copy when no lexical filler for a given slot is
available. In the previous section of this chapter we discussed the
question how, for certain semantic classes of predicates (e.g. those
relating to the action of knowledge transfer), predicate arguments are
linked together with discourse roles. Here, we apply both concepts in
order to interpret impersonal and indefinite personal constructions used
in written and spoken mathematical discourse.
Reference via predicate frame (i.e. indirect reference) is possible in
the case of syntactic constructions that allow some argument positions
to be left unfilled. In Subsection 3.3.3 we distinguished between
omission of predicate arguments motivated by pragmatic reasons
(ellipsis) and omission motivated by syntactic factors. In the first
case, the referents may be identified by linking unfilled PF-slots with
discourse roles known from the immediate context. Referring merely to
the prototypical feature specification on PF argument slots would not be
enough to achieve successful identification of discourse referents in
most of the non-specific (i.e. not formalised) contexts. This is
why, as we argued, context motivated, and consequently context
dependent, ellipsis is possible only where the same immediate
situational context is accessible both for the speaker and his
audience.
In the case of omission justified by syntax, the argument is first
demoted from its neutral (according to the PF specification) position,
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it becomes a chomeur (i.e. it loses its syntactic function, which is
taken over by another argument), and as such it can be left out. In
German and in other Indo-European languages, this is the case for
passive and reflexive constructions where the 1st argument of the
predicate frame may be or must be omitted in the clause structure. In
our data from mathematical discourse, we find instances of indirect
reference of both types. Their common feature is that to infer the
intended reference it is necessary to relate the actual structure of a
clause to the matrix predicate frame. Let us discuss the examples
found in the data, starting with constructions where there is no
demotion of the omitted argument down the hierarchy of grammatical
relations.
4.3.2 Man-Clauses
A simple example of a construction with an argument not demoted but also
non-lexical is the German man-construction. Man always takes the
syntactic subject position in constructions with predicates that have
prototypically human 1st participants. An exception is the passive
construction with the subject man, as e.g. in (1):
(1) Man wird oft gefragt....
'one is often asked...' .
This is possible only for predicates which have no prototypical semantic
constraints (or simply allow the feature + HUMAN) on arguments that
correspond to the passive subject man. Predicates such as behaupten ('to
presuppose') or annehmen ('to assume'), with 2nd arguments
prototypically related to the feature + ABSTRACT, do not permit passive
with the subject man:
(2) *Man wird angenommen...
'one is assumed... '
*Man wird behauptet...
'one is presupposed...' .
If the subject position is filled by man, no other lexical element can
be added (neither as apposition nor by conjunction). The examples in
(3b and c) are ungrammatical:
(3) a. Man beweist den Satz wie folgt
'one proves the theorem as follows'
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b.*Man, der Autor beweist den Satz wie folgt
'one, the author, proves the theorem as follows'
c.*Man und der Autor beweisen den Satz wie folgt
'one and the author prove the theorem as follows' .
Although man is a proper syntactic subject (i.e. it can be substituted
for lexically fully specified expressions such as der Autor or E. Landau
etc. without causing any changes in the syntactic structure of the
clause), it does not add any semantic or referential information to the
prototypical feature specification available in the PF for a given
argument position. Man functions as a surface representation of the
PF semantic prototype, constituting a unique example of this sort in the
language system of German.
To establish reference of the marc-expressions used in scientific
communication, this prototypical semantic information is not sufficient.
However, it seems that in the restricted context of mathematical
discourse, the so called indefinite personal pronoun man has definite,
though not constant, referents. The referential link can be
established by introducing the additional pragmatic dimension of
discourse roles, discussed in the previous section. Thus, it is the
pragmatic class of the predicate which determines the referential link
for indefinite referring expressions. We illustrate this point with
some examples, first from the spoken, then from the written discourse.
(Translation of all discourse examples is given in Appendix 2.)
Example 4.1:
...jetzt wo 11 en wir sagen wir haben einen
operator/dissipativ/nun/das konnte unser letzter teil fur
heute sein/definition/t von x dt nach x linear t heiBt
dissipativ genau dann wenn fur alle x aus dt existiert ein
x strich aus f von.../also ein funktional/so da3 der
realteil von x strich angewendet auf tx/daC der kleiner
gleich null ist/da glaubt man nie im leben daB man damit was
anfangen kann/ich geb' deswegen gleich mal den satz
an/.../wir beweisen ihn das nachste mal aber ich mag sie
mit dieser definition nicht ins wochenende gehen lassen
weil wie gesagt man glaubt nicht daB man damit irgendwas
anfangen kann/.../das ist so eine gleichma'Bige
beschranktheit dieser abbildung nach unten/das heiBt also
wenn das ding hier surjektiv ware/injektiv ist es/dann hat
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man genau eine abschatzung wie man sie braucht fur Hiller
Phillips/denn man hat sie einfach aus dem inversen operator
hier von/.../ das heiBt also wenn man auf irgendeine art und
weise sicherstellen kann da(3 das t abgeschlossen ist und ja
irgendwie raal surjektiv dann hat man schon die
voraussetzung/.../und... stellt sich wirklich heraus so
verruckt diese bedingung hier irgendwie aussieht daB man
sie wirklich relativ einfach nachrechnen kann /.../man hat sich ein
x aus dt herzunehmen und muB dann so ein x strich aus fx
finden/wobei man nicht weiB wie schwierig es ist fx zu
bestimmen/aber man muB's sich dann nur noch angucken/muB
keine norm ausrechnen / nichts/sondern man I'aBt irgendein
funktional los auf fx/und wenn man jetzt die norm ausrechnen
wollte von irgendwie tx Oder so/dann m'uBte man alle
funktionale nehmenf . . .Oder so/ . . .
(B-l)
Example 4.2:
C) Rationale Homotopie von S1-Faserungen. Im folgenden
suchen wir eine Mannigfaltigkeit mit H*(B,Q)=H* und eine
S1-Faserung p:EiB, so daB E und M rational
homotopieaquivalente Mannigfaltigkeiten sind. B soil
zunachst als rationaler Raum konstruiert werden, wobei wir
Sullivan's rationale Homotopietheorie heranziehen.
Satz 2.8. Sei p:EiB eine Sx-Faserung. Dann gibt es...
Satz 2.8. erh'alt man leicht aus einem Satz von Grivel. Die
letzte Gleichung in Satz 2.8 soil als
"Differentialgleichung" verstanden werden, die man Grad
fur Grad losen muB:... Dann mu|3 gel ten... Die rechte Seite
ist bestimmt, da dE(X) zerlegbar ist.
D) Aufbau freier S1-Operationen bis auf rationale
Homotopieaqui valenz. Kann man J wie in Satz 2.8 angeben,
so induziert die kurze exakte Sequenz..., p die
Augmentation, eine der Gysin-Sequenz ahnliche lange
exakte Sequenz... Man mochte nun r - und dam it dB - so
w'ahlen. da/3 obige Sequenz durch eine Leiter von
Isomorphismen verbunden werden kann...
(A—7)
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It is obvious that in both fragments man is not used as indefinitely
referential. Even though in most of the examples above no individual
can be selected as referent of man, the referential link is definite
and is determined by the set of statements predicated of the subject
man. Thus, even in an apparently homogeneous fragment of discourse,
we may find instances of man which do not allow for the same
interpretation, e.g. because they are associated with predicates related
to different discourse roles.
In examples 4.1 and 4.2, most instances of man may be interpreted as
referring to the general audience, i.e. to 'those who want to follow the
argument presented and have all necessary knowledge to do so'. In
most cases (e.g. in the first four instances in example 4.1), the
author does not exclude himself from that group in any explicit way.
However, an exclusion of this sort is possible and it can be illustrated
with another example in fragment 4.1, which we repeat here for
convenience:
(4) a. ...wobei man nicht wei3 wie schwierig es ist fx zu
bestimmen...
'...where one does not know how difficult it is to
estimate fx...' .
Here, the author clearly excludes himself from the group (referred to by
man) of those who do not know how difficult the problem is. The
author knows the answer and he confirms this in the two following
statements.
(4) b. ...aber man mu3's sich dann nur noch angucken/muB keine
norm ausrechnen...
'...but one only has to take a glance at it/one does
not need to calculate the norm...' .
A different case of narrowing the reference scope of man is illustrated
by an expression in example 4.2, repeated below:
(5) ...Man mochte nun r ... so wahlen, da0 die obige
Sequenz... durch eine Leiter von Isomorphismen
verbunden werden kann...
'...one would like to choose r in such a way that the
above sequence can be connected by a ladder of
isomorphisms... ' .
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Fragment 4.2 is taken from a paper written by two authors. Due to this
fact, the pronoun wir, which is the neutral indirect way of the author's
self reference in scientific discourse and which also allows for the
desired more general reading, becomes directly referential.
Consequently, in text A-7 wir is used to refer to the particular actions
and achievements of the authors (i.e. it is used as directly referential).
The neutral function of the generalised wir is taken over by man. In
example (5) (from fragment 4.2), however, man occurs together with the
modal verb mogen and this particular element seems to redirect the
reference interpretation and to narrow it to the authors' reference to
themselves. Different modal verbs have different reference switching
properties and we discuss this question in more detail in Section 4.4.
Other examples of definite, though varying reference of the pronoun man
are discussed in Subsection 4.4.1, where we relate this question to the
pronoun shift and analyse dependencies in the system of pronouns used in
a restricted context.
German constructions with the pronoun man in subject position
constitute the only example of a syntactically neutral structure where
the constituent corresponding to the 1st argument of the PF is lexically
empty (i.e. does not add any extra information to the PF prototypical
semantic feature specification) but not demoted down the hierarchy of
grammatical relations. Now, we discuss an example of a regular
omission of one argument position in a particular class of predicates.
4.3.3 Reduced Va1ency
In Section 4.2 it was pointed out that in the restricted context defined
by a lecture or by a particular mathematical paper, predicates related
to the action of knowledge transfer, such as (an)geben ('to give'),
darstellen ('to present'), zeigen ('to show'), have their 3rd argument
position associated with the discourse role of the goal of transmission.
This argument position is further linked with the immediate audience or
in the case of a mathematical paper also with the general audience.
Because this link remains constant in a given restricted domain, any
lexical filling of the 3rd argument slot would be interpreted as
referring to the audience. Since the reference of that argument is
expected, the informative value of the lexical filler is null and the
filler becomes redundant. Consequently, we observe a regular change
in the valency of trivalent verbs related to the knowledge transfer.
The 3rd argument position of predicates such as (an)geben or zeigen is
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especially well suited for this regular omission. Firstly, in German
the 3rd argument cannot be advanced to the syntactic subject position.
It remains associated with the Dative case marking even if the 2nd
argument becomes subject. 1st arguments, which are naturally selected
for syntactic subjects, cannot be omitted without major changes in the
syntactic structure of the clause. This is due to the fact that German
finite clauses (apart from few exceptional cases) must have an overt
grammatical subject. Omission of the 3rd argument does not cause any
rearrangements of the syntactic structure.
The second reason is more complex and relates to the problem of indirect
reference. The most common way of achieving self-reference in
scientific discourse is with the generalised wir. In most cases wir
may be interpreted as referring either to the speaker only or to the
speaker and the audience or, eventually, to the audience only.
Consequently, the most suitable form to be used as a lexical filler of
the 3rd argument slot would be the Dative form of the 1st Person Plural
pronoun, i.e. uns, as in (6):
(6) wir geben uns jetzt den Beweis dafiir
'we are now giving ourselves a proof for this'.
Example (6) is grammatical only if we accept the co-referential
interpretation of wir and uns. One cannot interpret wir as e.g.
author's indirect self-reference and uns as indirectly referring to the
audience. However, if wir and uns are to be co-referential, the
statement in (6) seems to be slightly awkward: it would mean that
either the speaker presents something (here the proof) to himself, or
that the speaker and the audience work together to present something to
themselves. Both interpretations would be rejected because they do not
match the pragmatic discourse roles assignment discussed in Section 4.2.
Moreover, the convenient general pronoun man cannot be used since it
does not possess a Dative form. The alternative form einem suggests a
singular referent interpretation and this is not a desirable one. Any
expressions referring to the immediate or general audience in a more
explicit way, e.g. euch, ihnen ('to you'), alien ('to everybody'), den
Lenten ('to the people') or der ganzen mathematischen Gemeinschaft ('to the
whole mathematical community') are either too narrow or simply do not
comply with the rhetoric of science. Therefore, the regular decrease in
valency is the most appropriate and pragmatically neutral solution.
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Let us illustrate this point with some examples from the written
(corpus A) and spoken (corpus B) mathematical discourse.
(7) Wir zeigen hier unter anderem, da/3 diese Vermutung richtig
ist...
'we show here among other things that this conjecture is
correct... '
(A-7)
(8) Im Abschn. 3 zeigen wir dann, wie man Z/pn-Operationen...
verschiebt, urn zu Satz 1.0 zu kommen
'in section 3 we show then how one shifts the
Z/pn-operations... to arrive at theorem 1.0'
(A-7)
(9) Der Beweis dieser beiden Satze wird in Abschn. 5 gegeben
werden.
Die Satze 3.1 und 3.2 wurden von Jones ... angegeben. Satz
3.2 folgt leicht aus... . Da uns die dort angegebenen
Beweise nicht vollig klar sind, haben wir Beweise im
Abschn. 5 ausgefiihrt. Andere Beweise hier fur sind von
Assadi ... gegeben worden
'the proof of these two theorems will be given in
section 5. theorems 3.1 and 3.2 were given by Jones... .
theorem 3.2 follows easily from... . since the proofs
given there were not absolutely clear for us we have
derived them in section 5. other proofs for this were
given by Assadi
(A-7)
(10) Ist die Bedingung ... nicht erfullt, so kann man
immerhin noch sagen...
'if the condition ... is not satisfied, one can still
say...'
(A-7)
(11) In diesem Abschnitt werde ich zeigen, wie man mit diesen
Resultaten auch Realisierungen zusammengesetzter
endlicher Gruppen ... erhalten kann
'in this section I shall show how, with these results,




(12) Folgerung 2b) liefert nun die Behauptung fur die Gruppe
G = M12
'conclusion 2b) gives then the statement for the group
G = M12 '
(A-ll)
(13) Fiir die sporadischen einfachen Gruppen stehen keine
bequemen Matrizendarstellungen zur Verfiigung, dagegen sind
die Charaktertafeln alle vorhanden
'for sporadic simple groups no convenient matrix
representations are available, whilst the character
tables are all at hand'
(A-ll)
(14) Wir zeigen jetzt, daB es zu jedem x eine Moglichkeit gibt,
xy flir alle y so zu definieren, daB...
'now we show that for each x it is possible to define xy
for all y in such a way that...'
(A-5)
(15) ...wir werden namlich zeigen daB wenn die zahl n minus
eins auf irgendwelche weise in ganzzahlige faktoren alpha
beta gamma und so we iter ... zerlegt wird/x in alpha
faktoren ... zerlegt werden kann...
'...we shall namely show that if the number n-1 can
somehow be resolved into integer factors a B 7 and so on
... then x can be resolved into a factors...'
(B-2)
(16) Er hat die Frage gestellt, ob eine beliebige abgeschlossene
Menge, die ..., die Nul lstel lenmenge der
charakteristischen Funktion ist
'he posed the question whether an arbitrary closed set
which ... is a set of zero values of the characteristic
function'
(A-9)
(17) ...wir wollen zeigen, daB es nur endlich viele
zwischenkorper gibt zwischen 1 und k...
'...we want to show that there are only finitely many
intermediate fields between 1 and k...'
(B-3)
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In the examples above, the predicates zeigen, geben, zur Verfugung stehen
('to be at sb's command'), sagen ('to tell') etc. are used as bivalent,
and the 3rd argument, which would express reference to the audience, is
omitted. This omission is to be explained by the pragmatic, context
determined, reference link between predicate arguments and discourse
roles. The omitted 3rd argument in examples (7)-(17) is linked with
the general audience. The intended reference of the 3rd argument for
this set of predicates does not depend on the reference of the 1st
argument position. In (16) the general interpretation of the
unexpressed 3rd argument is possible although the 1st argument is not
linked with the author. In this example, the predicate eine Frage
stellen ('to ask a question') is associated with the 3rd Person Singular
definite pronoun er in subject position. The general interpretation of
the 3rd argument is obvious because of the semantics of the 2nd
argument, linked with the presented fragment of knowledge.
Where the 3rd argument is to be linked with referents unexpected in the
restricted context, the reference is made explicit. One example of this
sort is given in (9), where an extra position (filled with the Dative
form uns) is added to the relational-attributive PF. This was
necessary to narrow the scope of the predicate nicht klar sein ('not to be
clear') and to restrict it, for rhetorical reasons, to the authors only.
Below we give more examples of trivalent predicates with all valency
positions lexically specified, due to the fact that the 3rd argument
position is no longer associated with the expected referent. Examples
illustrating this phenomenon were found almost only in the spoken
mathematical discourse. The only examples in the set of data from
written discourse come from the very informal introduction to a student
manual by Edmund Landau, whose specific language we discuss further in
Section 4.5. One example from Landau is quoted below as (18).
(18) . . .ich empfehle Dir aber als Ubungsaufgabe zu Kap.l, §4,
2 = 1 + 1
4 = ((1 + 1) + 1) + 1
zu definieren und jenen Satz zu beweisen.
'as an exercise to ch.l, §4, however, I recommend you to
define ... and to prove the above therem' .
(A—5)
Examples, (19)— (21), are taken from a lecture where the work of Carl
Friedrich Gauss was discussed in a historical perspective. There, it
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was often the case that the predicate argument linked with the source of
knowledge was associated with an individual referent, i.e. Gauss, and
the goal argument was associated with a specific group referent, i.e.
with those studying Gauss' theory. This change in the neutral
discourse role assignment is made explicit by a full lexical
specification of valency for predicates related to the transfer of
knowledge.
(19) ...und was macht Gauss dazu?/nun wir gehen sozusagen von
einer Galois-korrespondenz.../von so einem zwischen-
korper m heruber zu einer untergruppe u/und dann wird
Gauss uns gleich zeigen da/3.../nun das wissen wir schon...
'...and what does Gauss with this?/well we move over,
say, from Galois correspondence.../from such an
intermediate field m to a subgroup u/and then Gauss will
immediately show us that.../we 11 we know this already...
(B—2)
(20) ...das macht Gauss auch so alles/dann hat man eta null als
nullstelle eines polynoms vom grade e/also losung einer
gleichung vom grade e/nicht?/und dann hat er jedenfalls
diesen korper hier im griff/dann kann er das wieder uns
beweisen/zeigen da/3 dieses eta null hat...
'...and all this Gauss also does/and then one has n0 as
zero value of the polynomial of degree e/i.e. the solution
of an equation of degree e/yes?/and then he has the feel
of this field here/and then again he can prove it to
us/show that this nQ has...'
(B-2)
(21) ...jetzt hat er (i.e. Gauss - M.S.) uns schon erzahlt daS
dieses symbol/eckige klammer/abhangt von r ...
'...now he has already told us that this symbol/[]/
depends on r...'
(B-2)
If a simple deictic reference interpretation is desired and the speaker
refers to himself using ich, he addresses his immediate audience in a
direct way and the 3rd argument position is lexically filled by Ihnen as
in (22):
(22) ...da hab ich Ihnen also mitgebracht hier aus den
disquisitiones arithmeticae auf deutsch/habe eigentlich
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hier auf lateinisch/werde Ihnen nachher einen schonen
lateinischen satz vorlesen/.../also das schlieOt sich an
die seiten die ich Ihnen da gegeben habe an...
'...so I have brought you here along from the
disquisitiones arithmeticae in German/actually I have it
here in Latin/(I) shall read you later aloud a nice Latin
sentence/.../so this goes together with the pages that I
gave you...'
(B—2)
Examples such as (22) are related to what the speaker actually does in
the classroom. They contain predicates other than those relating to
the transfer of abstract knowledge (such as darstellen, zeigen etc.).
Vorlesen ('to read aloud') and mitbringen ('to bring along') describe real
actions performed by the speaker. Even the predicate geben ('to
give'), as used in (22), has its non-specific, literal meaning and as
such has all its argument positions filled.
In the spoken discourse we found also instances of free Datives, i.e.
constituents with Dative case marking, having no complement status,
coreferential with the clause subject. They are characteristic mainly
for an informal way of speaking. The morphological form found most
often was the Dative of the 1st Person Plural pronoun, uns as in
(23)-(24):
(23) ...zum vorgegebenen x definieren wir uns satze...
'...for a given x we define us statements...
(B-l)
(24) ...jetzt denken wir uns.../wir denken uns.../erinnern uns
an diese ... schnittpunkte...
'...now we think.../we think.../(we) recall these points
of intersection...'
(B-8)
The 1st Person Singular form mir, as in example (25), was also found in
our data:
(25) ...wichtig war mir die verbindung zwischen der
differenzierbarkeit und dem begriff der...
'...for me the important 'thing was the link between the
differentiability and the concept of ..." .
(B-4)
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In the examples (9) and (25) we have the Dative pronouns uns and mir
associated with complex predicates klar sein ('to be clear') and wichtig
sein ('to be important'). The pronominal forms in these examples cannot
be interpreted as synatactically and semantically empty. Syntactically,
they function as Dative objects. Semantically, they restrict the scope
of validity of the predicate.
We have discussed so far two, syntactically very simple possibilities of
indirect reference, i.e. the marc-clauses and the examples of a
pragmatically justified decrease in valency. German syntax allows for
a wide range of other, more complex, indirect ways for the author to
achieve self-reference as well as reference to the audience. Below, we
discuss indirect reference via:
1. passive constructions,
2. infinitival constructions,
3. Streckformen, i.e. predicates consisting of a
semantically neutral verb and a nominal predicative,
4. other nominal constructions.
4.3.4 Passive
As was pointed out in Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), passive
constructions with some predicate arguments missing are interpreted by
filling the appropriate slots in the current PF-copy with the
prototypical semantic feature specification from the matrix PF or from
the previous PF-copy. Schematically, this can be done e.g. by
activating the 'If-removed' facet on the argument slot (cf. Subsection
3.2.1). Then the prototypical semantic information about arguments as
well as the referential extra information provided by the restricted
context (i.e. the information on the discourse roles assignments)
becomes accessible. If we adopt this mechanism of reference
interpretation both the personal and the impersonal passives with
predicates associated with human 1st participants (in the restricted
context considered) can be interpreted as personal, i.e. the complete set
of participants can be retrieved.
Let us consider some examples to illustrate this point.
(26) Dieser Satz sagt also aus, da|3 alle MaBtheorien nur durch
Umrechnung aus der additiven entstehen. Sein Beweis war
am angegebenen Ort sehr umstandlich und uniibersichtl ich
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gefuhrt. Es soil nun hier ein ganz kurzer und
durchsichtiger Beweis gegeben werden
'this theorem states that all measure theories are
obtained by conversion from the additive one. its proof
was derived there in a very complex and obscure way.
here, a very short and clear proof shall be given1 .
(A-8)
In (26) we have a sequence of two agentless passive constructions. In
both cases the explicit reference to the agent is missing (i.e. there
are no agentive prepositional phrases) and, apparently, the
co-referential interpretation of the missing agents is not desired. This
is indicated by the contrastive use of tenses (Prateritum versus Pr'dsens
with a modal verb) and other contrastive deictic elements {am
angegebenen Ort versus nun hier) as well as by contrast ive adjectives
{umst'dndlich and unubersichtlich versus kurz and durchsichtig). The temporal
and local deictic markers (and in fact also the evaluative expressions)
seem to link the missing agent of the first passive construction in (26)
with a different individual than the current narrator, who is clearly
the referent of the missing agent expression in the second passive
construction. However, the two missing agents in (26) are
co-referential and the two agentless passives are forms of the author's
indirect self-reference. The referential link is made explicit at the
beginning of the paper in the opening phrase in (27):
(27) An anderer Stelle^ habe ich alle Inhaltstheorien betrachtet,
die folgenden vier Axiomen gentigen
'at a different place1) I considered systems of sets that
satisfy the following four axioms' .
(A-8)
After this link has been established, all instances of self-reference
are indirect (waAz-clauses, impersonal passives etc. ) and the desired
interpretation of the indirectly referring expressions is indicated by
various temporal or local deictic elements (cf. further discussion in
Subsection 4.3.5).
The contrast made in (26) may be interpreted in terms of the author's
intention to distance himself from his own earlier results, since his
theory has improved. In the case considered above, the co-referential
interpretation of the two missing agents was correct despite the
contrastive form used. However, an analogous contrast could be used to
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express reference switching if the two inherent agents were not
co-referential. This clearly shows that reference switching could be
achieved even if no directly referring expressions were present in the
clause surface structure.
Agentless passives can be interpreted in terms of the author's indirect
self-reference or as instances of his reference to the definite
(immediate or general) audience. This interpretation may result from
the semantic class of the predicate and its assignment of discourse
roles. Below we give some more examples to illustrate the use of the
passive in German mathematical discourse.
(28) In §3 gabeln wir das Axiomensystem A an dem Axiom von der
Existenz der Verbindungsgeraden. (author's indirect
self-reference using generalised wir and supported by the
local phrase in §i - M.S.) Das Axiomensystem A, zusammen
mit der Existenz der Verbindungsgeraden, ist Equivalent
mit dem Schmidt-Bachmannschen Axiomensystem, fur das der
Hauptsatz 1 schon in [4] bewiesen ist. (indirect reference
to the author of the paper [4] via PF of the agentless
Zustandspassiv - M.S.) Fur das Axiomensystem A,... wird der
Hauptsatz 1 in Teil II bewiesen (author's indirect
self-reference via PF of the agentless Vorgangspassiv,
supported by the local phrase in Teil II - M.S.)
'in §3 we append the system of axioms A with the axiom of
existence of the straight line connecting two points, the
system of axioms A, together with the existence of the
connecting line, is equivalent to the Schmidt-Banach
system of axioms, for which the main theorem 1 has
already been proved in [4]. for the system of axioms A,
... the main theorem 1 will be proved in part II'
(A-12)
(29) Das Problem der Einbettung topologischer Ringe in
Quotientenringe wurde ... wohl erstmals von Gelbaum-
Kalisch-Olmstedt [5] systematisch untersucht (direct
reference via agentive phrase - M.S. )
'the problem of embedding topological rings in the
quotient rings was for the first time systematically
investigated by Gelbaum, Kalisch & Olmstedt [5]...'
(A-10)
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(30) Der Begriff des general isierten Nullteilers stammt aus
der Theorie der normierten Algebren (vgl. auch Arens [2])
und wurde bereits von Andrunakievic-Arnautov [1] auf
beliebige topologische Ringe ubertragen. (direct
reference via agentive phrase - M.S.)
'the concept of the generalised null divisor originates
from the theory of algebras with norm (cf. also
Arens [2]) and has already been applied to arbitrary
topological rings by Andrunakievic & Arnautov [1]'
(A-10)
Actions such as beweisen ('to prove'), definieren ('to define'), formulieren
('to formulate'), untersuchen ('to investigate'), etc., in a restricted
context defined by pragmatic features characteristic for a lecture or
scientific paper, are prototypically predicated of the speaker/author.
If this link is to be redirected, an overt, explicit indication is
needed, e.g. by means of some definite local adverbials or, in fact, by
fully specified agentive phrases as in (29)—(30 ). In (28) local
deictic indicators support self-referential (or definite personal)
interpretation although no other means of reference are overtly used.
Deictic elements may favour self-referential interpretation even if the
discourse roles assignment for a predicate does not point to the author
as the most likely referent of the 1st argument.
4.3.5 Infinitival and Participial Constructions
Apart from simple and modalised passives used as means of indirect
reference, we find a wide range of infinitival or participial
constructions as well as numerous examples of nominalisation. There,
again, the interpretation results from the appropriate link between the
unfilled PF-slots and discourse roles (for predicate classes with
specific discourse roles assignments) or the prototypical semantic
features. We shall examine how the PF reference interpretation applies
to other constructions. Let us first consider an example with the
construction sich lassen + Infinitiv:
(31) Mit den Bezeichnungen von Figur 1 I'cisst sie sich
folgendermassen beschreiben




In the restricted context, the 1st argument position of beschreiben ('to
describe') is prototypically associated with the author. However, if
the PF of beschreiben is embedded in a construction with sich lassen, the
1st participant slot of the verb beschreiben is not filled with lexical
material. Consequently, (31) may have a general reading, i.e. it simply
expresses a certain property of the figure in question (pyramid), a
property which does not depend on who does the describing. Paraphrases
of (31), e.g. kann beschrieben werden,. or man kann beschreiben do not allow
for the same degree of blocking for the definite personal (i.e.
individual) interpretation. A similar general reading is allowed in
constructions with sein + zu + Infinitiv. We shall discuss later this
type of infinitival clause in more detail.
Since the construction sich lassen + Infinitiv has the most general reading,
it is a useful way of expressing mathematical statements where, e.g., a
certain property is attributed to certain objects as a result of human
cognitive actions such as defining or describing. Thus, this
construction is often used in written discourse, especially in theorems
and proofs, e.g.:
(32) Lemma 3.2. Sei E eine abgeschlossenne, symmetrische
Teilmenge des RN, die den Nullpunkt nicht enthalt, und
die beziiglich ... periodisch ist. Dann laBt sich E in
der Form ... darstellen, wobei die Mengen e k j
N-dimensionale Grundmengen sind
'lemma 3.2. let E be a closed symmetric partial set of
Rn which does not contain zero, and which is periodic
with respect to... . then, E can be represented as ...
where sets e k j are N-dimensional basic sets'
(A—9)
(33) Deshalb genligt es, zu zeigen, daB sich die Mengen ... in
der Form (4) darstellen lassen
'therefore it is enough to show that sets ... can be
represented as in (4)'
(A—9 )
(34) Mit Hilfe der Gysin-Sequenz lassen sich weitere
Bedingungen an H*(M) angeben




In (32 )-(34 ) above, the verbs darstellen and angeben are used in
infinitive constructions. This allows the 1st participants of the
predicates to be left out syntactically and, consequently, also
semantically. Thus, the construction in (33) is interpreted merely as
an attribution of a property darstellbar sein to the syntactic subject. The
constituent functioning as subject of (33) corresponds to the 2nd
argument of the predicate darstellen. This type of infinitive
construction is often seen as a passive paraphrase. As far as the
interpretation of reference is concerned, it represents a higher degree
of backgrounding of the 1st participant. In the spoken mathematical
discourse, more informal clauses with subjects man and wir are used
instead.
Below we discuss other infinitival constructions, um + zu + Infinitiv and
haben/sein + zu + Infinitiv.
The um + zu + Infinitiv construction is a typical, neutral form of German
Finalsatz. The referent of the overt subject of the main clause is
identical with the referent of the 1st argument in the PF of the verb in
the infinitive. Since this referential identity can be achieved
without repeating explicit (even if indirect) reference to the human
participant, we would expect the um + zu + Infinitiv construction to be
often used in certain parts of mathematical discourse (e.g. in proofs
and in comments on methodology). This was confirmed by the data:
(35) Um (2.2.f) sicherzustellen, muB man von diesem Rezept evtl.
in einem Punkt abweichen
'to guarantee (2.2.f) one possibly has to diverge from
this formula at one point'
(A—7)
(36) Um ... zu definieren, verkleben wir ... entlang ... mit...
'to define ... we fasten ... down along with...' .
(A-7)
The um + zu + Infinitiv construction occurs almost exclusively in the
written discourse, most probably because the syntactically more complex
structures are generally avoided in the spoken language. Instead of
complex sentences, we find sequences of relatively simple clauses. This
is illustrated in the discourse fragment 4.3 below:
Example 4.3
...das problem das man zunachst hat ist uberhaupt zu sehen daB
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diese menge nicht leer ist/also erstens r x ist nicht leer/na
ja/wenn x gleich null ist hat man keine groSen
schwierigkeiten/nicht?/nur wenn x ungleich null ist/also da/3
die geschichte nicht leer ist/ja dann nutzen wir einfach den
Hahn-Banach aus/so machen wir es einfach so/zum vorgegebenen x
definieren wir uns satze/tja/wie machen wir das?/wie nennen
wir das?/fi von x sei norm ... und zwar weil wir fi auffassen
als abbildung vom erzeugnis von x —fund wir setzen diese
abbildung linear fort/.. Jund fi wo 11 en wir machen zu einer
linearen abbildung auf dem erzeugnis von x mit werten im
korper/wir machen es einfach ganz brutal/wir setzen also
1inear fort...
(B-l)
In 4.3 the causal dependencies between clauses are expressed by means of
inserted questions (wie machen wir das? Chow shall we do this?'), wie
nennen wir das? ('how shall we denote this?')}, by simple temporal
adverbs such as zun'achst, erstens and dann or by the conjunction und.
Infinitival constructions found more often in the spoken discourse are
Z-U J
those involving verbs sein and haben + (lnfinitiv in various configurations
as illustrated in (37 )—(40 ).
(37) ...so schon diese bedingungen von Hiller und Yosida auch
sind/sie sind im allgemeinen schwer nachzurechnen/also es
ist im allgemeinen schwierig resol ventenabgleichung/
resolventenabschatzung zu finden/... /es ist leicht so was
auszurechnen aber so was auszurechnen ist schon
unangenehm. . .
'...although these conditions by Hiller and Yosida are
nice they are generally difficult to check/i.e. it is
generally difficult to find the adjustment of the
resolvents/the estimation of resolvents/.../it is easy to
calculate something like this but it is quite unpleasant
to calculate something like this...'
(B-l)
(38) Es sind zunachst einige Begriffe zu erl'dutern
'there are first some concepts to explain'
(A-4)
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(39) ...nun wenn ich das ut darauf ... anwende dann habe ich
das maximum nun noch zu nehmen...
'...well if I apply ut to this ... then I only have to
take the maximum...'
(B-l)
(40) ...man hat sich ein x aus dt herzunehmen.. .
'...one has to take an x out of dt...' .
(B-l)
(Note that in (40) we also have a free Dative constituent co-referential
with the subject man.)
Again, as was the case for sich lassen + Infinitiv, the 1st argument
positions of the main verb in sein + zu + Infinitiv in (37)-(38) are
blocked, i.e. (41a) is awkward
(41) a. sie sind von uns schwer zu finden
'they are *by us difficult to find'
and (41b) ungrammatical
b. es ist schwierig sie *von uns zu finden
'it is difficult to find them *by us' .
For trivalent verbs, such as geben {'to give'), lexical filling of the
3rd argument position is also considered as stylistically marked (as
contrastive), cf. (42):
(42) Der Beweis ist euch/Ihnen zu geben
'the proof is to be given to you' .
In constructions with sein + zu + Infinitiv, such as those in (37)-(38),
the 2nd argument in PF of the main verb is advanced to the clause
subject position. It seems that the zu + Infinitive form of the verbal
predicate changes the predicate-argument structure from a fully
specified PF to a relational-attributive frame with a deverbal
attribute.
The examples in (39) and (40) with haben + zu + Infinitiv have a different
syntactic structure and consequently require different semantic (and
referential) interpretation. The 1st participant of the main verb
nehmen {'to take') is co-referential with the 1st participant of haben,
i.e. no PF-slots are blocked. The hat + zu + Infinitiv construction,
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used mainly in the spoken discourse, may be seen as a direct though
slightly informal paraphrase of the muB + Infinitiv construction,
standard in the written discourse. The haben + zu + Infinitiv
constructions are used as means of indirect reference simply by filling
subject position by man or the generalised wir.
A truly impersonal function can be attributed to constructions such as
the one in (43):
(43) Wegen.. .geniigt es zu zeigen, da/3...
'because of... it is enough to show that...'.
Here, the infinitive of the verb zeigen ('to show') has the 1st
participant slot blocked since the finite verb genugen ('to be enough'/
'to satisfy') cannot be associated with human 1st participants. It
usually occurs with the dummy es. The construction can be used only if
there is no need to identify the referent of the 1st argument of the
main verb, e.g. if no specific referent is intended. Constructions
illustrated in (37),(38) and (41)-(43), are interpreted as general, i.e.
as referring to the principles of mathematical argumentation rather than
to any particular actions of any individual referents.
One could expect that this type of infinitival construction would be
used as well if the referent of the 1st argument slot was already known
or identified and if there was no other competing referent in the
discourse domain. This could be the case in the immediate situational
context of the spoken mathematical discourse. Theoretically this
assumption is likely to be true. However, in spoken discourse generally,
more personal constructions are preferred. To achieve a general reading
pronoun shift would probably be used instead, as illustrated in (44):
(44) ...es geniigt wenn wir nun zeigen daS...
'...it is enough if we now show that...' .
Apart from infinitival constructions, participial expressions are used
quite frequently. While in the non-technical discourse participial
constructions are commonly considered as abbreviated forms of finite
clauses, this interpretation does not always hold for mathematical
texts. In some cases participial constructions may, or have to, be
given (indirectly) referential interpretation via the PF. In (45a)
this interpretation is supported by the use of Konjunktiv /:
-118-
(45) a. Angenommen, U habe noch nicht diese Eigenschaft
'...let us assume U does not yet have this feature'
(A—4)
and in (45b) by the use of Konjunktiv II:
(45) b. Angenommen, es ware R e M*m+2
'let us assume that ...' .
(A-l)
The use of participial constructions is an individual choice of the
author. Some authors prefer to use finite clauses instead, as
illustrated in (45c and d):
(45) c. Wir nehmen an, (2) sei nicht erfullt...
'we assume that (2) is not satisfied...'
d. Wir konnen ... annehmen, da0...
'we can assume that...' .
(A-10)
Since mathematical discourse is highly formalised and standardised (due
to the deductive character of mathematical reasoning, (cf. Subsection
2.2.4)) some fossilised participial expressions function as a particular
type of discourse connective and should not be interpreted in
referential terms. This is illustrated by (46) below:
(46) Zusammenfassend erhalten wir nun mit Theorem 7,
Folgerung 3 und Lemma 11 die folgende Aussage
'summarising, with theorem 7, proposition 3 and
lemma 11, we obtain the following expression' .
(A-l)
The present participle in (46) is not interpreted as indirectly
referential, i.e. the 1st participant of the predicate erhalten ('to
obtain') is not interpreted as co-referential with the 1st participant
of the PF of zusammenfassen ('to summarise'). The same non-referential
interpretation applies to expressions such as angenommen, daB or
vorausgesetzt, daB ('presupposing that'). They can be substituted by
wenn wir annehmen, daB or wenn wir voraussetzen, daB. They can also be
substituted by wenn. Wenn, however, is semantically empty and its only
function is to express a particular (temporal or conditional) relation
between other statements. Angenommen daB and vorausgesetzt daB, on the
other hand, combine the relational function of wenn and the desired
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semantics of a cognitive action of some sort, inherited from the matrix
verbs they are derived from. Thus, in mathematical discourse they
constitute a class of semantically non-empty relational words.
More often than free participles, we find participles used as
attributes. We also find constructions that are passive in form
{Zustandspassive) but must not be interpreted as passives since they do
not correspond to any active clauses. Therefore they must be treated
as simple relational-attributive constructions. Whether participles
are to be considered as means of impersonal rhetoric (and interpreted
via their PFs as indirectly referential) or simply as adjectives,
depends on their semantics in the restricted context. This last
condition is important since the restricted discourse domain may impose
additional semantic and pragmatic constraints on the prototypical
feature specification of the PF argument slots.
As expected, past participles (Partizip II - forms) are more readily used
as potential means of indirect reference than present participles. This
is because they are predicated of the 2nd argument of the PF of the
matrix verb and therefore allow for the demoted 1st participant to be
left out. Present participles (Partizip I - forms) are predicated of
the 1st argument of the verb and consequently do not allow for its
omission. However, in some cases it seems that the restricted context
changes the prototypical feature specification of the arguments. In this
way certain originally non-technical lexical items lose their
prototypical meaning and become technical terms. To use them properly
one has to* learn their explicit definitions, where the new prototypical
arguments (valid in the particular domain of communication) are
specified. This explains why some predicates become defective in their
technical use. They may have different PFs, with a different number of
argument slots.
(47) Die Funktion <p ist unendlich oft differenzierbar, weil
die Differenziation unter dem Integralzeichen erlaubt ist
'function <p is infinitely often differentiable because
differentiation under the integration sign is
permitted' .
(A—9 )
The participial form erlaubt ('permitted') with the meaning illustrated
by the above example, occurs only in the relational-attributive form,
i.e. cannot be treated as derived from the standard PF of erlauben ('to
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permit') with the prototypically human 1st participant omitted. The
same comment applies to the expression z ist abgeschlossen ('z is closed')
in (48), since it does not have the corresponding active form:
(48) Satz 2.1. Seien Z, P und N disjunkte, bezuglich 0
symmetrische Teilmengen von R mit den Eigenschaften:
(i) P und N sind offen;
(ii) Z ist abgeschiossen...
'theorem 2.1. let Z, P and N be disjoint partial sets of R,
symmetric with respect to 0 and having following
properties:
(i) P and N are open;
(ii) Z is closed...' .
(A-9)
Example (49) below shows that one noun phrase may contain both
participial attributes having indirectly referential function and
participial attributes lacking this function. In (49), ausgewahlt
('chosen') must be related to its basic PF auswahlen ('to choose') and
linked with some sort of volitional human activity. However, this
meaning is modified by the adverb beliebig ('any'/'arbitrary') which
indicates that there is no need to identify the individual referent of
the 1st argument. Abgeschlossen, on the other hand, does not evoke
agentive interpretation.
(49) In [4] hat P. Levy charakteristische Funktionen
konstruiert, die in endlich vielen, beliebig ausgewahlten
abgeschlossenen Interval 1 en ... verschwinden und auSerhalb
dieser Intervalle positiv sind
'in [4] P. Levy constructed characteristic functions which
vanish in finitely many arbitrarily chosen closed
intervals ... and which are positive outside these
intervals' .
(A-9)
In this section we have presented the infinitive and participial
constructions as used in German mathematical discourse. We
distinguished between constructions that can be employed as means of
indirect reference and those that require non-referential
interpretation. This distinction is due to either a syntactic
constraint (blocking of the 1st participant slot) or a semantic
constraint (1st participant must be - HUMAN). In the following
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subsection we consider to what extent the PF modei applies to some
nominal expressions in mathematical texts.
4.3.6 Nominal Means of Indirect Reference via Predicate Frame
Nominal style is one of the features commonly attributed to scientific
discourse in general. In this subsection we discuss the use of nouns
and adjectives as a means of avoiding direct reference to the
participants in the communication.
Nouns which either derive from polyvalent verbs or share the same core
semantics may be related to a specific number of arguments corresponding
to the number of participants in an action/event described. Thus, we
could say that the notion of valency might be extended to word classes
other than verbs. Nouns which require certain complements or are
associated with certain participant roles occur both in technical and in
non-technical discourse. Technical discourse, however, exploits the
indirectly referential potential of nominal expressions to a greater
extent than would be possible in a non-technical (especially spoken)
communication. Here are some examples of the heavily nominal
mathematical discourse:
(50) Unser Ziel ist unter anderem ein neuer Beweis dieser
Aussage. - Im Zusammenhang hiermit befassen wir uns in der
vorliegenden Arbeit vor allem mit den folgenden beiden
Satzen, denen unabhangig vom obi gen ... Satz ein Interesse
zukommen diirfte
'our aim is, among other things, a new proof for this
statement, in this context we occupy ourselves in this
paper predominantly with the following two theorems which
deserve interest independently of the above theorem...'
(A-4)
(51) Mit dem Nachweis von Satz 1 ist eine Vermutung von K.
Stein ([22]) bewiesen
'with the proof of theorem 1, K. Stein's conjecture ([22])
is proved'
(A-4)
(52) Gegentiber den al lgemeineren Uberlegungen von IV sind im
vorliegenden Spezialfall starke Vereinfachungen moglich
'contrary to the more general considerations in IV, in
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this special case strong simplifications are possible'
(A—4)
(53) Im allgemeinen ist die Suche nach Klassenstrukturen E von
G mit l'(E) = 1 mit aufwendigen Rechnungen verbunden
'in general, search for class structures E of G with ...
is connected wih laborious calculations' .
(A-ll)
In the spoken discourse, the fragment quoted in (50) could take the
following form:
(54) ...wir mochten aufs neue beweisen was hier gesagt
wurde/deswegen befassen wir uns hier vor allem mit diesen
zwei interessanten satzen...
'...we would like to prove in a new way what was said
here/therefore we are concerned here first of all with
these two interesting theorems...' .
Some nominal expressions, such as unter der Annahme ('under the
assumption'), unter/bei Berucksichtigung ('taking into consideration') or
unter Voraussetzung ('presupposing') can be treated in the way free
participles were treated in the preceding subsection. These are
fossilised expressions that do not require any individual referential
interpretation. We could explain this by the fact that in a restricted
context they are permanently linked with a specific discourse role which
is defined as 'one who performs the calculation'.
Deverbal adjectives with suffix -bar may also serve the purpose of
indirect reference by their links with PF-slots of a matrix verb. Again,
this cannot be seen as a general rule, since the indirectly referential
property or potential of adjectives is determined by their specific
meaning in the restricted context. Thus, e.g., adjectives such as
integrierbar describe an inherent property of certain objects and do not
necessarily refer to any real action performed on those objects by any
real agent. For example, functions are integrierbar even if the actual
procedure of integration was not (cannot be) carried out (e.g. when
integrals cannot be found in a closed form).
Some other adjectives, such as e.g. realisierbar, losbar, aufzahlbar may
have different interpretations according to what objects they are
attributed to. For example in (55) and (56) they may be treated as
simple adjectives, i.e. as expressing properties rather than referring
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to possible actions:
(55) Sind k ein Korper mit (k : Qab) < 00 und G eine endliche
Gruppe, deren Kompositionsfaktoren zyklisch sind oder
GAR-Darstel lungen liber k(t) besitzen, so ist G als
Galoisgruppe liber k realisierbar
'if k is a field with ... and G is a finite group whose
composition factors either are cyclic or have
GAR-representations over k(t), then G can be represented
as Galois group over k'
(A-ll)
(56) Einbettungssatz von Iwasawa: Ist k ein Erweiterungs-
korper von Qab, so ist jedes Einbettungsproblem mit
auflosbarem Kern liber k losbar
'embedding theorem by Iwasawa: if k is an extension of Qab
then each embedding problem with a soluble core is soluble
over k' .
(A-ll)
Indirectly referential interpretation applies to adjectives related to
calculation procedures and techniques, such as e.g. vertauschbar (kann
vertauscht werden - 'can be substituted'), nachweisbar (kann nachgewiesen
werden - 'can be proved'). For these and other adjectives that allow
for indirect reference, the 1st argument of the matrix PF is not
associated with any specific individual referent and the construction
requires a general reading.
Adjectives with the suffix -bar have comonly been treated as means of
Deagentivierung in German. However, most instances of adjectives with
-bar found in mathematical texts express properties of mathematical
objects. Consequently, they cannot be considered as means of indirect
reference in this specific communicative domain.
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4.4 Other Means of Indirect Reference
4.4.1 Pronoun Shift
In the preceding section we discussed syntactic means of indirect
reference such as the passive or infinitive constructions. In those
cases the existence of an argument is inferred by reference to the
prototypical features on the matrix PF. In the restricted context of
scientific discourse, this type of indirect reference is possible for
verbs related to the set of context specific discourse roles. In the
contexts of scientific discourse such as those considered here, these
are the predicates related to the transfer of knowledge and to cognitive
actions in general. For these predicates, the existence and presence
(immediate or remote) of all prototypical participants is assumed as
necessary. Therefore, explicit reference to them may be omitted if this
omission is allowed by the syntax. In the previous section, we have
seen that the speaker may choose from a wide range of syntactic and
lexical means of indirect reference to himself and to the audience. Most
of the constructions considered so far can be used for self-reference as
well as for reference to the audience.
In this subsection we point out that the speaker's choice of indirectly
referring expressions is not accidental. We discuss the mechanism of
pronoun shift, indicating rules and constraints that govern the use of
pronouns.
Before beginning communication, the speaker has a full choice of means
he can use to refer to himself. He may choose direct self-reference by
using the 1st Person Singular pronoun ich (cf. Section 4.5 for details
of the use of deictic pronouns), although this contradicts the
impersonal rhetoric of science. Most naturally, he can use the
generalised wir, considered as a neutral means of self-reference in
scientific discourse. Wir used in science for indirect self-reference
is different from the 1st Person Plural pronoun used in non-scientific
communication, as was pointed out by Strawson [1959] (cf. Subsection
2.3.2). The generalised wir is not a proper Plural pronoun, since it
does not have a corresponding Singular, and it is not a proper 1st
Person pronoun since it can be used for referring to the audience only
(i.e. excluding the speaker). Although it does not happen very often
in practice, the author might also use the indefinite personal pronoun
-125-
man or impersonal passives for self-reference (supported by local and
temporal deixis). In our corpus one paper was written in this manner.
The initial choice, even if influenced by science specific rhetoric and
a general desire to be objective i.e. impersonal, is still speaker
dependent and individual. Although the speaker has a free first choice,
his further steps, i.e. the choice of the way he refers to the immediate
audience, to the individual reader or to shared knowledge are determined
by how the self-reference is achieved. Let us now consider what
different options are available after different initial choices.
If the author's choice for self-reference is the deictic ich, a direct
reference to other participants in the communicative situation and to
its time and place is preferred. This means that the immediate
audience will be addressed by Sie and the speaker and audience together
will be referred to by wir (i.e. ich + Sie). Only the general, ideal
audience, which is a personification of the entire knowledge on the
subject, will be referred to by means of impersonal constructions. In
the spoken communication, this convention does not have to apply to the
entire discourse. However, any change in the established reference
pattern must be made explicit. We leave out here detailed discussion
of direct self-reference with the 1st Person Singular pronoun ich and
its implications. This point is further analysed in Section 4.5 and
examples are given.
If the generalised wir is chosen as the way of the speaker's
self-reference, the same form can still be used to refer to the speaker
and the audience together. The change of referential scope is often
signalled, either by the fact that the predicate is associated with
different discourse roles or by means of local and temporal deixis.
This can be illustrated with the following passages from the spoken
discourse.
Example 4.4
...also die menge a besitzt innere punkte und der durchschnitt
beider mengen ist leer/nach dem trennungssatz den wir jetzt
aufgeschrieben haben/das ist der trennungssatz nach Eidelheit/
kann man die beiden mengen trennen/mit einer hyperebene
trennen/also nach Eidelheit/>vo sind wirl/hier/satz von
Fenchel/ das ist jetzt nun die aussage/ja/hier/soweit sind wir
gekommen/...folgendes gilt/x eins angewandt auf ypsi.../oder
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ypsilon angewandt.. ./das wollte ich ... schreiben/ypsilon
angewandt auf x.../hatten wir also.../beta gleich null konnen
wir weglassen und dann steht hier nun ... /jetzt wollen wir uns
Uberlegen da0 das hier ein widerspruch istI...I jetzt wollen wir
sagen dies ist ein widerspruch/den wollen wir uns doch gemeinscim
uberlegen/das haben wir uns auch schon liberiegt/... /wieso geht das
jetzt nlchtl /jetzt haben wir punkte aus dem endlich-
keitsbereich/...das ist vielleicht etwas knapp hier/der satz
hier.. ./aber.. .uberlegen m'uQte man eventuell auch noch
mal .../den satz genau ausfiihren/obuohl er geometrisch naturlich
ganz leicht ist...
(B—4)
In the discourse fragment abqtfe wir is used in two different functions.
The first is the speaker's indirect self-reference in the phrase nach
dem trennungssatz den wir jetzt aufgeschrieben haben. The self-referential
interpretation is supported by the pragmatic link relating the 1st
participant of aufschreiben ('to write down') to the speaker.
In the same fragment wir is also used for direct reference to the
speaker and the audience together in the phrase den (widerspruch) wollen
wir uns gemeinsam uberlegen. This interpretation is explicitly signalled
by gemeinsam (' together' ).
The speaker uses also direct self-reference, i.e. the pronoun ich, when
he refers to his own mistake - das wollte ich... schreiben.
Impersonal constructions are used to distinguish between reference to
the speaker or the speaker and the audience together on the one hand,
and the body of general mathematical knowledge on the other hand. This
knowledge is neither subjective nor is its validity dependent on an
individual speaker. In example 4.4 the indefinite personal pronoun
man is used contrastively to the wzV-clauses. Further examples of the
man-clauses from the discourse fragment by the same speaker are given
below:
Example 4.5
...also wenn diese beziehung gilt dann sagen wir dann sind die
aufgaben schwach dual und dual/.../das nennt man ja dual oder
stark dual/.../ das heiSt dual und dann unterscheidet man noch
wenn die beiden aufgaben dann noch losbar sind/dann nennt man
dieses noch dann stark/das ist ja aber sekundar jetzt/diese
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unterscheidung//«r uns jetzt ist das wichtigste wenn diese
beide/daB die beiden gleichen wert .../das bedeutet wenn wir
die eine aufgabe gelost haben und den wert berechnet haben dann
haben wir zugleich auch die duale aufgabe/zumindest den wert
der duaien aufgabe auch schon bestimmt/.. ./also diejenigen die
sich etwas mit der linearen programmierung oder sonst
beschaftigt haben/.../dann werden Sie feststellen daB gerade dadurch
daB man die duale aufgabe hat/.. ./iiberhaupt erstmal. so was wie
simplex algorithmus definieren konnte/denn man braucht immer wenn
man rechnet ... ein achtungskriterium/dann mochte man wissen
ist man schon soweit mit der rechnung daB man dam it aufhoren
kann/daB man ja die vorgegebene genauigkeit schon bereits
erreicht hat/das ist eine sehr wichtige fragestellung...
(B—4 )
Spoken discourse always contains some deictic elements. A mathematical
paper, on the other hand, can be written in a fully 'impersonal' style,
i.e. without even the generalised wir as a means of indirect
self-reference. Nevertheless, a distinction between actions attributed
to the author and the reference to the audience or to general knowledge
can still be made. A special type of deictic expression is used to
support the interpretation of certain indirectly-referential expressions
as referring to the author. These are the text-deictic elements, related
to the structure of the text itself (further discussed in 4.4.2).
Below we give some examples taken from a paper (text A-2 in our corpus)
where neither the ich- nor the w/r-form of the author's self-reference
was used.
(57) a. Um dies aufzuklaren, soli im folgenden die
Funktionenfolge (on), die gegeben ist durch ...
untersucht werden
'to explain this, the sequence of functions (an), given
by ... is investigated in the following'
b. Zum Abschluss sei noch eine vierseitige Pyramide
erwahnt, bei der sich a lie Kantenwinkel elementar
berechnen lassen
'finally a four-sided pyramid will be mentioned, in
which all angles ... can be easilly calculated'
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c. Die moglichen regularen Pyramiden mit dieser
Eigenschaft wurden in Kapitel 2 diskutiert
'the possible regular pyramids with this property were
discussed in chapter 2'
d. Zunachst seien die regularen Pyramiden betrachtet, bei
denen a lie Kanten gleich lang sind
'first, regular pyramids with all edges equally long
shall be considered'
(A—2)
(57b and d) illustrate a very special use of Konjunktiv I. The predicate
betrachten ('to consider') in the restricted context of mathematical
discourse does not have any constant link with discourse referents. It
can be associated with the author as well as with the audience, or with
their common activity. Since in the paper considered neither ich nor
wir was chosen as means of the author's self-reference, the remaining
options are passive and infinitive constructions. When used in the
Indikativ mood, they would be open for either self-referential or general
interpretation. The use of the Konjunktiv I disambiguates the
expression. Being a departure from the neutral Indikativ mode, it
signals the reference-switching and consequently supports the
(semantically marked) self-referential interpretation (cf. further
discussion on the reference supporting function of the mood in
Subsection 4.4.2).
In the same text (A—2), the reference to the audience is signalled by
the use of periphrastic imperatives with the Konjunktiv I or with modal
verbs in maw-clauses. The use of the Konjunktiv I distinguishes
maw-clauses used to address the immediate audience from the indefinite
personal man in its general function. Konjunktiv I may be seen as a
formal indication of the reference-switching. However, the reader is
probably able to distinguish between actions that he is asked to perform
and general statements. This distinction is based on the link between
PFs of certain verbs and the set of context-specific discourse roles.
At the uppermost level of indirect reference, i.e. in statements related
to the general audience and in statements describing properties of
mathematical objects, passives without deictic elements and infinitive
constructions are used.
The pattern of reference naturally changes when a mathematical paper is
written by two (or more) authors. In this case the pronoun ich cannot
-129-
be used as a direct self-reference since the paper is a joint
production. Direct self-reference of the authors is taken over by wir,
as illustrated by the fragment below:
Example 4.6
Wir wollen nun versuchen, ein Ergebnis analog zu 3.4 fur
Mannigfaltigkeiten zu beweisen. ...
Es gilt
Satz 3.5 1) X' ist Poincare-Komplex.
2) X'/Zr kann als einfacher Poincar^-Komplex
angenommen werden.
3) Das Spivaksche Normalenbundel u:X'/Zr - GB liftet
zu B Cat. ...
Wir fixieren eine Liftung... und erhalten ... .
Also brauchen wir nur festzustellen, wann ... .
Fur diese Forderung betrachten wir eine explizite rationale
Aquivalenz ... .
Benutzen wir den natur lichen Isomorphismus (im glatten Fall
benotigen wir hier Bedingung P4) ... so folgt offenbar, da/3 ...
Wir erhalten nun . . .
(A—7)
Self-reference can also be achieved in an indirect way, e.g. with
passives accompanied by some deictic elements (in the example below it
is the use of the Future Tense:
(58) Dies wird in einer spateren Arbeit behandelt werden
'this will be considered in a future paper' .
(A-7)
However, wir cannot be used in its non-deictic (general) function any
more. This function is taken over by man and other means of
indirect-reference, as illustrated below:
Example 4.7
Bezeichnet e : K [e ] - K den Augmentations-Homomorphismus
(e(e) = 0), so I'aBt sich vermoge der angegebenen Isomorphismen
die Gysin-Sequenz folgenderma/3en darstellen: ...
Nun muB noch die multiplikative Struktur der Kohomologie-Ringe
berilcksichtigt werden. FolgendermaBen gewinnt man ... . Dann
definiert man ... .
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Beweis von Lemma 2.5. Zunachst konstruieren wir durch Angabe
von Erzeugern eine geeignete Unteralgebra... und bestimmen ...
eine Bi1inearform... .
(a) m = 21. Wahle man einen maximal en $m-isotropen
Unterraum K1... . Zum Beweis von (a) kann man setzen: ...
(A—7)
The mechanism of pronoun shift described and illustrated in this
subsection is based on a hierarchy principle. Direct reference is the
first and most natural choice in most contexts.
If, however, for some reason, e.g. due to the impersonal rhetoric of
science, this choice is abandoned, the reference system starts at the
next level. In German scientific discourse, for instance, this would
be the generalised wir used for self-reference. The author can make
the initial choice above the level of definite pronouns and use only the
indefinite personal pronoun man or passive and infinitive constructions
as means of self-reference. Then, the distinction between
self-reference and reference to other participants in the communication
is supported either by the link between the PF of a lexical predicate
and specific discourse roles or by all sorts of deixis. These rules
are language- and context-specific (cf. e.g. Laberge & Sankoff [1979]
for a discussion of the mechanism of pronoun shift in Montreal French).
The following (discourse opening) fragment of a mathematical paper
illustrates various types of indirectly referential expressions used
without affecting definite personal reading.
Example 4.8
1. Einfuhrung
Die syntaktisch beschrankte Rekursion wurde in [1] eingefiihrt,
um gewisse Klassen zeitbeschrankter Turingmaschinen ...
beschreiben zu konnen. In anschlieBenden Untersuchungen,
z.B. [3,4], hat sich diese Operation als sehr geeignet zur
Beschreibung der inneren Komplexitat von Funktionsklassen
erwiesen. So ist z.B. das klassische Problem PTIME = PTAPE
formulierbar in der Rekursionstheorie als Frage nach der
Gleichwertigkeit der ... . Ausgehend von der lib lichen
syntaktisch beschrankten Rekursion werden wir neue




Zuerst wollen wir fur einige Funktionen Abktirzungen
festlegen ...
Wir fu'hren nun die syntaktisch beschrankte Rekursion m-ter
Stufe ein.
(A—1)
In the above fragment wir is used for the author's self-reference. This
interpretation is supported by the adverbials zuerst ('first') and nun
('now'). The present participle ausgehend is also interpreted as
referring to the author. The agent less passive wurde eingefuhrt is
given a definite reference interpretation because of the locative phrase
in [I] which points to a specific idividual referent (not identical with
the author). The construction ist formulierbar has a general reading and
is equivalent to kann formuliert werden or I'dQt sich formulieren.
The hierarchical and systematic nature of the pronoun shift in
scientific discourse facilitates the interpretation of the indirectly
referential expressions. Once the initial choice is made, i.e. once it
is decided and made explicit what has been chosen as a means of the
author's self-reference, the interpretation of other indirectly
referential expressions used in a given restricted context is to a large
extent predictable. A difference in the way this mechanism works in the
written and spoken discourse is discussed in Chapter 5 (Subsection
5.1.1).
4.4.2 Deixis as Support of the Reference Interpretation
So far we have looked at syntactic means of indirect reference and the
mechanism of pronoun shift. We have seen that one and the same
syntactic construction or even one and the same pronoun may fulfil a
number of different referential functions. The interpretation of
reference depends on the discourse roles associated with the predicate
and on the overall referential set-up chosen by the speaker/author (e.g.
on the initial choice of the means of self-reference, spoken versus
written discourse, etc.). This interpretation, is facilitated by
lexical and non-lexical deictic means, such as local and temporal
indicators, as well as by Tense and Modality. In this section we
discuss the use of deictic elements in scientific discourse,
concentrating on their reference-supporting and reference-switching
function. (For a comprehensive presentation of pronominal and other
deictic elements in German see Braunmuller [1977].)
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In Subsection 2.3.1, we indicated that, according to the impersonal
rhetoric of science, all egocentric particulars should be avoided, i.e. not
only the author's direct self-reference but also any direct reference to
the place and time of communication. Mathematicians usually view
mathematical knowledge as a body of proven theorems. As such
mathematical facts are a-temporal (i.e. always true) and a-spatial. They
do not need to (or even cannot) be related to any time or place.
Scientific activity in mathematics, on the other hand, like all human
activities, happens in a situation , i.e. it has location in time and
space (and consequently in a certain culture). Mathematical papers as
well as the spoken mathematical discourse (e.g. a lecture) contain
statements about facts of both types mentioned above, i.e. theorems (and
other primary statements) and descriptions of operations one has to
perform to prove them etc. (meta-statements). Facts of the first type
are seen as time- and space-independent and expressed in a non-indexical
mode (cf. 2.3.1). But since facts of the second type are related to
deictic categories, their description may contain deictic, indexical
elements. Since we are concerned here with reference to human
participants in the communication, we are interested only in the second
type of statements, i.e. in metastatements. Moreover, the impersonal
rhetoric of science applies to metastatements only. Mathematical facts
are a-personal by themselves, i.e. cannot be presented in a personal
way.
In the case of a mathematical lecture, deictic elements cannot be
completely avoided. The speaker and the audience share the same
immediate situational context and deictic expressions (such as e.g. hier
('here') when pointing to objects or formulae on the blackboard ) are
often the most economical ways of reference. In written discourse,
here and now are also used but in most cases have a different function.
The interaction between the author and the audience (the reader) is
delayed (cf. Subsection 2.2.2). Consequently, the participants in the
communication do not share the same situational context and here and now
cannot be used in their situation-deictic function any longer. They become
text-deictic, i.e. they refer to certain points in the narration itself,
or to the discourse as a whole (often here is used contrastively to
other communicative situations i.e. other papers). In spoken discourse,
the deictic and the narrative functions of time- and place-adverbials
are often collapsed. Then the deictic interpretation is preferred.
Discourse fragments below illustrate the use of elements of local and
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temporal deixis in written and spoken mathematical discourse.
Example 4.9
Ich will hier kurz den Beweis fur r = 1 angeben, urn den Einsatz
der Bedingungen (G), (A) und (R) vorzufiihren. ... Nach (R) ist
K/k ein rationaler Funktionenkorper, so da/3 jetzt die




Wenden wir uns nun den Klassen zu...




Da das Hauptergebnis aus [4] wesentlich in den Beweis von Satz
2 eingeht, erscheint es nutzlich, einige Bemerkungen hieruber
anzuschl ie/3en. Es handelt sich hier um die Xquivalenz des
(normalen) komplexen Raumes im Sinne von Behnke, Stein
einerseits und im Sinne von Cartan, Serre andererseits
(A—4)
Example 4.12
...also dies ist wie gesagt/hoff' ich jedenfalls so/gut zu
lesen/.. ./also das sind die wichtigsten satze Liber die
konjugierten funktionen... /verbindung zwischen ... soil damit
jetzt hier charakterisiert werden/... ich wollte dann spater
diesen satz auch in den text noch integrieren deshalb habe ich
die nummerierung.../also hier fangt dieser satz an/hier an.../
diejenigen die skript haben brauchen jetzt hier nicht
mitzuschreiben.../ .../wie gesagt also ich mochte jetzt nicht
voraussetzen da/3 sie denn das.../schon das skript.. ./dann
schon gelesen haben/also wir benutzen nun nur das skript so
wirklich nur als erganzung/und da sage ich ihnen ja nur paar
seiten die sie jetzt... /die zu dieser vorlesung jetzt gehoren/die
sie sich angucken soil en und jetzt /auch jetzt/.../so sind auch




...ja dann sind wir fertiq/nel/so/jetzt wollen wir sagen wir
haben einen operator/dissipativ/nun das konnte unser letzter
tei 1 fur heute sein...
(B—1)
Example 4.14
...jetzt wollen wir mal sehen periode sechs zwei/sechs zwei/das
ist ja nun eine andere periode/das macht er (i.e. Gauss -
M.S.) auch/.../so ja wie macht man jetzt diesel/...jetzt konnten
wir das naturlich/jetzt ist.../das lambda ist die zwei/das geht
also jetzt los hier mit zwei plus.../zwei mal.../wie soil en wir
das machen?/.. ./na ja hier hinten steht das einfach.. ./die frage
ist doch/die wir eben hatten/ist wie kriegen wir denn andere
verschiedene perioden hierl/hier hat er die eins
genommen...Ihier hat er die zwei genommen/welche lambdas
miissen wir denn nehmen um alle perioden zu berechnen?/.../ das
ist ein alter trick aus der allgemeinen zahlentheorie/und dazu
mu(3 man das produkt zweier perioden ausrechnen/und das war
lange zeit glaube ich sehr schwierig fur den Gauss/und ist
auch bis heute nicht ganz einfach/aber das macht er eben mit
seiner merkwiirdigen bezeichnerei/hier in dem artikel dreihundert
fun fund vierzig/ausqesprochen Ubersichtl ich/hier rechnet man das
produkt von zwei perioden/.../gut/den rest konnen wir dann am
montag machen/
(B-2)
We note that in spoken discourse direct, situation-deictic use of here
and now is licensed. Jetzt hier can be used contrastively to dann sp'dter
as illustrated in example 4.12. The reference of hier can also be made
explicit as in hier in dem artikel dreihundert funfundvierzig or hier hinten in
example 4.14. On the other hand the narrative, text-deictic function
of here and now in mathematical papers is an expected consequence of the
self-contained character of written scientific discourse. Although
scientific knowledge may be seen as independent of real time and space,
its presentation has a certain structure, organisation and sequential
order. It is therefore quite natural to use the otherwise unemployable
now and here to refer to that structure or sequence.
Apart from lexical means of deixis, verb categories such as Tense and
Mood may be used to support specific reference interpretation or to
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signal reference switching. The category of Tense is deictic. The
choice of grammatical tense is speaker dependent and reflects his
'location' in real time and his way of ordering the events. In
scientific discourse the temporal order of events is largely replaced by
their causal dependency which does not involve the time factor. Thus,
the General Present Tense is a preferred convention. Any departure
from the Present Tense signals that the statement requires
interpretation which goes beyond the restricted context (i.e. it should not
be assigned interpretation according to the set of discourse roles
assumed for the context etc.). To facilitate the interpretation,
clauses involving tenses other than Present usually contain either some
direct reference to the participants or some indication of time or place
which helps to identify participants referred to indirectly. This is
illustrated by the examples below.
(59) Der Begriff des quasikomplexen Raumes wurde von K. Stein
in [22] eingefuhrt, um ... Raume zx ... kurz beschreiben
zu konnen
'the concept of the quasi-complex space was introduced
by K. Stein in [22] to describe in a short way ...
spaces zx ...'
(A—4)
(60) Mit Hilfe von Zusatz 1 konnte Belyi in [2] unter anderem
zeigen, daB alle klassischen einfachen Gruppen ... als
Galoisgruppen ... vorkommen
'using condition 1, Belyi could show in [2] among others,
that all classical simple groups ... are Galois
groups...'
(A-ll)
(61) Die syntaktisch beschrankte Rekursion wurde in [1]
eingefuhrt, um gewisse Klassen zeitbeschrankter
Turingmaschinen ... beschreiben zu konnen
'the syntactically restricted recursion was introduced in
[1] to describe ... certain classes of Turing machines
with time limit'
(A—1)
(62) Die Bedingungen in Satz (1.0) konnen voraussichtlich
abgeschwacht werden, wenn ... Operationen zugelassen
werden. Dies wird in einer spateren Arbeit behandelt werden
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'conditions in theorem (1.0) can probably be weakened
when ... are permitted, this will be considered in a
future paper'
(A—7)
(63) Haufig werden wir die Tatsache benutzen, da0 die ...
A-Moduln eine ... Serresche Klasse bilden
'we shall often use the fact that the ... A-modules
constitute a Serre-class'
(A-7)
In (59)—(61) the Past Tense is associated with explicit reference to the
participants involved. In (59) and (60), proper names are used. In
(61) the locative phrase in [1] points to the agent. In (62) and (63)
the Future Tense (Futur I) is used. These two examples illustrate two
types of self-reference: indirect reference via the PF in (62) and
direct in (63) (NB the text A-7 is written by two authors).
We note that the Past Tense in scientific discourse may be used to refer
to any of the discourse participants. The use of the Future Tense, on
the other hand, is in most cases connected with the speaker's
self-reference or his reference to the audience and himself together.
This dependency may be related to the distinction between past events
(facts) and future events (assumptions or hypothetical facts). As we
pointed out in Subsection 2.2.2, scientific discourse obeys the Gricean
maxim of quality - do not say what you do not have evidence of.
Therefore, we may assume that the author talks only about those future
events that are certain for him. These are mostly events which he
controls, i.e. in which he himself is involved.
The other speaker dependent verb category is Mood. The neutral choice
is the indicative, and most of the mathematical discourse, over 90% in
the written discourse, involves the indicative. Details of a frequency
analysis of verb categories in German and French mathematical discourse
are presented in Stroihska & Zamojska [1985] and in Stroihska
[1987-forthcoming]. In German, the possible formal departures from
the neutral Indicativ are: Imperativ, Konjunktiv I and Konjunktiv II. The
wurde-form is not treated separately in this thesis.
These three morphologically distinctive moods, as well as some other
modal elements used in mathematical discourse, fulfil two major
functions which we could label as voluntative and conditional.
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The conditional interpretation results from the use of the Konjunktiv II
form of the main verb (or Konditionalis i.e. wurde + infinitive of the
main verb) as well as from the use of the modal verbs, often also in
Konjunktiv II. All these forms may signal the hypothetical, conditional
status of the statement, and reveal the existence of a subject who makes
the judgement and presents his subjective point of view. Some examples
of conditional expressions are given below:
(64) Wir nehmen nun an, es ware Q e L*. Wegen Lemma 8 gate es
dann ein r, so daJ3 zu jedem n Polynome P)...
existieren...
'now we assume, there w,Kere ... . then according to
lemma 8 there would be an r, such that for every n there
exist po1ynomia1s...'
(A—1)
(65) Aus J, R folgt D. ... Aus ... Oder ... wurde folgen:...
'from J, R follows D. ... from ... or ... would
follow:..." .
(A—12)
Frequency analyses indicated that Konjunktiv II and Konditionalis are used
rather rarely in mathematical discourse in general. In Stroihska &
Zamojska [1985] it was shown that these two forms together covered less
than 1% of the investigated corpus of mathematical texts, although this
value may differ for different branches of mathematics.
The Mood used more often (over 6% in the freiyqfency analysis referred to
above) is Konjunktiv I in its voluntative function, characteristic of
mathematical discourse. We illustrate the use of voluntative
Konjunktiv I (the so called heischender Konjunktiv) with the examples
below:
(66) Bemerkungen. Sei Mm eine einfach-zusammenhangende
geschlossene Mannigfaltigkeit
'remarks, let Mm be a simply connected closed manifold
(A—7)
(67) Satz 3.2. G operiere frei auf X aber trivial auf ... .
Dann gibt es...
'theorem 3.2. let G operate freely on X but trivially
on ... . then there is...'
(A-7)
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(68) Fur den Rest dieses Paragraphen seien Xn und Yn
geschlossene n-dimensionale Mannigfaltigkeiten. S1
operiere ... auf Yn und X sei ... homotopieaquivalent zu Y.
Sei r eine Zahl fur deren Primteiler PI, P2 und P3 gelten.
SchlieBlich werde X' wie in 3.4 gewahlt
'for the rest of this paragraph, let Xn and Yn be closed
n-dimensional manifolds, let S1 operate on ... Yn and let
X be ... homotopy equivalent to Y. let r be a number for
the prime divisor of which PI, P2 and P3 are satisfied.
Finally, let X' be chosen as in 3.4 '
(A—7)
(69) Grundannahme: Gegeben sei eine aus involutorischen
Elementen erzeugte Gruppe..., die den folgenden Axiomen
geniigt:...
'basic assumption? let a group be given which is generated
from involute elements and which satisfies the following
axioms:...'
(A—12)
(70) Es seien X eine ZufallsgroBe und f(t) ihre
charakteristische Funktion
'let X be a random variable and let f(t) be its
characteristic function'.
(A—9)
In the examples above, Konjunktiv I indicates the voluntative character
of the statement and, in a sense, the creative nature of mathematical
activity. Using Konjunktiv I, the author defines certain objects or
their properties. By this act of defining or stating the properties,
mathematical objects are 'brought into being' and can be further
described and investigated. The results of this investigation hold
only if the initial requirements on the object, spelled out by the
author as a theorem, are met. This creative element in mathematical
activity is naturally associated with the author in the case of a
mathematical paper presenting original ideas. If an analogous
construction is used in spoken discourse, where the speaker presents
concepts introduced by somebody else, the volitional element in the
interpretation of Konjunktiv I would most probably be associated with the
speaker. In this case, it is the control over the presentation of the
concepts rather than their creation.
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However, we must note that the Konjunktiv I form of theorems in
mathematics has become a rhetorical standard. As such it is normally
not given a referential interpretation. We observed a similar
development in the case of the fossilised participles discussed in
Subsection 4.3.5. From a purely linguistic point of view, Konjunktiv I
must be treated as a departure from the routine indicative mood. This
departure points to the creative element in the act of defining (the
same construction with the indicative would be a description, not a
theorem). As such, it could be treated as a form of the author's
indirect self-reference. We believe, however, that, due to the highly
formalised nature of mathematical discourse and looking at this
phenomenon synchronically, Konjunktiv I simply signals the special status
of theorems and distinguishes them formally from other parts of
mathematical discourse.
In non-technical communication Konjunktiv I is mainly used in Reported
Speech {Indirekte Rede). There, it signals that the speaker is merely
reporting what was said by someone else and does not take any
responsibility for the correctness of the statement (i.e. a distinction
must be drawn between normal language use and quotations or mention of
someone's words). By using Konjunktiv I (which is not obligatory in the
Reported Speech in German) the speaker may suggest that he distances
himself from the statement he repeats, or simply doubts that what was
said is true. We could expect that this interpretation is not a
desirable one in scientific discourse since it clearly reveals the
author's subjective point of view. Indeed, in the corpus we looked at,
no instances of Konjunktiv I were found in Reported Speech.- This,
however, cannot be generalised, since Indirekte Rede with Konjunktiv I is
likely to occur in, for instance, essays on the history of mathematics.
Konjunktiv I in mathematical discourse fulfils yet another important
function. It is used with the subject man as a periphrastic form of the
imperative:
(71) Man w'ahle nun a € H2(B;Z) = [B;BS1 ], eine Klasse, die ...
auf ein Vielfaches von e abgebildet wird...
'now one should chose ... a class which ... is mapped
onto a multiple of e ...'
(A—7)
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(72) Man beachte, dass sie ausser von der Wahl des Parameters
h auch von der ebenfalls wi 1 lkiirl ichen Normierung (2)
abhangen
'one should note that they depend not only on the choice
of the parameter h but also on the arbitrary
standardisation (2)'
(73) Als Beispiel hierzu betrachte man etwa ...
'as an example for this one should consider, say,
(A—2 )
(A—4 )
(74) Man vergleiche hierzu auch [4], Seite 250, Satz 2
'one should compare here also [4], page 250, theorem 2'
(A-4)
(75) Man habe vor Augen, da/3...
one should bear in mind...'
(A-4)
(76) ...und dieses Verfahren wiederhole man bis man t
erreicht...
'and one should repeat this procedure until one
reaches t...' .
(B-3)
In the examples above, Konjunktiv I also has to be interpreted as having
a voluntative function. Despite the common voluntative reading, there is
a difference between heischender Konjunktiv in theorems and the
periphrastic imperative constructions with man. Firstly, they involve
predicates from two distinct semantic classes. As has already been
pointed out, theorems, as primary mathematical statements, are by
definition a-personal. Consequently, they involve either relational
verbs or predicates that (at least in the restricted context of
mathematical discourse) do not have prototypically human participants.
The mzi/z-clauses, on the other hand, are possible only for predicates
related to human participants. Consequently, the subject man must be
interpreted as personal. The second difference relates to function.
While Konjunktiv I in theorems signals the special status of a statement,
the periphrastic imperative may be interpreted as a reference to the
audience (inclusive or not). The Konjunktiv in (71)-(76) signals
the reference-switching, from the general interpretation of man to the
reference to the audience (or the audience and the author together).
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Modal verbs may also fulfil the same function, as it is illustrated
in extiiple 4.15 below:
Example 4.15
...und man nehme einen erzeuger und/also das/das ist
klar/also der zweite fall/k sei unendl ich/dann muS> man etwa
wie folgt argumentieren/ja also den korper von da oben den
brauchen wir noch/also wir machen folgendes/also wir setzen
voraus .../.. ,/jetzt muQ man sich folgendes uberlegen ...
(B—3)
In the discourse fragment above the man-clauses are used contrastively
to the wir-clauses. The w/r-clauses may be interpreted directly as
referring to the speaker and the audience together. We may note that
the indirectly referential man could also be used in this function. The
periphrastic imperative with man, however, is pointing to the audience.
The audience is instructed to follow certain algorithms in order to
achieve a formerly specified goal. This form of the imperative could
be labelled as didactic.
In this section we have discussed personal, local and temporal deixis in
mathematical discourse and deictic categories of the verb. Taking the
deictic elements as supporting the interpretation of reference, we have
analysed these together with certain prototypical features of predicate
semantics and with pragmatic constraints on language use in the
restricted context of scientific discourse. Only when all these
aspects are brought together can we give mathematical discourse an
appropriate reference interpretation.
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4.5 Directly Referential Use of Deictic Pronouns
4.5.1 First Person Pronouns
In the majority of cases the speaker's self-reference in scientific
discourse is achieved in an indirect way. There are instances of the
1st Person pronouns ich and wir used as directly referential. Although we
find directly referential 1st Person pronouns both in written and in
spoken mathematical discourse, they differ in their stylistic value.
In this section we comment on their use and on some principles that
govern their distribution.
The impersonality of mathematical rhetoric is a stronger imperative in
written discourse and the Plural pronoun wir functions there as a
neutral way of self-reference of the author. Therefore, we encounter the
pronoun ich in written mathematical texts only in exceptional cases.
In our data from spoken discourse, on the other hand, there are numerous
occurrences of ich. The immediate situational context and the fact that
the speaker is facing the real audience make it possible to use all
sorts of directly referential deictic expressions.
In scientific discourse we find expressions such as here and now in two
different functions. They can be used as 'indirectly' referring to the
narrative structure (cf. Subsection 4.4.2) or as directly referring to
the situation of communication. Also the 1st Person Plural pronoun wir
is used as directly and indirectly referential and we comment further on
its directly referential use at the end of this subsection.
If the 1st Person Singular pronoun ich occurs in mathematical discourse,
then, unlike other deictic elements, it has only one function, i.e. it
is used by the speaker to refer to himself. In the set of written
mathematical texts that we analysed, there are few occurrences of ich.
The use of the 1st Person Singular pronoun is obviously considered as
contradicting the rhetoric of science. In older texts, if ich was used
(except in introductions), one of the possible justifications for its
use could be the assumption that the speaker for some reason did not
identify himself with the community of mathematicians. (This
explanation has been indicated to me by Professor Hilger Wolff from the
Department of Mathematics, Christian Albrecht University in Kiel, who
also suggested a possible source of examples for direct self-reference
with ich in written mathematical discourse. )
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Such an outsider in the mathematical community of his time was Edmund
Landau, a 20th century German mathematician who, for a variety of
reasons, did not identify with his milieu. In the introduction to his
Grundlagen der Analysis [1930 ] p.VII, he wrote that his book was meant as
a concession "an die (leider in der Mehrheit befindlichen) Kollegen,
welche meinen Standpunkt in der folgenden Frage nicht teilen". In his
writings, Landau distinguishes between his own statements or proposals,
for which he uses forms of direct self-reference, i.e. mein or ich, and
statements about what he assumes and accepts as general mathematical
knowledge. Statements of the second type are expressed by means of
impersonal constructions, with an indirectly referential wir or without
any overt reference to acting humans at all.
Introducing the directly referential pronoun ich into discourse
perspective licenses a more direct system of reference in general.
Thus, other directly referring expressions (first of all proper names
and forms of addressing the audience directly) also occur in the text.
The style becomes more 'personal'. Let us consider a fragment of
Landau's writing in more detail. The following passage is taken from
the beginning of his [1923] paper;
Example 4.16
Es sei U{n) die Anzahl der Zerlegungen von n in zwei
Quadrate,
(formula).




Ich werde die Cramersche Methode vereinfachen und zu einem
Beweise des neuen Satzes
(formula)
fiihren. (A—6)
The Plural form wir, commonly considered as a neutral way of the
author's self-reference in scientific discourse, was rejected by Landau,
possibly because he felt that no other mathematician adopted the same
position. Thus the indefinite general wir could no longer be
considered as neutral in that specific context.
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However, when the argument develops and the author arrives at
conclusions that logically follow from the assumptions, he uses
impersonal constructions as in (77)
(77) Im Falle M2 « y ist hiermit (2) bewiesen
'in the case of M2 s y , (2) is thus proved' .
Since the proof was logically derived, its truth is no longer dependent
on the author's subjective point of view. A proven theorem belongs to
the body of accepted mathematical knowledge and as such it must be
expressed in a distinctive way, i.e. not as speaker dependent.
In modern mathematical writing, a more personal, individual style is no
longer an exception. Illustration is given in the passage 4.17 below.
Example 4.17
Mit Hilfe von Zusatz 1 konnte Belyi in [2] unter anderem
zeigen, da/3 a lie klassischen einfachen Gruppen ... als
Galoisgruppen regularer Korpererweiterungen liber Qab(t)
vorkommen. ... Die Korpererweiterungen N/k(t) ... weisen
Symmetrien in der Verzweigungsstruktur auf. Dies nutze ich
flir ein scharferes Rational itatskriteriurn aus, und zwar hier
der einfacheren Formulierung wegen nur fur s = 3. Dazu
schreibe ich ... und definiere ... .
Dann erhalt man durch die Operation der erzeugenden Elemente
der S3:... eine Operation der Elemente ... {siehe [11], Zusatz
3.5 bzw. [12], Zusatz 6.3). Bezeichnet man die Anzahl der
Bahnen unter diesen Operationen mit ..., so existiert wieder
Mit Folgerung 2b) la&t sich zum Be i spiel zeigen, daB a lie
primitiven nicht auflosbaren Permutationsgruppen vom Grad
d S 15 als Galoisgruppen liber Q(t) realisiert werden k'o'nnen
(siehe [11] und [15]). Als Abschlu/3 des ersten Abschnitts werde
ich noch zwei Beispiele mit s = 4 auffuhrem
(A-ll)
As already mentioned, ich as a way of the author's self-reference
supports deictic interpretation of other potentially deictic elements.
Wir would then also be interpreted as ich + du, the reader. In most
cases this is not a desirable interpretation since no real actions are
carried out jointly by the author and an individual reader. In
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example 4.17 data, the author refers to himself using ich and avoids any
reference to the audience, except via PF for predicates such as zeigen
('to show') or geben ('to give') and except in the standard Singular
expression siehe ('see'). Reference to other authors is made directly by
proper names or indirectly by impersonal passives with a locative
phrase. The general statements are made by means of marc-clauses and
impersonal (passive and infinitive) constructions.
Wir can be used also as a direct self-reference. This is the case when
a paper is written by two or more authors, which necessarily rules out
the use of ich. It seems that in one coherent piece of written
discourse, i.e. in one paper, wir is rarely used simultaneously for
direct and indirect reference. If wir is used for direct
self-reference, man is a preferred form of addressing the audience.
In general, there is no need to relate the statements of mathematical
facts to any persons, there is even no obvious way of relating them to
humans. Bringing a general truth into a perspective of a single person
necessarily limits the scope of its validity.
While in the written discourse self-reference with the pronoun ich is
still relatively rare (although this convention may change), ich is used
quite naturally in the spoken discourse. In the case of a spoken
communication, the presence of the speaker and the audience makes a
direct reference the obvious choice, at least in some parts of discourse
(e.g. when the speaker refers to operations he himself performs on the
blackboard etc.).
Examples illustrating the use and the implications of ich in the spoken
mathematical discourse are given in the next subsection, where the
direct reference to the audience is considered.
4.4.2 Direct Reference to the Audience
Once the speaker introduces a direct way of self-reference, the
reference to the audience may also be made more explicit, i.e. the
audience may be addressed directly by forms of the 2nd Person or by the
polite form Sie. In the spoken discourse we found only the S/e-forms
of addressing the audience. The more informal Ihr would violate the
social convention. The singular form du was not possible as a form of
addressing the collective audience because of its individualizing
effect.
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The audience may be addressed also by an inclusive wir, and to find out
whether it represents direct or indirect reference we have to consider
the meaning of the predicate. In the case of directly referential use
of wir (= ich + Sie) the audience (i.e. the extension of Sie) must be a
participant in the event described by the predicate (i.e. must belong to
the extension of that predicate). Other cases, i.e. the indirectly
referential use of wir , were discussed in Subsection 4.4.1. Here, we
concentrate on the question of the distinction between directly and
indirectly referential use of wir based on the semantic properties of
the lexical predicate. The following passage illustrates the use of
some directly referential expressions in the spoken mathematical
discourse:
Example 4.18
...wenn jetzt dieses kleiner gleich lambda ist dann setzen wir
das einfach ein/ also das ist irgendwie ganz einfach/also wenn
dies jetzt ... dann konnen Sie's einsetzen/. .. dam it sind wir ein
schritt weiter/also wir brauchen jetzt die gruppe von
kontraktionen zu betrachten/das problem das jetzt zunachstmal
noch besteht ist/es konnte hier noch m stehen/.. ./und dariiber
wissen wir im moment nichts/aber jewel Is dieses ... kriegen wir
weg/was wir uns also noch merken m'ussen ist wenn wir statt
einer kontraktionshalbgruppe haben eine allgemeine .../dann
bringen wir das omega t einfach weg /und was Ubrig bleibt
ist ... sind beschrankte halbgruppen .../und dieses problem
das werden wir auch aus der welt schaffen aber nicht sofort...
and further:
Example 4.19
...und zwar das was ich hier jetzt prasentiere ist naturlich nicht
der anfang der geschichte sondern das ende/nicht? /zunachstmal
wurde die sache naturlich fur Hilbert-raume gemacht/und dann
ging es naturlich darum wie findet man eine richtige
verallgemeinerung fur Banach-raume und bei den bedingungen die
ich ja zunachstmal ausschreibe denken Sie sich vielleicht
zunachtstmal an den Hilbert-raum ...I ich formuliere es aber
gleich fur Banach-raume/und zwar geht es also jetzt .../das
ist jetzt nam 1 ich sehr abstrakt zunachstmal/also ich bitte sie
das einfach so zu schlucken zunachstmal ...
(B-2)
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In Section 4.2 we have said that in the restricted context of scientific
communication certain semantic classes of predicates are associated with
specific participants in the situation of communication. Thus
predicates used to describe the activities of presenting knowledge (e.g.
angeben ('to give') or zeigen ('to show') have the speaker as a
prototypical referent of the 1st participant slot in their PFs, and the
immediate or potential audience as a referent of the 3rd participant
slot. On the other hand, predicates used to describe specific
mathematical operations to be carried out on mathematical objects are
not associated with any referential constraints. The examples of this
class of predicates in 4.18 and 4.19 are: einsetzen ('to substitute'),
wegbringen ('to remove'/'to eliminate'). Other examples of this type
are verbs such as addieren ('to add'), dividieren ('to divide') as well as
some predicates that have been used in mathematics in a restricted
'metaphorical' meaning, as e.g. losen ('to solve'). For these verbs
the prototypical semantic specification on the 1st participant slot does
not change in the restricted context, i.e. no additional, role-related
features are supplemented. Since predicates in this class are
referentially neutral, i.e. they are used to describe certain
mathematical operations in general, their interpretation is very
sensitive to the choice of the lexical items in the 1st participant
slot.
If the neutral, general interpretation of these predicates is to be
preserved, i.e. if the focus is on the properties of mathematical
objects or relations, then indefinite expressions are used or the 1st
argument slot is left empty. If predicates from this class are
associated with pronouns ich, wir (in a paper written by two authors), du
or Sie, the expression is interpreted unambiguously as direct reference.
Thus, the only pronouns that are referentially ambiguous (direct versus
indirect or general reading) are instances of wir in spoken or written
discourse by a single author.
Here we comment on one particular case of directly referential use of
wir, and we repeat as (78) a clause quoted in example 4.18:
(78) ... damit sind wir ein schritt weiter
'... with that we are a step further on .
The wir in this example is directly referential, i.e. it is used to
refer to the speaker and the audience (ich + Sie reference). Its
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special feature is that it is bound by the semantics of the predicate in
such a way that only the immediate participants in the communicative
situation may be interpreted as its referents.
Similarly, in (79), where we repeat another passage from example 4.18:
(79) und dieses problem das werden wir auch aus der welt
schaffen aber nicht sofort
'and this problem, we will get rid of that too, but not
right away'
the use of Future Tense binds the referential scope of the pronoun. The
deictic wir in (78) and (79) cannot be replaced by an indefinite man.
The general man and wir are freely interchangable only if wir is used
without any marking that would limit the scope of its possible
reference.
Summarising these observations, we may formulate two constraints on the
use and interpretation of referring expressions in a restricted context
of scientific communication:
1. the personal pronoun wir cannot be interpreted as
indirectly-referential in contexts bound by specific
temporal (i.e. Past, Future and non-general Present Tense)
or local markers;
2. the indefinite personal pronoun man cannot be used as
general in contexts bound by markers related to the
immediate context of communication.
We pointed out that the Singular form of the 2nd Person, du, cannot be
used to address the real audience in the case of a spoken mathematical
discourse. This constraint is conditioned by two factors. Du would
be considered as too informal (as it is also the case for Ihr) and it
would contradict the obvious collectiveness of the audience. However,
these two factors affect only the communication with immediately present
audience. They can be ignored in the written scientific discourse,
primarily because reading is usually an individual activity. Thus the
author may address an individual reader and the Singular 2nd Person
forms are allowed. It is a well established convention in written
scientific discourse to use 2nd Person Singular imperative forms such as
vergleiche ('compare') or siehe ('see') and they are not considered as
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indicating informal style. It is, however, not common to find other
than conventional instances of the Singular 2nd Person forms. If they
occur, they mark the style of the particular author as informal. We
illustrate this with anothe"r passage from Landau [1930 ]. In the
introduction to his handbook of analysis (Vorwort fur den Lernenden) he
wrote:
Example 4.20
1. Bitte lies nicht das nachstehende Vorwort fur den
Kenner! ...
3. Bitte vergi(3 alles, was Du auf der Schule gelernt hast;
denn Du hast es nicht gelernt.
(A—5)
Landau must have been aware that this was not a conventional way of
addressing the reader. The introduction ends:
Example 4.21
5. Entschuldige, daB ich Dich duze; dies geschieht nicht nur,
weil man den Leser mit "lies" und "siehe" anzureden
pflegt, sondern weil dies Buch zum Teil in usum
delphinarum geschrieben ist ...
(A-5)
However, in the following introduction for a specialist (Vorwort fur den
Kenner) the style is again more formal and no du forms are used, since
they would violate social convention. This introduction ends:
Example 4.22
Wenn aber gar dem einen oder anderen Kollegen der anderen
Richtung die Sache so leicht erscheint, daB er sie in seinen
Aufangervorlesungen (...) bringt, wtirde ich ein Ziel erreicht
haben, auf das ich in groBerem Umfange nicht zu hoffen wage.
(A-5)
These forms of addressing the audience in a more or less formal but
direct way are limited to the introduction and do not occur in the
scientific discourse itself. This is why we left them out in the
discussion and considered them only as a marginal phenomenon of direct
reference.
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In the last section of this chapter we present the results of a pilot
count, carried out on a small sample of the data. This analysis shows
that the common belief in the apparently impersonal character of
mathematical discourse requires revision.
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4.6 Analysis of Text Samples
4.6.1 Methods
A pilot count was carried out on the text samples (A-9 and B-6) from
the two text corpuses described in Subsection 4.1.2. The samples
consisted of 146 and 195 clauses. Fourteen multilevel criteria were
used to describe the internal clause structure, taking into account
syntactic and semantic aspects. No attempt was made to present a more
exhaustive analysis of the data available, although we intend to extend
this line of research in the future. The pilot study was meant as a
check of the proportion of personal and non-personal clauses in
mathematical discourse. We chose the criteria of description to indicate
whether anything in the clause points to the speaker, i.e. can be
considered as the speaker's reference to himself. Clauses containing
one or more 'self-referential' elements are treated as personal, i.e.
allowing for a personal interpretation.
Below we list the criteria and their levels used for description of the
internal clause structure. The first three criteria were necessary
merely for identification of clauses. Criteria 4 and 5 describe the
level of structural complexity of sentences, i.e. are not directly
relevant for the interpretation of reference.
1. Case identification number
2. Text number
3. Sentence number
4. Number of clauses in a sentence
5. Level of the clause subordination
0 - for a simple clause or the main clause of a complex
sentence; 1 - for a clause subordinated to the main clause;
2 - for a clause subordinated to a subordinate clause of level
one, etc.
6. Semantic verb type (according to the classification presented
in Subsection 4.2.1):
1) prototypical action verb






















4) voluntative Koniunktiv I




1) present (i.e. Prasens)
2) past (i.e. Prateritum, Perfekt, Plusquamperfekt)
3 ) future (i.e. Futur I and II)
4) not applicable (e.g. in the case of clauses with
non-indicative mood)
Number of explicit arguments as compared with the number of PF
arguments:
1) equal to the number of PF arguments
2) less
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11. Semantic characteristics of the lexical subject NP:
1) + Human (lexically fully specified)
2) Human-like (e.g. personification of computers etc.)
3) + Inanimate
4) man (+ Human but not lexical)
5) dummy subject es
6) event (i.e. a complex phrase or clause referring to an
'event')
7) 0 (no explicit subject)
12. Prototypical semantics of the 1st participant:
1) + AGENT (i.e. prototypicallv human)
2) OTHER (i.e. no restrictions)
3) + TARGET (i.e. prototypically inanimate)
4) not applicable (i.e. PF{0} )
13. Clause constituent corresponding to the 1st participant:
1) subj ect
2) another complement (i.e. 1st participant demoted)
3) non-argument (i.e. 1st participant presented as e.g. free
Dative in pseudo-reflexive construction or corresponding to
the possessive pronoun modifying the subject in infinitive
constructions)
4) 0 (omission of the 1st participant)
5) not applicable
14. Evolving subject perspective (i.e. subject of the current
clause is referentially identical with on of the following):
1) last subject
2) one of the previous subjects
3) previous argument
4) element of the previous discourse, however, without
argument status
5) something newly introduced
6) something inferrable
7) not applicable (e.g. in subjectless constructions)
8) dummy es
9) previous statement as a whole
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15. Means of the speaker's self-reference:
1) ich
2) generalised wir excluding the audience
3) generalised wir including the audience
(This distinction is due to the predicate semantics and,
consequently, to different links betwen predicate
arguments and discourse participants, as described in
Section 4.2.)
4) indirect self-reference via PF
5) reference to the context of writing/speaking
6) use of evaluative modifiers
7) other means of self-reference (e.g. Tense, Mood, etc.)
8) 0
16. Means of the speaker's reference to the audience:
1) full imperative
2) generalised inclusive wir
3) periphrastic and other forms of imperative
4) indirect reference via PF
5) question
6) reference to the context of reading/1istening
7) other means of reference to the audience
8) 0
17. Other than personal means of deixis:
1) spatio-temporal deixis
2) text-deixis
3) other deictic elements
4) 0
Underlined are those levels which indicate the speaker's presence in
direct or indirect way. This may be the speaker's explicit reference
to himself, some form of his reference to the audience, or reference to
the context of communication.
The following analysis was performed using the SPSSx computer package
(cf. SPSSx User's Guide [1983 ]).
Personal clauses, i.e. those containing at least one of the underlined
characteristics, were counted. At the following stage we analysed
certain dependencies between the semantic and referential
characteristics of clauses. In particular we looked at the semantic
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verb type and the personal or non-personal status of a clause to see whether
there is a systematic relationship between these two features. The
results of this count are presented in the following section.
To give an indication as to whether the sample size of 195 clauses is
large enough, we give the following calculation.
Let p be the true (population) proportion of
personal clauses;
Let P be the discovered relative frequency of
personal clauses.
Then, under some assumptions of independence, the 95% confidence limits
for the population p are:
P ± 1.96 7 p(1—p )/N 1 .
Replacing N by 195 we have
P ± 1.96 yp(l-p)/195 1 .
The 95% confidence interval will become at least 95% confidence interval
if we replace p by lA.
= P ± 1.96//78CT1
= P ± 0.070 .
This means that if the appropriate assumptions hold, the proportion of
personal and non-personal clauses in German mathematical discourse,
which is estimated on the basis of 195 cases, has a 95% confidence
interval not longer than 0.14. This accuracy is absolutely sufficient
for our purposes. However, we should note that the assumptions
underlying the above calculation (i.e. the assumption that each clause,
independently of all others, had the probability p of being personal)
are evidently not fulfilled. This is due to the fact that individual
styles of authors and text types allow for a different degree of usage
of personal and non-personal clauses. Let the above calculation be
just an informal justification of the limited sample size.
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4.6.2 Results
The count of the frequency of personal clauses in the two samples gave
the following results. In the data sample from written discourse 107
clauses out of 195 were classified as personal (55%) and 88 as non-personal
(45%). In the data sample from spoken discourse 121 clauses out of 146
were classified as personal (83%) and 25 (17%) as non-personal.
The number of clauses with verbs associated prototypically with the
human 1st participant was 28 (14%) for the written and 16 (11%) for the
spoken discourse. This clearly shows that also clauses with predicates
other than those denoting prototypical or cognitive actions, were given
personal interpretation.
In the written discourse, among clauses with verbs associated with
prototypically human 1st participants 20 (71%) had the 1st argument
of the predicate overtly expressed. In the spoken discourse this
figure was 11 what amounted to 69% of the predicates associated with
prototypically human 1st participants. This shows that the remaining
number of clauses with personal predicates (ca. 3/iq) involved indirect
reference to the agent-like participant.
We did not refer here to all of the criteria listed in Subsection 4.6.1
since not all of them were employed in the quantitative check. The
computer count was carried out on a sample of size 195. We were
interested in options available for a speaker rather than in the
estimates of frequencies of their usage.
We must note here that frequencies of usage of particular forms change
in time, that is depend on rhetorical fashions of a given period. They
obviously also depend on individual tastes. Further computer analyses
can give more interesting results for phenomena other than the ways of
the speaker's reference to the participants in the communication. For
example, the evolving subject perspective or the dependency between the
syntactic structure of a clause, the word order and the functional
sentence perspective could be further analysed in terms of the criteria
given in Subsection 4.6.1. These analyses obviously require larger
data samples and, more importantly, a randomised approach to the
selection of texts and analysed clauses. They were, however, beyond




5.1 Summary of Results
5.1.1 Systems of Reference in Spoken and Written Mathematical Discourse
In the preceding chapters we have
1. described syntactic and semantic properties of German
impersonal constructions (Chapter 1);
2. set up a pragmatic background for their analysis as means of
indirect reference in scientific discourse (Chapter 2);
3. developed a model to describe non-isomorphic mapping between
syntactic and semantic representations of German impersonal
constructions (Chapter 3);
4. presented the analysis of indirectly referential expressions
in German mathematical discourse (Chapter 4).
In this chapter, we first summarise the results of the analysis
presented in Chapter 4. We also point out differences between the
reference systems used in spoken and written mathematical discourse and
indicate some changes in the reference systems used in mathematical
texts at different times (Section 5.1). Then, in Section 5.2, the
final conclusions are stated and some lines of further research
suggested. In particular, other linguistic phenomena are indicated which
could be analysed in terms of the criteria proposed in this thesis.
Spoken mathematical discourse is in many respects very similar to the
written discourse. In particular, statements of mathematical facts
(i.e. theorems and theorem-like statements) commonly have the same form
in written and spoken discourse. Most differences between the two
sorts of discourse relate to the speaker's/author's presentation of self
and to his reference to other participants in the communication.
In Section 4.4 we presented arguments in support of the thesis that in
the restricted context of mathematical discourse the means of indirect
reference constitute a complete system of reference. Here we shall
further discuss this point and indicate differences between the system
of reference in spoken and written mathematical discourse.
By saying that means of indirect reference constitute a complete system
we mean that within an indirectly-referential framework it is possible
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to point to each of the discourse participants in a distinctive way.
This, in turn, means that a system of indirect reference can (in an
appropriate context) effectively replace a direct system of reference
and is able to take over all its functions. It provides a distinctive
means of self-reference, means of referring to the immediate audience
including the speaker, means of referring to the audience only and,
finally, means of referring to the shared knowledge on the subject,
personified by the 'encyclopaedic' reader or general audience.
There is, however, no single system of indirect reference valid for all
instances of mathematical discourse. The fact that various initial
choices (i.e. choices of means of the author's self-reference) are
possible and that, consequently, various indirectly-referential
frameworks may be set up, was discussed in detail in Section 4.4. There,
we also indicated that indirect reference works differently in spoken
and written discourse. Here, we point out and discuss two aspects of
that difference. The first one concerns preferred interpretations of
reference, the second relates to the scope of validity of the
established systems of reference.
Spoken discourse, i.e. a mathematical lecture, necessarily involves some
form of deixis. The immediate presence of the speaker and the
audience, the fact that they share the situational context (i.e. time
and place of communication) justify the use of deictic elements as the
most economical way of referring.
Therefore, if the pronoun wir is used without any preceding discourse,
for instance in a passage opening a lecture, it will be interpreted as
referring directly to the speaker and the audience together. This is a
preferred interpretation even if the lexical meaning of the predicate
could suggest pragmatic links with a different discourse participant.
Thus, for instance, in Example 5.1, the predicate definieren ('to
define') is prototypically linked with the speaker as referent of the
1st argument position of the PF. Nevertheless, when there is no previous
discourse which would introduce indirect self-reference of the author,
wir is more likely to be interpreted as direct reference to the speaker
and the audience together. The joint interpretation would probably be
preferred for predicates prototypically linked with the audience, such
as e.g. lernen ('to learn'). (This possibility was suggested to me by
one of the lecturers from the Department of Mathematics in Kiel. There
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are, however, no examples of this sort in our corpus.) Thus, wir in the
invented example (1):
(1) letztes mal haben wir gelernt was man unter einer
transzendenten erweiterung versteht
'last time we have learned what one understands by a
transcendental extension'
would probably be interpreted as speaker's polite reference to the
audience. This effect of politeness is achieved by including oneself
among those who are referents of the 1st argument position of lemen.
In general, in spoken mathematical discourse the deictic,
directly-referential reading of wir is favoured. Below are three
examples of the lecture opening passages illustrating the use of wir:
Example 5.1
wir hatten in der letzten sitzung definiert was man unter einer
algebraischen erweiterung versteht und unter einer




... und wenn wir heute den satz ... beweisen wollen. .. / ja
letztes mal haben wir uns so mit trennungseigenschaften
beschaftigt/haben also konvexe mengen die leeren durchschnitt
hatten durch hyperebenen getrennt/heute wollen wir uns erstmal
auch ein biBchen mit hyperebenen beschaftigen und dann werden
wir... betrachten. . .
(B—5)
Example 5.3
... ja da wollten wir ja jetzt uns dieser gausschen
periodentheorie da zuwenden/und diese ... besagt uns folgendes/
wir haben eine ungerade primzahl d hoch p/ungerade/und wir
betrachten da(3 p der gleichtei lungspolynom ist/ich nenn das wie




In the examples 5.1-5.3 wir is used with predicates prototypically
linked with the speaker (e.g. definieren ('to define'), beweisen ('to
prove')) as well as with predicates with no prototypical links (e.g.
sich beschaftigen ('to be occupied'), betrachten ('to consider')). In the
lecture opening passages, expressions with both verb types are
interpreted as direct reference tick + Sie reading). This interpretation
cannot be affected by the use of tenses other than Prasens
(Plusquamperfekt in example 5.1, Perfekt and Futur I in example 5.2,
Prateritum in example 5.3) since these departures from the general
Present Tense support the deictic use of wir.
In written discourse, on the other hand, it is conventional to employ
indirect reference. This does not rule out directly referential
interpretation if a paper is written by two or more authors as is the
case in example 5.4:
Example 5.4, paper by two authors
1. Einleitung
Die Frage, ob jede geschlossene Mannigfaltigkeit eine
nicht-triviale Operation einer kompakten Liegruppe G auf sich
zula'Bt, ist von verschiedenen Autoren negativ beantwortet
worden... . Wir zeigen hier unter anderem da/3... .
(A-7)
Except for articles written by more than one author, wir in the passage
opening a mathematical paper (i.e. being the first referring expression
in the discourse) may be interpreted either as author's indirect
self-reference or as his reference to himself and to the possible
readers, i.e audience remote in time and space. Which interpretation
is preferred depends on the lexical predicate and its link with
discourse roles, and on the deictic elements used to support reference
(indicated by bold print). Example 5.5 illustrates the indirctly
self-referential use of wir since the 1st argument position of geben




Es seien X eine Zufal lsgrd/3e und f(t) ihre charakteristische
Funktion. In dieser Note geben wir eine Charakterisierung der
Nul lstellenmenge von f(t) in den folgenden drei Fallen: ... .
(A-9)
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In example 5.6 wir is also used for self-reference. This
interpretation is supported by the use of the Past Tense and by
text-deictic phrases, {in ... der vorliegenden Arbeit and im folgenden).
Example 5.6.
Einleitung
In Teil I der vorliegenden Arbeit betrachteten wir eine
Verallgemeinerung des Schmidt-Bachmannschen Axiomensystems
der absoluten Geometrie, der auch die minkowskische Geometrie
genugt (das Axiomensystem A). Im folgenden wird der iiber
das Schmidt-Bachmannsche Axiomensystem hinausreichende Teil
des Axiomensystems A (das Axiomensystem A') untersucht.
(A—12 )
Note that in the above example 5.6 self-reference in the discourse-
opening clause is achieved by the generalised wir and in the clause
immediately following impersonal passive is used in the same function.
Both instances of indirect self-reference are supported by coherent
deictic elements pointing to the author as intended referent.
The use of wir for referring to the author and those who want to follow
his argument is illustrated in example 5.7.
Example 5.7
In seinem Tagebuch ... notiert C.F. Gauss am 9. Oktober 1796
den Satz, dass fur eine ungerade Primzahl p jede nicht
triviale ganzzahlige Linearkombination der primitiven p-ten
Einheitswurzeln von Null verschieden ist. Dies ist offenbar
gleichwertig mit ... . Bezeichnen wir allgemein mit W(f(t))
den von den Nullstellen eines Polynoms f(t) erzeugten
Q-Teilraum von C, so konnen wir den Satz von Gauss in der Form
aussprechen; ... .
(A-3)
This interpretation is achieved by the conditional form 'if-then', not
bound by any deictic elements. Predicates bezeichnen ('to denote') and
aussprechen ('to express') are relatively free, i.e. do not necessarily
require a constant link with the speaker as a referent of their 1st
argument positions.
Thus, for spoken mathematical discourse, the deictic, direct reference
is a favoured (default) option for interpretation. In written
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discourse, on the other hand, where the impersonal rhetoric of science
is the usual convention, indirect reference is preferred. These two
discourse types are governed by rules specific for each of them
separately, and even one and the same person changes his/her system of
referring according to the mode of presentation (spoken versus written).
Our corpus contains two examples of written and spoken discourse from
the same speaker/author (for two different individuals). These are the
pairs A-3, B-2 and A-12, B-6. In both cases ich self-reference is used
only in the spoken discourse and wir as indirect self-reference (i.e.
excluding the audience) is used only in written discourse, supported by
the text-deixis. We may conclude that spoken and written mathematical
discourse are pragmatically distinct and that this difference results
in the choice of one or other distinctive system of reference.
The second interesting difference between the systems of reference in
spoken and written mathematical discourse is that of the scope of
validity of established frameworks of referring.
In a mathematical paper, i.e. in written discourse, systems of reference
work globally. Once a framework is set up, it remains valid for the for
the whole paper. If, for example, the generalised wir is chosen for
self-reference, we do not expect to encounter, and in fact do not
encounter, any instances of ich used in the same function. Written
discourse is thus referential ly coherent, which seems to be an obvious
consequence of a higher level of impersonality, a sophisticated system
of indirect reference and of the nature of writing in general, with time
to change syntax and polish up the language.
In spoken discourse, systems of reference work locally, that is more than
one framework of referrring may be used during the same lecture. These
local frameworks vary mainly in the speaker's choice of term for
self-reference (ich-wir-man) and in the speaker's choice of term for
reference to the audience (Sie-wir-man). Because in spoken discourse
deixis is legitimate, reference interpretation within the changing
framework is supported and facilitated by various deictic elements.
Thus, in spoken discourse reference systems are only locally coherent, i.e.
apply to parts of discourse, not to discourse as a whole.
We can find an analogy for local systems of reference in written
discourse, namely in monographs, where the framework of reference may be
different in the preface (more personal, i.e. direct) and in the text
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itself (indirect). This phenomenon was illustrated with examples in
Section 4.5 (cf. examples 4.22 - 4.24). A different system of
reference may also be found in the 'summary' section of some scientific
papers. The 'summary', contrary to the 'preface1, usually represents the
most indirect and impersonal type of reference.
The following diagrams illustrate the hierarchical nature of the system
of indirect reference and summarise the referring techniques used in
written and spoken German mathematical discourse.
Note, that there is a difference between written and spoken discourse in
the possible ways of referring to the audience. In the written
discourse we distinguish between reference to an individual reader and
reference to the general audience. No means of joint reference to the
speaker and the reader were found in our corpus. In the spoken
discourse, on the other hand, we distinguish between the speaker's
reference to the audience and himself together, and his reference to the
audience only. Note also, that no means of direct reference to the
general audience were found in our data from written discourse.
WRITTEN DISCOURSE
(one author)









the reader (du) ...
audience
restricted



























Figure 5. System of referring in written discourse, two or more authors



















,*) possible only as a local framework
Figure 6. System of referring in spoken discourse
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5.1.2 Development of Referring Strategies
A comprehensive analysis of the development of referring strategies in
mathematical discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis. It would
require investigation of a large body of mathematical texts from
different epochs and by different authors. Thus, in the remarks
presented in this subsection we do not attempt to give a general picture
of the changing rhetoric of mathematics. We merely indicate to what
extent results from the analysis of contemporary mathematical discourse,
discussed in this thesis, are valid for older texts. To achieve this
aim, we looked at some original German mathematical texts from the 19th
century and at 19th and early 20th century translations of other texts.
As was indicated in Subsection 2.2.4, mathematics has a unique status
among the arts and sciences. The special nature of mathematics is
closely related to the special character of mathematical creation and
discovery. Henri Poincar6 (1854-1912), French mathematician and
philosopher, described this phenomenon as follows:
"The genesis of mathematical discovery is a problem which must
inspire the psychologist with the keenest interest. For this
is the process in which the human mind seems to borrow least
from the exterior world, in which it acts, or appears to act,
only by itself and on itself, so that by studying the process
of geometric thought we may hope to arrive at what is most
essential in the human mind."
Poincar6 [1952] p.46
We may assume therefore, that the general nature of mathematical
discovery is independent of time and culture, and as such that- it has
not changed. On the other hand, the creative character of mathematical
activity necessarily brings the individuality of the author into
consideration. Yet another factor which must be taken into account is
the rhetoric of mathematics. Rhetoric in general is, as Kaplan [1972]
put it, "not universal... but varies from culture to culture and even
from time to time within a given culture. It is affected by canons of
taste within a given culture at a given time" (p.7).
It seems that the rhetoric of science generally develops towards a more
personal presentation of the research performed. The impersonal
rhetoric, however, was and still is a neutral convention in many works
and for many scientists. In mathematics, the impersonal rhetoric is
supported by the a-personal nature of mathematical statements and by the
growing level of formalism in their expression.
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Taking into account the above mentioned factors, we might expect that
mathematical texts written in the 19th century will not differ
considerably from modern mathematical discourse as far as the expression
of mathematical statements is concerned (apart from differences due to
the general development of the German language and to the changing
formalism). Also, as we find individual differences with respect to
the presentation of self in modern mathematical discourse, we may expect
to.see individual differences in referring strategies in older texts.
Interesting, from the point of view of the research presented here, is
the question, whether certain principles of indirect reference applied
in texts written one or two centuries ago.
Our analysis, necessarily limited, concentrated on the following texts:
Euclid (365- ca. 300 b.c. ) Die Elemente ('Elements'),
translation from Greek, published in Leipzig 1933;
L. Euler (1707-1783) Mechanik ('Mechanics') translation from
Latin, published in Greifswald 1848;
C.F. Gauss (1777-1855) Allgemeine Flachentheorie ('General theory of
planes'), written in 1827, translation from Latin,
published in Leipzig 1921 (5th edition);
C.F. Gauss Disquisitiones Arithmeticae, translation from Latin,
published in 1889;
C.F. Gauss Zur Theorie der complexen Zahlen ('On the theory of complex
numbers'), published in Werke, Vol. 2, (2nd edition),
Gottingen, 1876;
C.G.J. Jacobi (1804-1851) Zur Theorie der elliptischen Functionen ('On the
theory of elliptical functions'), published in Berlin
1881;
F.G. Frobenius (1849-1917) Zur Theorie der elliptischen Functionen ('On the
theory of elliptical functions'), first published in
Journal fur die reine und angewandte Mathematik in 1877;
The most striking difference between the above listed texts and texts
discussed in Chapter 4, is a higher level of syntactic complexity of
impersonal constructions used for indirect reference. Since impersonal
rhetoric was clearly a prevalent convention in 19th century mathematics,
the resulting impression is one of a highly impersonal style of
narration. We find this even in those parts of a text which
are usually most personal, e.g. in a preface written by the editor. We
may illustrate this phenomenon with a final passage from the editor's
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preface to the 1889 edition of Gauss's Disquisitiones •.
Example 5.8
Da nun die 'Disquisitiones arithmeticae' ein durch seine Form
hervorragendes klassisches Werk sind, so kann das Studium
derselben im Original text nicht dringend genug empfohlen werden.
Wem es aber zunachst nur darum zu thun ist, mit dem Inhalte
selbst bekannt zu werden, der wird es jedenfalls dankbar
annehmen, wenn es ihm durch Hinwegraumung ausserer
Schwierigkeiten ermoglicht wird, seine ganze Aufmerksamkeit auf
die Sache zu richten. Daher darf man sich immerhin der
Hoffnung hingeben, dass die vorliegende deutsche Ausgabe
vielen Lesern sehr willkommen sein wird .
The sophisticated form of indirect self-reference, illustrated with the
last phrase, darf matt sich der Hoffnung hingeben, cannot be considered as
a generally accepted convention in older texts. The editor's preface
to the 1848 German edition of Euler's Mechanik shows a different
referential framework with ich as initial choice. Below, we quote the
opening and the closing sentences:
Example 5.9
Das vorliegende Werk hatte ich, urn es griindlich kennen zu
lernen, dermassen studiert, dass ich es in's Deutsche ubertrug,
und alle Stellen, welche mir von selbst nicht klar waren,
durch Worte und Calcul zu erlautern suchte.
Dieses Vorwort hielt ich fur nothwendig, urn zu bewirken, dass
das Werk aus dem richtigen Gesichtspunkte betrachtet werde und
spreche schliesslich den Wunsch aus, dass dieser I. Theil eine
gunstige Aufnahme finden moge .
Also in the following translation of the introduction written by Euler,
direct self-reference with ich (corresponding to the 1st Person Singular
form of the verb in the Latin original) is used. However, in the
mathematical text itself, only indirect means of self-reference are
used. Ich appears only in comments added by the editor and clearly
distinguished from Euler's original. In this case, two different
systems of reference run parallel (but separate) in one piece of
discourse.
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An indirect system of reference is also used by Frobenius (wir - man -
impersonal passive and infinitive constructions) and in all three
translations of Gauss. As was illustrated in Subsection 2.3.2, Gauss
used to write in an 'impersonal' manner even in his private mathematical
diary. In his strictly mathematical writing, he follows impersonal
rhetoric and uses a highly sophisticated system of indirect reference
which we illustrate with the fragment below.
Example 5.10
Wir haben allgemein die identische Gleichung... . Aus dieser
neuen Auflosung kann man auf gleiche Weise eine dritte
ableiten u.s.w. Man liberzeugt sich leicht, dass wenn die erste
Auflosung in reel 1 en Zahlen ist, auch die dritte eine solche
sein wird. Es ist noch zu bemerken, dass wenn a, b, c keinen
Factor gemein haben, dasselbe auch von a1, b', c' gel ten
wird... .
from Gauss' s Zur Theorie der complexen Zahlen
Among the referring expressions in 5.10, wir points to the speaker and
audience together; the first man, and the es ist zu bemerken
construction point to the audience.
The interpretation of indirect self-reference is supported by deictic
and text-deictic elements (in bold print), as is illustrated below:
Example 5.11
Da im Folgenden sehr haufig solche Potenzen der Wurzel r zu
betrachten sind, deren Exponenten wiederum Potenzen sind,
derartige Ausdrucke aber im Druck nicht ohne Schwierigkeit
wiedergegeben werden konnen, so werden wir uns zur
Erleichterung des Druckes im Nachstehenden der folgenden
Abkiirzung bedienen.
from Gauss 1 s Disquisitiones
It is an interesting difference, if compared with modern mathematical
discourse, that the deictic function of the system of grammatical tenses
is exploited to a much larger extent. Modern discourse prefers the
general Present Tense even for description of future events. An
example of the use of the Future Tense (Futur I) is given in 5.11 above,




Das Ziel der nachfolgenden Untersuchungen, welches kurz
anzugeben nicht unnutzlich sein wird. . .
from Gauss 1 s Disquisitiones
Exaple 5.13
In Fltissigkeiten sind nam 1ich, wie wir spater sehen werden, wo
von der Bewegung der Korper in ihnen die Rede sein wird, die
bei gleichen Geschwindigkeiten hervorgebrachten Widerstande
den Dichtigkeiten der erstern proportional .
from Euler's Mechanik
Note that in the examples above the Future Tense is used to refer to the
following parts of the paper itself, i.e. its function is also
text-deictic. In modern texts Present Tense would be used.
The individual nature of the author's initial choice of terms for
self-reference is confirmed by the fact that direct self-reference may
still be used although it apparently violates rhetorical principles.
We find examples of direct self-reference in the 1881 edition of
Jacobi's Gesammelte Werke. Here we quote the passage opening the
chapter on the theory of elliptical functions:
Example 5.14
Unter den Formeln, durch welche man die vielen von mir in den
Fundam. nov. gegebenen Entwicklungen mit leichter Mtihe noch
vermehren kann, scheint mir die nachfolgende... einen
eigentiiml ichen Character zu haben
from Jacobi's Gesammelte Werke
As we pointed out in Subsection 4.4.1, when ich is used as a means of
self-reference, wir would also be interpreted as deictic which is not a
desirable effect. Consequently, discourse examples with ich do not
contain any instances of wir. The same was the case in the older texts
we looked at.
In the 1933 translation of the Euclid's Elements we find practically no
instances of the author's self-reference. The text, preceded by a set
of definitions, axioms and postulates, consists of practical questions
and their solutions. The indirect reference to the audience (via
commands expressed with man + Konjunktiv /, man + modal verbs, or with
infinitive constructions) may be considered as the only indication of
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the existence of the narrator. This technique, however, cannot be
directly compared with the 19th and 20th century mathematical discourse
simply because Euclid's works (due to the fact that they were written
over 2,000 years ago) could not be preserved as exactly as books or
papers written in the last century. If anything was left out in the
subsequent versions, these were most likely the extra mathematical
elements, i.e. those which might have been marked as personal.
The limited scope of this analysis does not allow any generalisations.
It seems, however, justified to conclude that, while rhetorical
conventions and individual tastes vary, principles of semantic
interpretation of language phenomena remain relatively stable.
5.1.3 Means of Impersonal Narration Unexploited in Mathematical
Discourse
German offers a wide range of syntactic constructions which allow the
language user to describe actions and events without any explicit
reference to human participants, including himself. In Chapter 1 we
presented German impersonal constructions and discussed their semantic
interpretation. Since the rhetoric of mathematical discourse advises
its disciples to write and talk in a possibly impersonal manner, we
could expect that all linguistic means of impersonality available in the
language, will be exploited. This, however, is not the case. Certain
options are not used. In this subsection we look at some devices for
achieving the impersonal style that are not exploited in mathematical
discourse, namely some pseudo-reflexive constructions. We comment on
the possible reasons for their non-occurrence.
Some transitive and intransitive German verbs, when used to refer to
human activities, allow for impersonal, pseudo-reflexive constructions.
Below, we discuss this type of impersonal constructions in more detail
to illustrate how it is handled in terms of the PF model.
For transitive verbs, such as e.g. lesen ('to read'), the 2nd argument
may be promoted to subject position. The 2nd argument promotion to the
topical position, however, does not determine the clause structure in an
unequivocal way. There are several options, passive being the most
obvious choice. In this case, the predicate has passive morphology and
the 1st argument may be, but does not have to be, left out. Other
options are: infinitive constructions, i.e. sich lassen + infinitive of
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the main verb and sein + zu + infinitive of the main verb. In both
cases the 1st argument may, but does not have to be, omitted. Finally,
the pseudo-reflexive construction may be used. Here the 1st argument
must be left out and the verb is marked as reflexive. The reflexive
pronoun is co-referential with the subject. The reflexive marking on
the verb is necessary since the verb has not been properly
detransitivised (i.e. has active morphology) and as such requires an
object. The semantic object, i.e. the 2nd argument of the predicate,
functions as syntactic subject. In the semantic representation, however,
at PF level, it is still the 'object' of lesen. This discrepancy
between syntax and semantics is indicated by the reflexive verb
morphology, which signals the intended middle interpretation. Passive
verb marking is just another way of signalling that the clause subject
is not the 1st argument of the predicate. Here is an example of the
pseudo-reflexive use of a transitive verbs
(2) a. Hans las dieses dicke Buch nur muhsarn
'Hans read that thick book only with difficulty'
b. Dieses dicke Buch las sich (*von Hans) nur mlihsam
'that thick book read (*by Hans) only with difficulty'
The 1st argument demotion has different consequences for intransive
verbs. There is no 2nd argument to be promoted and the subject
position cannot be filled lexically. Since German requires an overt
grammatical subject, es fills the subject position. The reflexive
pronoun signals the middle reading. It may also be seen as
co-referential with es, since both elements have a syntactic function
only (i.e. both are semantically empty). This purely syntactic
(formal) character of es is confirmed by the fact that in languages with
subject-incorporation (e.g. in Polish) the function of es is taken over
by verb morphology. In general, the semantic (and referential)
interpretation of pseudo-reflexive constructions (for both transitive
and intransitive verbs) must be arrived at by reference to the PFs of
the relevant predicates. The examples below illustrate the
pseudo-reflexive construction with an intransitive verb 'to sleep' in
German and in Polish:
(3) Es schlaft sich gut auf dem Lande
'One sleeps well in the country'
(4) Na wsi dobrze sic 4pi
'in the country, one sleeps well'
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(Note that Polish allows free Datives within the pseudo-reflexive
construction, pointing to the 1st argument of the predicate:
(5) Na wsi dobrze mi sic Spi
'in the country, I sleep well'.)
Both in German and in Polish, pseudo-reflexives are stylistically marked
as colloquial. This may be one of the reasons for not using them in
scientific discourse. However, there is yet another reason which, we
believe, is the major factor in rejecting this type of construction. As
was mentioned above, in contrast with other means of the 2nd argument
promotion, pseudo-reflexive constructions do not allow for the demoted
1st argument to appear in the clause structure. This constraint
suggests that the personal interpretation is 'blocked', i.e. that the PF
specification of the prototypical 1st argument is not accessible. This
becomes clear if we compare the two examples in (6):
(6) a. Die Tur offnete sich
'the door opened'
b. Die Tiir wurde geoffnet
'the door was opened' ,
where the first one concentrates on the event as such while the second
implies some sort of external agency. The same argument could be used
to explain why the Zustandspassiv is very rarely used in German
mathematical discourse in comparison with the Vorgangspassiv.
If this is the case we would have to assume that pseudo-reflexive
constructions are too impersonal, since they do not hide but remove
acting participants from the discourse perspective.
We could expect that pseudo-reflexives may be used in statements of
mathematical facts, i.e. in fully impersonal parts of mathematical
discourse. This, however, is impossible since the sets of predicates
used in theorem-like statements and in pseudo-reflexive constructions
are disjoint. Expressions of the first type, i.e. theorem-like
statements, cannot be related to humans (thus they contain relational
and existential predicates with the feature <0THER> as semantic
specification on their PF-slots). Pseudo-reflexives, on the other
hand, are possible only for predicates prototypically associated with
humans. Therefore, this type of 'impersonal' construction cannot be used
in theorems.
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There is yet another reason why pseudo-reflexives are not used in
mathematical discourse. As was illustrated in (2)—(5), this syntactic
construction is practically always used with some adverb of manner
characterising certain aspects of the process or action described by the
predicate (cf. nur muhsam in (2b), gut in (3), dobrze in (4) and (5)).
The presence of this adverbial phrase is a necessary condition for using
the pseudo-reflexive form. Scientific discourse in general avoids
explicit expressions of quality judgements. Adverbs of manner are
quite rare in mathematical texts, and since they condition the use of
pseudo-reflexives, we may well expect that these will not be frequently
used either.
5.1.4 Other Consequences of Impersonal Rhetoric
So far we have discussed mainly syntactic means of indirect reference,
that is, rearrangements of the predicate arguments which result from the
1st argument demotion down the hierarchy of grammatical relations. In
this subsection we discuss yet another method of indirect reference,
which may be labelled personification of certain inanimate objects. This
phenomenon might be seen as a most natural consequence of impersonal
rhetoric. However, it is common in non-technical and non-scientific
communication as well and could be simply considered as a result of
language economy. We concentrate on the syntactic description of the
personification in terms of the PF model. Examples below illustrate
this phenomenon:
(7) Die vorliegende Arbeit liefert einen axiomatischen Aufbau der
minkowskischen Geometrie...
'this study gives an axiomatic structure of Minkowski
geometry...'
(8) Die nebenstehende Tabelle zeigt die Eigenschaften des zur
jeweiligen Geometrie gehorigen "Skalarprodukts"...
'the table shows the properties of the 'scalar product'
which belongs to the given geometry...'
(9) Die Satze 1.47 (fur eigentliches G) und 4.2 besagen
zusammen...
'theorems 1.47 (for proper G) and 4.2 state together...'
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(10) Die Beweisbarkeit des eukl idischen Paral lelenaxioms ...
zeigt insbesondere, da0...
'the fact that the Euclid's axiom of parallel lines can be
proved ... shows in particular, that...'
(A-12)
In the examples, above predicates liefern ('to deliver'), zeigen ('to
show'/'to demonstrate'), besagen ('to state') have the subject position
filled, not by expressions referring to the 1st participants, but to
some sorts of peripheral participants in the event or its circumstances.
Therefore, the 1st participant is not demoted but simply replaced by an
element which does not belong to the relevant PF. Consequently, the
syntactic shape of the clause does not change. Although personification
of inanimate objects (i.e. linking these objects with predicates
prototypically associated with human activities) is an impersonal option
readily available in German (both in scientific and in non-scientific
discourse), it is stylistically marked as 'figurative' or
'metaphorical', and as such not frequently used. Its use is largely
dependent on the individual speaker's preferences. In our corpus,
personification was used almost exclusively in text A-12.
In mathematical discourse, shifting of the acting participants in the
background is accompanied by foregrounding of the objects related to the
discourse topic. The major part of any mathematical discourse consists
of statements of mathematical facts, and as such it is a-personal,
a-temporal and a-spatial. Since in this thesis we are interested in the
reference to human discourse participants only, we have left all
theorem-like elements of mathematical discourse out of consideration. At
the end of this section, however, we briefly mention one linguistic
phenomenon characteristic of these sections of mathematical texts.
Since in theorems no reference to humans is possible, only a-personal
predicates are licensed. This is because, as noted by, e.g. Weisgerber
[1963], due to the properties of personal verbs, Indo-European languages
do not allow for a fully agentless presentation (we commented on
Weisgerber's statement in more detail in Subsection 1.2.3). Verbs used
in German for theorems comply with the a-personal requirement. Their PFs
have either no prototypical specification on the 1st argument slot (i.e.
they have the feature <0THER>), or they specifically require the
features <+ Inanimate> or even <+ Abstract>. Examples of the first
type of predicates are all sorts of relational verbs (equative,
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attributive, locative etc.), existential predicate es gibt ('there is1),
verbs such as heiBen ('to be called'), besitzen ('to possess'), etc. To
the second class belong verbs such as gelten ('to satisfy') or bestehen
('to consist') etc. For these two semantic classes of predicates no
prototypical personal interpretation is possible.
The following last section of this thesis presents conclusions from the
research on reference in German mathematical discourse and attempts to
answer the question: Is scientific discourse really impersonal?
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5.2 Conclusions
5.2.1 Indirect Reference in Mathematical Discourse
The research presented in this thesis originated from an interest in the
syntax and semantics of impersonal constructions in German. We decided
to investigate these constructions as used in scientific texts, where
they are particularly frequent. In the course of analysis of the data
from written and spoken mathematical discourse it became apparent that
the problem may be viewed from at least two different angles, that is
either from a purely formal perspective or from a discourse
perspective.
Independently of which of these approaches is adopted, the common point
of departure for the analysis is the fact that impersonal constructions
in German {and in many other Indo-European languages) are allowed only
for personal verbs, i.e. for verbs prototypical ly associated with human
activities. Thus, in German, clauses with the subject man, or with
passive and pseudo-reflexive constructions, are possible exclusively
for verbs which could otherwise turn up with personal subjects referring
to humans. Consequently, this prototypical semantic link with human
agents can be inferred even if no explicit reference to the acting
participant is made.
If the formal point of view is taken, impersonal constructions may be
assigned a personal interpretation because of the predicate semantics.
However, since the syntactic structures are analysed in isolation, that
is, without any co-text and out of situational context, the semantic
interpretation may only be indefinite-personal. As was pointed out by
Strawson [1959] and as is generally assumed among philosophers, definite
reference cannot be achieved by means of indefinite expressions. This
assumption must be revised when impersonal constructions are analysed in
the restricted context in which they were originally used.
In naturally occurring communication (as opposed to contrived examples),
impersonal constructions do not turn up in isolation but are used as an
element of discourse and as such must be analysed in terms of discourse.
Human communication always takes place in a more or less well-defined
situation. Scientific exchange of thoughts is an instance of
communication in a fairly restricted context. If the language use in
mathematics is chosen as the object of investigation, additional
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factors, relating to the deductive character of this science, facilitate
the reference interpretation (cf. Section 2.2). If pragmatic factors
are taken into account, along with the specific impersonal rhetoric of
mathematics, most of the constructions with impersonal syntax used in
mathematical discourse prove not to be impersonal. They are
interpreted not just as personal, but as definite-personal. That is, the
speaker is able to use them distinctively to refer to different
participants involved in the communication.
In the restricted context of scientific communication the
interpretation of reference is supported not only by the personal
semantics of the predicate but also by the context-specific link between
arguments of the predicate and context-specific discourse roles. And
since they are in turn constantly associated with particular referents
(i.e. with specific participants in the communication), definite
reference to those participants may easily be achieved in an indirect
way, that is by means of impersonal constructions. Thus, restricted
context sets different parameters for the reference interpretation than
those of the sentence grammar. These context-specific parameters
cannot be easily formalised as a set of rules, which is a common problem
in the description of any discourse phenomena. Philosophical or formal
approaches, on the other hand, offer complete models which are
interesting as theories of reference but often fail to fit real language
data.
The approach adopted in this thesis was an attempt to describe the
phenomenon of indirect reference in the language of mathematics at
discourse level, that is, taking pragmatic factors into account.
Assuming that pragmatic factors determine syntactic choices, we have
concentrated on the syntactic and semantic aspects of indirectly
referential expressions.
We assumed that the verb is the nucleus of a sentence. Semantics of
the predicate, i.e. its "logico-semantic valency" (cf. Helbig [1982])
determines the number and type of arguments that it may be associated
with in the language use. Taking this approach, we naturally followed
many lines of the research on valency and case grammar, since these
theories have the concept of verb centrality in common. Description of
reference phenomena requires us to take into account three aspects of
linguistic analysis:
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- the semantic aspect, i.e. participant roles associated with
predicate arguments;
- the syntactic aspect, i.e. grammatical relations assigned to
the predicate arguments;
- the pragmatic aspect, i.e. pragmatic function of the
predicate arguments.
Pragmatic factors cannot be easily accommodated in a linguistic model
but they decide which of the options available in syntax for the
description of a certain state of affairs will be chosen. Thus, in the
predicate frame model presented in this thesis, the syntactic component
is a set of options symbolised by the conditional 'If-Then' facets
associated with PF argument slots (cf. Section 3.2 for the notion of
syntactic facets). Syntactic choices depend on the pragmatic function
assignment. Semantic interpretation is read from the declarative
knowledge about predicate arguments stored on the PF-slots. No attempt
was made to give the model a complete formal shape or to combine it with
any of the current theories of grammar. However, theoretical concepts
employed in this thesis, such as e.g. prototypical participants or
context-specific discourse roles linked with predicate arguments, may be
effectively used in other frameworks. We believe we have shown that,
with the mechanism of reference interpretation described in this thesis,
impersonal constructions used in German mathematical discourse may be
assigned definite-personal readings.
5.2.2 Applications and Further Lines of Research
The model presented in this thesis was developed to handle specific
cases of a non-isomorphic mapping between syntax and semantics. As
such, it seems to be suitable for describing instances of a discrepant
relation between these two levels of representation other than
syntactically impersonal constructions. We believe that phenomena such
as, e.g. reflexivisation, could be further investigated in terms of the
PF model. This model allows for a clear distinction between reflexive
elements with or without equivalents in the semantic representation and,
consequently, with or without grammatical functions. We would like to
apply the concept of predicate frame to impersonal and reflexive
constructions in Slavic languages to see how the distinction between
clauses without an overt subject (i.e. clauses with deictic pronouns
omitted due to the fully specified personal form of the predicate) and
impersonal constructions could be made. Another problem which is worth
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looking at is the question of constraints on extending the PF model to
other parts of speech (i.e. to deverbal nouns and adjectives).
Another interesting area of investigation which could not be further
explored in this thesis is the problem of 'competition' between
prototypical semantic feature specification on the PF argument slots and
features added by the lexical items filling a given slot. In this
context, problems such as metaphorical or allusive use of language could
be investigated. Allusion is commonly defined as 'indirect reference'.
It could be interesting to compare it with indirect reference in
scientific discourse to see whether it also requires a restricted context
to be adequately interpreted. The problem of pragmatic function
assignment in restricted contexts should be further investigated, with
particular emphasis on the way in which pragmatic functions influence
syntactic choices.
The analysis of indirect reference presented here was carried out on
data from German mathematical discourse and we should mention in these
closing remarks at least one aspect in which this research is relevant
for LSP teaching. The results confirm that scientific discourse
employs specific means, not available in everyday communication, in
order to achieve its specific goals. The results also show that
certain linguistic means, used in both contexts, have different
functions in scientific and non-scientific communication. Therefore,
in teaching languages for special purposes, it is essential to teach
linguistic forms as related to their context-specific functions and not
merely as phenomena of grammar. So, e.g. it would be misleading to say
that the German man is used to express reference to some indefinite
individual or group of individuals, since this is practically never the
case in mathematical discourse. Here, man can be used for
self-reference, reference to the definite audience (when with Konjunktiv
I or with modal verbs) or for expression of general truths. Linguistic
analysis of LSP and teaching language for specific purposes require not only
the knowledge of the language itself, but also understanding of the
specific purpose the language is used for.
We believe that the methods developed and the results presented in this
research give some guidance for the further investigation of the
relations between syntax and semantics when language is used in
restricted context. We also hope that the observations about the
mechanism of reference in German mathematical discourse could be
directly applied to LSP theory.
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APPENDIX 2
Translation of the discourse examples in Chapters 4 and 5.
Example 4.1 (from page 100)
...now we want to say we have a dissipative operator/wel1/that
could be our last part for today/definition/t of x dt by x
linear t is called dissipative iff for every x out of dt there
is an x prime out of f of.../i.e. a functional/such that the
real part of x prime applied to dx/that this is less or equal
zero/one would never believe that one can use it/that is why
I'll give you the theorem at once/we prove it next time but I
do not want to let you go away for the weekend with this
definition because, as it was said, one does not believe that
one can use it for anything/.../this is such a uniform
confinement of this mapping down there/this means then, that
if this thing here was surjective/it is injective/then one has
exactly one estimation as one needs it for Hi 1ler-Phi11ips/one
has it simply from the inverse operator from there/.../this
means then/if one can somehow make sure that t is closed and
that it is somehow surjektive then one has already the
condition/and it turns out that although this condition here
looks crazy, one can calculate it relatively simply/.../one
has to take an x out of dt and then one has to find such an x
prime out of fx, while one does not know how difficult it is
to define fx/but one only has to look at it/one does not have
to calculate any norm/nothing/one lets a functional down onto
tx/ and now if one wanted to calculate the norm of, say, tx or
so/then one would have to take all functionals/... or so...
(B-l)
Example 4.2 (from page 101)
C) Rational homotopy of S1-fibres. In the following we are
looking for a manifold with H*(B,Q) = H* and for a Sx-fibre
p:EaB, such that e and m are rational homotopy equivalent
manifolds. B shall be first constructed as a rational space
and we use here Sullivan's rational homotopy theory.
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Theorem 2.8. Let P:EiB be a S1-fibre. Then there is...
One obtains theorem 2.8 easily from the Grivel's theorem.
The last equation in theorem 2.8 is to be understood as a
"differential equation", which one has to solve grade by
grade:... Then,... must be satisfied. The right side is
determined because dE(X) is resolvable.
D) Construction of free S1-operations up to the rational
homotopy equivalence. If one can state r as in theorem
2.8, then the short exact sequence..., where p denotes the
augmentation, induces long exact sequence, similar to the
Gysin sequence. Then one would like to choose t - and
consequently also dB - in such a way that the above
sequence can be bound by a ladder of isomorphisms...
(A—7)
Example 4.3 (from page 115)
...the problem that one has first is to see that this set
is not empty/so firstly r x is not empty/well if x is equal
to zero one does not have great difficulties/does he?/only
if x is not equal to zero/so that this thing is not
empty/well then we simply apply the Hahn-Banach/then we
simply do it this way/for a given x we define us
statements/wel1/how shall we do that?/how shall we denote
that?/let 9 of x be the norm... and this because we define
9 as a mapping from the product of x.../and we continue
this mapping linearly/and we want to make 9 to be a linear
mapping onto the product of x with values in the field/we
do it simply fairly brutai/we continue linearly...
(B-l)
Example 4.4 (from page 126)
so the set a has inner points and the intersection of the
two sets is empty/according to the separation theorem which
we have just written down/this is the separation theorem by
Eidelheit/one can separate the two sets/separate with a
hyper-plane/wel1, by Eidelheit/where are we?/here/theorem
by Fenchel/this is then the statement/yes/here/we have been
so far/the following is satisfied/Xj applied to y .../ or y
applied to.../this is what I wanted to write/y applied to
x.../.../so if we had.../we can estimate (3 = 0 and then
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here stands.../we shall consider now this here as a
contradiction/.../now we want to say, this is a
contradiction/ and we want to consider this together
with.../.../we have already considered this/.../why does it
not work now?/we have points out of the finite domain
now/this is perhaps very brief/this theorem here../but one
would possibly have to consider also.../(one would have) to
derive this theorem precisely/although geometrically it is
very easy...
(B-4)
Example 4.5 (from page 127)
so when these relations are satisfied then, we say, then
these problems are weakly dual and dual/.../one denotes this
as dual or strongly dual/.../this is called dual and then one
distinguishes when the two problems are soluble, then one
denotes it also as strong/this, however, is of secondary
importance/this distinction/for us now the most important
thing is when these two/that these two (have) the same
value.../this means that when we have solved one problem and
found the value then we have also solved the dual problem/we
have at least found the value of the dual problem/.../those
who have once done anything connected with the linear
programming or something like that/then you will realize that
exactly because one has the dual problem/.../generally for
the first time one could define something like simplex
algorithms/thus one always needs, when one calculates...,a
significance criterium/one would like to know whether one is
gone far enough in calculations so that one can finish
them/that one has already reached the required accuracy/and
this is a very important question...
(B-4)
Example 4.6 (from page 130)
We shall now try to prove for manifolds a result analogous to
3.4. ...
It follows
Theorem 3.5 1) X' is a Poincare-complex;
2) X'/Zr can be treated as a simple
Poincare-comp1 ex;
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3) the Spivak's normal bundle u:X'/Zr -» GB
shifts to B Cat.
We fix a lifting and obtain... .
Thus, we only need to find out when... For this we consider
an explicit rational equivalence... .
If we use the natural isomorphism (in a simple case we need
here condition P4)... and the property..., then obviously
follows that... . Mow we obtain... .
(A—7)
Example 4.7 (from page 130)
If e : k[e] - K denotes an augmentation homomorphism
(e(e) = 0), then, using the isomorphism given before, the
Gysin sequence may be represented in the following way:... .
Now the multiplicative structure of the cohomology rings must
be considered. In the following way one obtains... Then one
defines...
Proof of lemma 2.5 . First we construct a suitable
subalgebra... by specifying the generators and we define a
bi1inear form...
(a) m = 21 . One shall choose a maximal <pm isotropic subspace
K1... To prove (a) one can substitute:...
(A—7)
Example 4.8 (from page 131)
1. Introduction
The syntactically restricted recursion was introduced in [1],
to describe ... certain classes of Turing machines with time
limit. In the following investigations, e.g. [3,4], this
operation proved to be well suited for description of the
internal complexity of function classes. So, e.g. the
classical problem PTIME = PTAPE may be formulated in the
recursion theory as a question of the equal value of... .
Going out from the standard syntactically restricted recursion
we shall introduce new operations by reducing the number of
the steps of recursion.
2. Definitions
First, we want to set the abbreviations for some functions...




Example 4.9 (from page 134)
I want to present here shortly the proof for r = 1 to
demonstrate the application of conditions (G), (A) and (R)...
According to (R), K/k is a rational functional field, so that
now the proposition of the embedding theorem follows, in the
case of r = 1, from the Hilbert's theorem of irreducibi1ity.
(A—11)
Example 4.10 (from page 134)
We shall now consider classes H* .
m
Now, we want to give an additional characteristic for classes
Hm(rn > 2).
(A-l)
Example 4.11 (from page 134)
Since the main result from [4] goes into the proof of theorem
2, it seems useful to add some remarks about this here. The
question here concerns the equivalence of the (normal) complex
space in the sense of Behnke, Stein on the one hand and in the
sense of Cartan, Serre on the other hand.
(A—4)
Example 4.12 (from page 134)
...so this is as it was said/at least I hope so/good to
read/.../these are the most important theorems about
conjugated functions... /connection between ... shall be
characterised now and here/later I wanted to include this
theorem in the text, therefore I have the numbering/so the
theorem begins here/here.../those who have the script do not
need to take notes now here/as it was said I do not want to
assume now that you.../already...the script/have read it/so we
now use the script really only as a complement/and so I ask
you to.../only few pages which now.../which now belong to this
lecture/which you should have a look at and now/also
now/.../so now they are also meant as a complement...
(B-4)
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Example 4.13 (from page 135)
...well then we have done it/haven't we?/so/now we want to
say we have an operator/a dissipative one/well this may be
our last part for today...
(B—1)
Example 4.14 (from page 135)
...now we would like to see the period six two/six two/well,
this is a different period/this he (i.e. Gauss - M.S.) also
does.../so, how can one do this now?/... now we could
obviously/now is/lambda is equal to two/this goes now here
with two plus... two times.../how shall we do this?/.../well,
here at the back stands simply.../but the question is/the one
that we just have/how do we obtain all other periods
here?/here, he took the one.../here he took the two/which
lambas shall we take to obtain all periods?/.../this here is
an old trick from the general number theory/and for this, one
has to calculate the product of two periods/and this was for a
long time, I believe, very difficult for Gauss/and is also up
to the present not so simple/but he does this with his
remarkable notation/here in the article three hundred forty
five/very clearly/here one calculates the product of two
periods/well/we can do the rest on Monday...
(B-2)
Example 4.15 (from page 142)
...and one takes a generator and/so this/this is clear/and the
second case/let k be infinite/then one has to argue as
follows/well we still need the field up there/so we do the
following/so we presuppose.../.. ./now one has to consider the
following...
(B—3)
Example 4.16 (from page 144)
Let V(n) be the number of decompositions of n into two
squares
(formula).





I shall simplify the Cramer's method and lead it to the proof
of a new theorem
(formula).
(A—6)
Example 4.17 (from page 145)
With the help of condition 1, Belyi could show in [2] among
others, that all classical simple groups ... are Galois groups
of the regular extensions of fields over Qab(t). ...The
extensions of fields N/k(t) ... show symmetries in the
branching structure. I use this for a sharper criterium of
being rational, here only for s = 3 because of the simpler
form. For this I write... and define...
Then, by the operation of the generating elements of S3 , one
obtains an operation of the elements... (see [11], condition
3.5 or [12] condition 6.3). If one denotes the number of paths
under these operations as..., then again there are...
With conclusion 2b) one can show, for example, that all
primitive not soluble groups of permutations of grade d $ 15
may be represented as Galois groups over Q(t). At the end of
the first section I shall present two more examples with
s = 4.
(A-ll)
Example 4.18 (from page 147)
...now when this is less than or equal to x then we simply
substitute this/so this is somehow quite simple/so now when
this...than you can substitute it/...with that we are a step
further on.../so now we have to consider a group of
contractions/now the problem which initially occurs is/there
could stand an m here/.../and we do not know anything about it
in the moment/we can, however, eliminate this.../what we still
have to note is that if instead of a semi-group of
contractions we have a general one.../then we simply drop the
ft t .../and what remains is.../ are restricted semi¬




Example 4.19 (from page 147)
...and, no doubt, what I present here and now is obviously not
the beginning of the story but the end of it/isn't
it?/obviously, this was first done for Hilbert spaces/and then
the question was obviously how one finds an appropriate
generalisation for Banach/spaces and with conditions which I
write down, to begin with, you probably first think about
Hilbert space/but I formulate it immediately also for Banach
space/and this goes now/...for the time being it is very
abstract/and I want you to swallow it first simply as it
is...
(B-2)
Example 4.20 (from page 150)
1. Please do not read the following foreword for the
expert!...
3. Please forget everything that you learned at school
because you didn't learn it.
(A-5)
Example 4.21 (from page 150)
Excuse me if I call you Du-, this happens not only because one
is used to addressing the reader with lies ('read') and siehe
('see') but because this book is written partly in usum
delphinarum.
(A-5)
Example 4.22 (from page 150)
But if the material seems so easy to any colleague with a
different approach that he uses it in his introductory
lectures, I would have reached a goal which I dare not hope
for in the wider sphere.
(A-5)
Example 5.1 (from page 161)
in the last session we had defined what one understands by an
algebraic extension and by a transcendental extension/and then
we have theorem twenty five...
(B—3)
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Example 5.2 (from page 161)
...and if we want to prove today the theorem.../we 11 last time
we occupied ourselves with the separation properties/thus we
separated convex sets which have an empty intersection, with
hyperplanes/today we also want to occupy ourselves first
briefly with hyperplanes and then we shall consider...
(B—5)
Example 5.3 (from page 161)
...well now we wanted to consider this Gauss's theory of
periods/and this...tells us the following/we have an odd prime
number d to the power p/odd/and we consider that p is the
divisible polynomial/I denote this as usual n t of p/.../and
we want to solve this thing algebraically...
(B—2)
Example 5.4 (from page 162)
1. Introduction
The question, whether each closed manifold permits a
non-trivial operation of a compact Lie group G, was answered
negatively by many authors... . We show here among others,
that...
(A-7)
Example 5.5 (from page 162)
1. Introduction
Let X be a random variable and let f(t) be its characteristic
function... In this note we characterise the set of null
values of f(t) in the following three cases:...
(A-9)
Example 5.6 (from page 163)
Introduction
In Part I of this paper we considered a generalisation of the
Schmidt-Banach1s system of axioms of the absolute geometry
which is also satisfied by the Minkowski geometry (system of
axioms A). In the following, the part of the system of
axioms A, which goes beyond the Schmidt-Banach system of
axioms, is investigated (i.e. system of axioms A').
(A-12)
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Example 5.7 (from page 163)
On the 9th October 1796, C.F. Gauss notes in his diary the
theorem that for an odd prime number p, each non-trivial
integer linear combination of the primitive p-th...roots is
not equal to zero. This is obviously equivalent to... . If
we generally denote the Q-subspace of C generated by the roots
of a polynomial f(t) as..., then we can express the Gauss's
theorem in the following form:...
(A-3)
Example 5.8 (from page 169)
Since the 'Disquisitiones arithmetica' are, due to their form,
a magnificent classic work, the study of them in the original
can never be advised too strongly. Those, however, who are
initially interested only in learning the content, should also
be grateful, if they are enabled to concentrate their
attention on the content itself by the removal of the external
difficulties. Therefore one may hope that the German version
presented here will be welcomed by many readers.
Example 5.9 (from page 169)
In order to become acquainted with this work I had studied it
to such an extent, that I translated it into German and tried
to explain by words and calculus all those places which for me
were not clear by themselves.
I believed that this preface was indispensible to make sure
that this work is seen from the right perspective; Finally I
express the wish that this first part may find a favourable
reception.
Example 5.10 (from page 170)
We have generally an identical equation... . From this new
solution one can derive in the same way a third one etc. One
easily finds out that when the first solution is in real
numbers, the third one is also like this. It should also be
noted, that when a, b, c do not have any factor in common, the
same is true about a', b', c1...
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Example 5.11 (from page 170)
Since in the following, powers of the root r are considered,
whose exponents are again powers, expressions of this type,
however, cannot be easily represented in print, thus, to
facilitate the printing, we shall use below the following
abbreviations.
Example 5.12 (from page 171)
The aim of the following investigations, which to mention
briefly will not be superfluous...
Example 5.13 (from page 171)
In liquids, as we shall see later, where the movement of
bodies in them is discussed, the resistances by the same speed
are proportional to the density of liquids.
Example 5.14 (from page 171)
Among formulae by which one could easily multiply those given
by myself in the Fundam. nov., it seems to me that the
following one,...,has a remarkable nature.
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